The Malegaon Bomb Blast case has been a focal point of national discourse this week due to its complex intertwining of terrorism allegations, communal implications, political controversy, and prosecutorial challenges. The case attracted significant media and public attention upon the Special Judge A.K. Lahoti’s judgment delivered on 31 July 2025, when all accused were acquitted of major terror-related charges stemming from the September 2008 bombing in Malegaon, Maharashtra.
The accused included prominently named individuals such as Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur and Lt. Col. Prasad Purohit, whose involvement raised intense debate about “saffron terror” and the role of Hindu nationalist groups in acts of terror.
The judgment was notable for its pointed criticism of investigative agencies, primarily the Maharashtra ATS and the NIA, for procedural irregularities in evidence collection and sanctioning, the prevalence of hostile or retracted witness testimony, and failure to establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.
As a result, the verdict stirred sharply divided reactions across political and social groups regarding justice, secularism, and state accountability. The Supreme Court jurisprudence extensively cited in the judgment has further underscored critical legal standards in conspiracy and terror trials, making this ruling a landmark in Indian criminal law.
1. Facts of the Case
On the night of 29 September 2008, an improvised explosive device (IED) placed inside an LML Freedom motorcycle exploded near Shakeel Goods Transport Company on a crowded street between Anjuman Chowk and Bhiku Chowk in Malegaon, Nashik District. The blast occurred around 9:35 pm, coinciding with the holy month of Ramazan and the eve of Navaratri, intensifying communal sensitivities.
The detonation caused extensive devastation, claiming six lives and injuring 101 people. The motorcycle involved bore a fake number plate (MH-15-P-4572) though its original registration was GJ-05-BR-1920, registered to the accused Pragya Singh Thakur (A-1). Forensic investigation revealed the explosive to be military-grade RDX mixed with ammonium nitrate, confirming a sophisticated bombing.
In the immediate aftermath, the area erupted in chaos as large crowds gathered. The angry mob assaulted police personnel and set fire to vehicles and establishments. Multiple FIRs were registered, and law enforcement scrambled to restore order and begin an urgent investigation.
2. Stages of Investigation
The investigation proceeded through distinct phases with involvement of multiple agencies, each leaving an indelible mark on the case trajectory.
2.1 Initial Local Police and Crime Branch Efforts
Immediately following the blast, the Local Crime Branch of Nashik Gramin, assisted by Azad Nagar Police Station officials, undertook initial scene preservation, evidence collection, and victim medical aid. Specialists in bomb detection and forensic science teams took swabs, retrieved splinters, and gathered physical debris, including the motorcycle and number plates. Forensic reports confirmed the presence of RDX and ammonium nitrate.
The initial FIR (Crime No. 130/2008) was filed on 30 September 2008. Injured persons, eye-witnesses, and local residents gave statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of the CrPC. The chaotic scene, however, complicated evidence preservation.
2.2 Transfer to Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS)
Recognition of the blast as a terror act led to transfer of jurisdiction to the Maharashtra ATS. The ATS, under senior officers, opened an extensive investigation focused on an alleged conspiracy by “Abhinav Bharat,” a radical Hindu nationalist organization. ATS named individuals including serving Army officer Lt. Col. Prasad Purohit and religious activist Sadhvi Pragya Thakur as principal accused masterminds.
The ATS investigation involved electronic surveillance, call detail record (CDR) analysis, seizure and forensic examination of laptops, mobiles, and storage devices, as well as narco-analysis tests. Several accused were arrested, and purported “confession” statements were recorded, most of which were later challenged as unlawful and coercive.
The ATS framed the case to depict a coordinated, ideologically driven conspiracy with meetings across Indian cities like Bhopal, Indore, Faridabad, Nashik, and Kolkata. It involved extensive fundraising, arms procurement, and explosive assembly at the accused Sudhakar Chaturvedi’s residence.
2.3 National Investigation Agency (NIA) Takeover
In 2011, the Government of India transferred the cases to the NIA for its centralized oversight over terror and national security matters. The NIA re-investigated the matter, reassessing prior evidence and witness testimonies. A notable number of ATS witnesses described coercion and torture during their earlier statements and many testimonies were recanted, giving rise to credibility concerns regarding the investigation in general.
The NIA substantially narrowed charges, withdrawing Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (MCOCA) provisions, discharging several accused, and focusing on limited The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) and Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) offences. The absconding accused Ramji Kalsangra and Sandeep Dange remained at large. Supplementary charge-sheets and reports reflected a fundamental re-evaluation of the prosecution’s initial sprawling conspiracy.
3. Final Charges and Court Proceedings
By the time of conclusion of trial, the principal accused before the Special NIA Court were Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur (A-1), Ramesh Upadhyaya (A-4), Sameer Kulkarni (A-5), Ajay Rahirkar (A-6), Lt. Col. Prasad Purohit (A-9), Sudhakar Dwivedi (A-10), and Sudhakar Chaturvedi (A-11).
Charges included IPC Sections 120-B (criminal conspiracy), 302 (murder), 307 (attempted murder), 326 (grievous hurt), 324 (voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons), 427 (mischief), and 153-A (promoting enmity). The prosecution also alleged offences under Sections 16 and 18 of the UAPA and Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1980 (ESA).
The trial in the Special Court at Mumbai was a marathon 16-year proceeding involving examination of 323 prosecution witnesses spanning victims, eyewitnesses, police officials, forensic scientists, and technical experts. The defense produced 8 witnesses, mainly comprising senior military personnel, defending the alibi and integrity of accused army officers.
The court heard extensive legal arguments, including contestations of the admissibility and validity of evidence, procedural propriety of sanctions under UAPA and ESA, and allegations of political and communal bias in investigative tactics.
4. About the Judgment
4.1 Court and Parties
The case was tried in the City Civil and Sessions Court, Mumbai, designated as a Special Court under the NIA Act, presided over by Special Judge Abhay Kamalnayan Lahoti. The State of Maharashtra (ATS) and Union of India (NIA) acted as prosecuting agencies. The accused, a mix of civilians and military personnel, faced trial with victim representatives appearing as interveners.
4.2 Observations on Investigation
The court deeply scrutinized the investigation’s quality and credibility. It noted and highlighted wide-scale contradictions and hostility in witness testimonies, with many prime witnesses retracting key parts of their statements over the course of investigation and trial, alleging torture and coercion by ATS. The court also noted conflicts between investigative conclusions arrived at by ATS and NIA.
The forensic chain of custody was found unsatisfactory, particularly regarding the link between the bomb-laden LML motorcycle and accused Pragya Singh Thakur. A large chunk of electronic evidence such as audio recordings and call intercepts were inadequately authenticated or insufficiently corroborated.
Sanction orders essential for trial under UAPA and ESA were found to be defective, marked by procedural lapses and lack of independent application of mind, undermining the validity of prosecutions under these statutes.
4.3 Issues Framed by the Court
The trial court framed twenty-eight (28) key points for determination to assess the prosecution’s case. These included whether the bomb explosion occurred as alleged, resulting in six deaths and over 100 injuries; whether an IED fitted on a stolen LML Freedom motorcycle caused the blast; and whether it was assembled using RDX and ammonium nitrate.
Since allegations of a criminal conspiracy by the accused to disrupt public order and incite communal violence were central to the case, the court examined whether accused persons were present at or near the scene, and if their conduct established guilt. It scrutinised the admissibility and reliability of forensic, electronic, and documentary evidence, including call records, confession statements, and voice samples, alongside procedural aspects like FIR delays, sanction validity, and custody chain.
Further, the court evaluated whether changes in investigation theories or hostile witnesses impaired the prosecution. Lastly, it considered whether each accused was part of the conspiracy within Sections 120B IPC and 10 of the Evidence Act, and whether guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt to justify conviction under UAPA, Explosives Act, and IPC.
6. Judicial Observations, Analysis, and Findings
6.1 Analysis of Evidence and Conspiracy Doctrine
The Court carefully distinguished between the fact of the explosion (Issue 1), which was amply confirmed through medical, forensic, and circumstantial evidence, and the existence of a criminal conspiracy (Issues 5, 6, 27, 28). While six deaths and 101 injuries were conclusively established and the use of RDX and ammonium nitrate in the IED was undisputed, the central question remained: Did the prosecution prove a “meeting of minds” or common unlawful agreement among the accused?
The judgment drew from key Supreme Court precedents, including Jayendra Saraswathy Swamigal v. State of Tamil Nadu[1], which sets out that conspiracy requires cogent evidence of an agreement to commit an illegal act; mere association or parallel conduct does not suffice. Moreover, statements or acts made by co-conspirators are only admissible if the existence of a conspiracy is independently established. The court also cited Bodh Raj v. State of J&am;K[2], which established that circumstantial evidence in conspiracy must form a complete and unbroken chain that points unerringly to the guilt of the accused, to the exclusion of all plausible alternatives.
Applying these standards, the court found that the evidence of secret meetings, planning, or the individualized roles of the accused in the alleged conspiracy was fragmented, inconsistent, and overall vitiated by hostile witnesses and allegations of custodial pressure. While the prosecution pointed to meetings in Bhopal, Faridabad, and Nashik as “overt acts,” witness testimony on actual participants, discussions, and intentions was uncorroborated or contradicted by the same or other witnesses during trial.
6.2 Chain of Custody, Forensics, and Electronic Evidence
Regarding the motorcycle’s ownership and the alleged direct involvement of Pragya Singh Thakur (A-1), forensic and documentary evidence faltered on the chain of custody. Restoration of engine and chassis numbers confirmed the motorcycle’s former registration, but the prosecution failed to establish, with reliable oral or documentary evidence, that she transferred, loaned, or permitted use of the vehicle for the blast. The presence of RDX traces at various sites (homes, devices) and on seized objects was also insufficient in demonstrating unbroken control or knowledge by the present accused.
The court relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra[3] to reinforce circumstantial evidence standards, underscoring that every link in the chain must be independently and conclusively established.
Electronic evidence, including CDRs, intercepted calls, and voice analysis, was examined in light of Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer[4], which mandates compliance with Section 65B of the Evidence Act for admissibility. The court concluded that the authenticity, preservation, and legal chain for such electronic materials were lacking, and evidence was not corroborated by any untainted, direct testimony.
6.3 Hostile Witnesses, Coercion, and Witness Protection
A central problem for the prosecution was the number of key witnesses who retracted earlier statements, some even doing so under oath during trial and specifically alleging police coercion or custodial violence by ATS officers. The court analyzed this factual position in light of Supreme Court authorities like Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli v. State of Gujarat[5] and Mahesh Narain Bhatt v. State of Gujarat[6], which settle the legal position that hostile witnesses may still be relied on if independent corroboration exists; however, in the present case, corroborative chain was broken or absent. The court further cited State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram[7], reiterating that improperly obtained or recanted statements cannot underpin conviction.
6.4 Defective Sanction and Procedural Irregularities
Sanction orders under Section 45 of the UAPA and equivalent provisions of the ESA were found to be defective, being either granted by incompetent authorities or without real application of mind and independent review. This is in contravention of the fundamental requirement set out in Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab[8] and Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat[9]. The court categorically held this as an independent ground vitiating prosecution under these statutes, regardless of sufficiency of other evidence.
6.6 Cumulative Assessment and “Benefit of Doubt”
In conclusion, the court made reference to Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra[10] and State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran[11] to highlight and apply the “benefit of doubt” standard and the cumulative effect of proved and unproved circumstances.
The court held that, except for the occurrence and consequences of the explosion itself, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt on the involvement, agreement, or commission of the charged offences by the present accused, and that all sanction orders for prosecution were defective or vitiated.
7. Parties’ Response and Notable Comments
Advocate Mahesh Jethmalani, representing Sadhvi Pragya, expressed sympathy for the victims’ families, acknowledging their suffering due to the politicization of the case.
Advocate Ranjeet Sangle, representing Sudhakar Dhar Dwivedi noted that out of 323 witnesses, 40 turned hostile, 40 important witnesses were dropped, and 40 died during the lengthy trial. They argued that there was no proof and all accused deserved acquittal.
Advocate Shahid Nadeem, representing the victims, criticized the NIA for not taking strict action against hostile witnesses and conveyed their intention to challenge the verdict in the Bombay High Court. He described how 103 victim witnesses had to appear in Bombay, 300 kilometres from Nashik, enduring difficult conditions like rain and heat to testify.
Special Public Prosecutor Avinash Rasal said further course of action would be considered after reviewing the detailed judgment (over 1,000 pages).
8. Impact and Future Outlook
The case and verdict have become central to debates around communal polarization and the politicization of terror investigations. The outcome leaves lingering questions for the blast victims and the community, fuelling perceptions of injustice and potentially deepening communal distrust, as no one stands convicted for the attack that claimed 6 lives and left over 100 civilians injured.
Both the NIA and the Maharashtra government have stated that they will thoroughly study the judgment before deciding whether to file an appeal. The usual appeal route is from the Special NIA Court to the Bombay High Court and, if necessary, the Supreme Court of India.
[1] AIR 2005 SC 716
[2] (2002) 8 SCC 45
[3] (1984) 4 SCC 116
[4] (2014) 10 SCC 473
[5] (2011) 11 SCC 111
[6] (2009) 10 SCC 141
[7] (1999) 3 SCC 507
[8] AIR 1957 SC 896
[9] (1997) 7 SCC 622
[10] (2006) 10 SCC 681
[11] (1999) 8 SCC 679
