In a criminal writ petition filed before the Bombay High Court seeking quashing and setting aside of the entire proceedings filed under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) along with orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chamorshi, a Single Judge Bench of Justice M.M. Nerlikar partly allowed the petition quashing the complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act in respect of petitioners 2 to 4, but refused to grant any relief to petitioner 1.

The impugned proceedings were initiated by the respondents under Section 12 of the DV Act. The petitioners asserted that no relationship in the nature of marriage existed between the parties. A First Information Report (FIR) was registered by respondent 1 on 07-05-2022 against petitioner 1 under Section 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, alleging sexual abuse. After investigation, a chargesheet was filed on 26-06-2022. On 06-07-2022, petitioner 1 got married to petitioner 4.

Petitioner 1 submitted that he never shared a household with respondent 1, and hence, their relationship could not come under the purview of the definition of ‘domestic relationship’.

The Court referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in D. Velusamy v. Patchaiammal, 2010 DGLS (SC) 835, wherein certain guidelines were carved to interpret the ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ on which petitioner 1 relied to contend that merely spending weekends together would not come under the purview of domestic relationship.

Respondent 1 pointed out that in the impugned order the court had already considered the first ingredient as laid down in D. Velusamy (supra) and had rendered a positive finding stating that she had a relationship with petitioner 1 while granting an interim maintenance to her and her child. It was also contended that she became pregnant, but was forced to abort the child by petitioner 1 and that she gave birth to a girl child after she conceived for a second time.

The Court noted that since petitioner 1 had refused to marry the wife, she approached the police to lodge the said FIR. It appeared to the Court that there was a relationship between the couple and reference was made to the Supreme Court’s decision in Indra Sarma v. V.K. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755. Hence, the Court gathered that the couple had a ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ as they had been together for a long time and a child was born to them.

While taking note of the points framed by the Trial Court to grant interim maintenance, the Court noted that the guidelines laid down in D. Velusamy (supra) were also satisfied. Thus, the Court stated that it was not inclined to quash the complaint proceedings as a child was born out of the relationship.

Further, the Court opined that evidence is required to be led by parties to make an informed decision and that the relationship between petitioners 1 and 4 would be decided by the Trial Court. However, the Court noted the alleged date of marriage petitioners 1 and 4, i.e., 06-07-2022, which demonstrated that the relationship between petitioner 1 and respondent 1 preceded the said marriage.

The Court noted that a mention was made in the said FIR as per which the pregnancy of respondent 1 at the time was of six weeks and the girl child was born on 19-10-2023. Since a DNA report was awaited, the Court had doubts about the paternity of the girl child. Further, since there were no allegations against petitioners 2 to 4, the Court partly allowed the petition by quashing and setting aside the complaint in respect of the said parties.

Lastly, the Court rejected the request for grant of stay to the present order.

Appearances:

For Petitioner – Mr. A.R. Fule

For Respondent – Mr. J.A. Anthony