The Bombay High Court has clarified that the deliberate alteration of official service records by an employee in a position of trust, such as a college Principal, for the purpose of securing a financial advantage, constitutes misconduct involving moral turpitude. When such misconduct is proven through a procedurally fair enquiry, a major penalty like termination from service is not shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the offence.
The High Court, therefore, explained that the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters is limited, and a court will not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless it is arbitrary, outrageous, or falls outside the limits prescribed by law.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Amit Borkar observed that in the context of a teaching institution, ‘misconduct’ refers to a knowing disregard of duties, while ‘moral turpitude’ involves conduct showing dishonesty, abuse of position, or a tendency to secure personal advantage by improper means, which lowers the dignity expected of a teacher.
The Bench noted that not every punishable act involves moral turpitude. The tests are whether the act shocks the moral conscience of society, whether the motive was base, and whether the perpetrator could be considered of a depraved character. The Bench emphasized that when a teacher knowingly manipulates official records for personal gain, the act transcends a mere breach of rules and becomes moral turpitude.
The Bench observed that the central issue was not the settlement or the University’s order regularizing her service, but the Petitioner’s own act of physically altering the service book. There was adequate evidence, including the testimony of office clerks, to establish that the Petitioner had directed the alteration of her service book using correction fluid to show continuous service as Principal.
Also, the Bench noted that the Petitioner’s explanation, that she was acting on guidance from a Head Clerk in the Joint Director’s office, was not supported, as the said Head Clerk denied giving any such instruction. Thus, the Bench held that as the Principal and custodian of institutional records, causing such alterations to be made, especially for personal benefit, is a serious act of misconduct affecting trust in the institution’s functioning.
The Bench rejected the Petitioner’s contention that she gained no monetary benefit, and observed that pay fixation statements and salary slips showed that for an intervening period, her pay was calculated based on the higher scale reflected in the altered service book. The Bench stated that a temporary gain obtained by manipulating official records is still a gain, and the presence of this motive removes the act from a technical lapse to the category of deliberate wrongdoing.
Further, the Bench found that there was a pattern of non-cooperation and resistance to administrative decisions, which amounted to a dereliction of duty. It also found that the circulation of confidential correspondence and the persistent refusal to allot premises for external examinations were not isolated administrative choices but a course of action inconsistent with the responsibilities of a Principal.
Regarding procedural objections, the Bench found the enquiry to be fair, noting that the Petitioner was given a reasonable opportunity to defend herself and that the non-supply of certain documents did not cause real prejudice.
Lastly, the Bench observed that the principle of proportionality requires the penalty to match the seriousness of the act. It noted that conduct involving moral turpitude, such as dishonesty and abuse of authority, affects the trust essential for an educational institution. Thus, the Tribunal had correctly modified the penalty from dismissal to termination, which is a serious but lesser punishment.
Accordingly, the Bench concluded that the punishment of termination was severe but corresponded to the nature of the proved acts and could not be described as arbitrary or shockingly disproportionate, thus warranting no interference under judicial review.
Briefly, the Petitioner was a confirmed Lecturer who was appointed as the Principal of Respondent No. 2 College. During her tenure, she reported alleged irregularities involving the son of the then Secretary of the Respondent No. 1 Trust, leading to a period of conflict. This resulted in her probation being extended, a reversion to the post of Lecturer, and a subsequent suspension in 1997. Following a change in the Trust’s management, her suspension was revoked, and she was reappointed as Principal in 1999 under a compromise.
After another change in the management in 2003 and 2004, where individuals she previously had conflicts with regained control, the Petitioner alleged she was harassed. In 2004, the management initiated a departmental enquiry against her and placed her under suspension. Further, a charge sheet was served, containing thirteen allegations, where the Inquiry Officer found her guilty of all charges, and the management dismissed her from service in 2006.
The Petitioner appealed to the College Tribunal, which held that only four of the thirteen charges were proved but concluded that these were sufficient to hold the Petitioner liable for termination of service, modifying the punishment from dismissal to termination. The four proven allegations were: (i) misrepresenting the continuity of her service as Principal and making false entries in her service book; (ii) blocking the management’s efforts to systematize administration; (iii) misusing her official position by forwarding letters to non-office bearers; and (iv) not making college premises available for other institutions’ examinations.
Appearances:
Senior Advocate Mihir Desaid and Advocate N. R. Bubna, for the Petitioner
Advocates C. R. Sadasivan, Ameeral Hasan, and Itisha Ranka, for the Respondents
