The Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench) has clarified that the requirement of service of a purchase notice under Section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (MRTP Act) is satisfied in substance when the notice is brought to the knowledge of the planning authority (even through a governmental channel), is placed before its competent body (the general body), and is acted upon institutionally. In such circumstances, the planning authority is precluded from defeating the statutory lapse on a hyper-technical plea of ‘no service’, especially when its own subsequent conduct and resolutions demonstrate knowledge and consideration of the notice.
The Court therefore held that a lapse of reservation under Section 127 of the MRTP Act is automatic by operation of law upon the failure of the authority to take concrete steps towards a declaration under acquisition law, within the stipulated period. Service through a governmental channel, which was then acted upon by the general body, was deemed sufficient.
Further, a court exercising PIL jurisdiction will not interfere to compel the continuation of a reservation on a specific parcel of land where the reservation has legally lapsed, particularly when the public interest has been addressed by the planning authority through a subsequent revised development plan that provides for similar public amenities on other lands, added the Court.
The Division Bench comprising Justice Vibha Kankanwadi and Justice Hiten S. Venegavkar clarified that Section 127 of the MRTP Act does not involve a ‘de-reservation by order’ but creates a ‘deeming consequence’. If the planning authority fails to acquire the land within the specified time after a purchase notice is served, the reservation is deemed to have lapsed automatically by operation of law. The impugned communication dated September 21, 2015 was not an exercise of power to de-reserve but merely an administrative intimation recording the statutory position.
The Bench held that the requirement of serving a purchase notice was satisfied in substance. Although the Municipal Council initially denied receipt, the record showed that the State Government forwarded the notice to the council, and the council’s general body placed it for consideration and acted upon it. The Bench reasoned that once the competent authority has demonstrable knowledge of the notice and acts upon it institutionally, it cannot defeat Section 127 on a hyper-technical ground of the initial mode of service.
Further, the Bench observed that steps towards acquisition must be real steps leading to a statutory declaration under acquisition law, not mere correspondence or internal resolutions. The Municipal Council’s resolution citing lack of funds and inability to acquire the land was an explanation for its inaction, not a ‘step’ within the meaning of Section 127.
The Bench also noted that the council’s subsequent institutional conduct, such as resolving that the land was not required for acquisition and treating the reservation as lapsed, precluded it from later re-agitating the plea of ‘no notice’. This conduct was considered relevant not to override the statute, but to assess the credibility of the ‘no service’ contention.
On the PIL’s prayer to maintain reservation and the effect of the Second Revised Plan, the Bench observed that development plans are not immutable and the MRTP Act provides for their revision. Since the second revised development plan had come into force and safeguarded reservations for public amenities elsewhere, the petitioner could not insist that the reservation remain pegged only to the subject lands.
While concluding, the Bench held that judicial interference in planning matters is limited to legality and not the merits of the planning choice, and the petitioner’s insistence amounted to an impermissible attempt to micro-manage town planning through a PIL.
Briefly, the Public Interest Litigation (PIL) concerns lands in Hingoli, originally owned by Usmanshahi Mills, later National Textile Corporation (NTC). The Revised Development Plan of Hingoli, which came into force on July 01, 1994, had designated these lands for various public amenities, including a stadium, high school, primary school, health centre, library, gymnasium, garden, and open space. Subsequently, NTC sold the property to Respondent No. 5, M/s. Nidhi Mercantile Limited.
The core of the dispute arises from a purchase notice, which Respondent No. 5 claims to have issued under Section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (MRTP Act). The Hingoli Municipal Council initially contended that it never received this notice and alleged it was forged. The Respondent No. 5 had previously filed a petition seeking a declaration that the reservation had lapsed, but withdrew it with liberty to pursue alternate remedies. Following this, Respondent No. 5 approached the State Government, which led to the Urban Development Department issuing the impugned communication stating that the reservation on the subject lands had lapsed. Thus, the petitioners filed this PIL to quash this communication and to have the reservation maintained.
The Municipal Council’s position was inconsistent over time. While it initially denied receiving the notice, subsequent records showed that the State Government had forwarded the notice to the council, which was then placed before its general body. The general body, in a meeting in 2012, recorded its inability to acquire the land due to the high cost involved. Later, in a meeting in 2015, after the State’s communication, the council resolved that the reservations had lapsed and the land was not required for acquisition. Meanwhile, a second revised development plan for Hingoli came into force in 2019, which provided for public amenities on other lands.
Appearances:
Advocates D.S. Bagul and P.D. Bachate, for the Petitioners
AGP S.B. Narwade, along with Advocates Vivek Bhavthankar and Anil S. Bajaj, for the Respondents
