The Delhi High Court has clarified that prolonging a marriage that exists merely in law and not in substance, can cause ‘exceptional hardship’, and insisting on the one-year statutory waiting period under Section 14 of the Hindu Marriages Act, 1955 (HMA), serves no meaningful purpose.
The Court found that the marriage was never consummated, the parties have lived separately since its inception, reside in different countries with no reasonable probability of reconciliation, and there are compelling personal circumstances (like caring for aged parents) preventing relocation.
Thus, the Court granted leave to the parties to present their joint petition for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B(1) HMA forthwith, without waiting for the expiry of one year from the date of marriage, and remanded the matter to the concerned Family Court to proceed with the petition under Section 13-B HMA in accordance with the law, expeditiously.
The Division Bench comprising Justice Vivek Chaudhary and Justice Renu Bhatnagar noted the provisions of Section 13-B(1) HMA, which allows for a divorce petition by mutual consent after one year of separate living, and Section 14 HMA, which bars any divorce petition before one year has elapsed since the date of marriage, unless a case of “exceptional hardship” is made out.
Reference was made to the Full Bench judgment in Shiksha Kumari v. Santosh Kumar [MAT.APP. (F.C.) 111/2025], which clarified that the one-year statutory period under Section 13B(1) HMA can be waived by applying the proviso to Section 14(1) of the HMA, provided the court is satisfied that circumstances of ‘exceptional hardship’ exist.
Lastly, the Bench held that the registration of a marriage is a “statutory mandate” and cannot, by itself, be determinative of matrimonial harmony or the viability of the marital relationship. Thus, the Family Court’s reasoning that registration negated the claim of hardship was found to be unsustainable.
Accordingly, the Bench concluded that where a marriage has never been acted upon through cohabitation, “the question of saving such a marriage does not meaningfully arise”.
Briefly, the marriage between the appellant, Nupur Garg, and the respondent, Dwarkesh Ahuja, was solemnized at Arya Samaj Mandir, New Delhi. However, the parties never cohabited, even for a single day, and the marriage was never consummated. Immediately following the marriage, they continued to reside separately at their respective parental homes.
Later, the parties decided to seek dissolution of the marriage by mutual consent due to irreconcilable differences and complete incompatibility discovered immediately after the marriage. It is claimed that the respondent resides in Canada, while the appellant resides in India to take care of her aged parents and is not in a position to relocate. The respondent is also unable to relocate to India.
Accordingly, a joint petition for divorce under Section 13-B(1) of HMA was presented within seven months of the marriage, and an application under Section 14 of the HMA was filed with it, seeking the court’s leave to present the petition before the expiry of the mandatory one-year period.
The Family Court, however, dismissed this application, holding that the parties had not established “exceptional hardship” and had not made sincere efforts to save the marriage.
Appearances:
Advocates Abhishek Wadhwa, Somyaa Gurung and Saurabh Yadav, for the Appellant
Advocate Dhiraj Bhiduri, for the Respondent
