In a criminal petition filed before the Delhi High Court for the grant of leave to appeal against the judgment dated 12-02-2018 by the Metropolitan Magistrate, a Single Judge Bench of Justice Amit Mahajan granted the State leave to appeal and transferred the respondent’s appeal to this Court by exercising power under Section 447 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).
On 20-11-2016, the respondent was driving a truck in a rash and negligent manner. While so, he struck a motorcycle from behind, causing the death of the motorcycle rider (victim). By the impugned judgment, the Metropolitan Magistrate acquitted the respondent of an offence under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and convicted him of an offence under Section 304A of the IPC.
The State contended that the Magistrate had overlooked that the truck was loaded with 8000 bricks weighing 32000 kg, and that the truck’s weight was around 7000 kg, which established his negligence, as the load was 2.5 times the permissible weight.
The Court perused the impugned judgment and stated that although the Magistrate found that the respondent had caused the death of the victim, warranting his conviction under Section 304A of the IPC, he had been acquitted for an offence under Section 279 of the IPC since it was unclear as to how or in what manner the accused had acted by driving the truck prior to the incident. It was noted that the only factor considered by the Magistrate was that the speed of the vehicle was not too high or excessive.
The Court perused the statutory provisions, referred to the Supreme Court’s decisions, and stated that both offences share the common feature of the commission of a rash or negligent act. It was said that in the present matter, the prosecution did not wish to distinguish between the rashness and negligence prior to the accident and during the accident. It was further stated that once it is found that the accused caused death by rash and negligent driving on a public road, the ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 279 are met, as the same is an act of endangerment.
The Court stated that high speed is not a sine qua non to constitute an offence under Section 279 of the IPC, and that the possibility of rashness could not be negated on account of low speed, especially when the accused was driving a heavy vehicle, carrying material exceeding the permissible limit, in a zig-zag manner.
Thus, the Court allowed the petition and granted the State leave to appeal.
Further, the Court stated that the respondent’s petition against his conviction for an offence under Section 304A of the IPC was pending before the Sessions Court and opined that it would be expedient to transfer the respondent’s appeal to this Court so that both appeals can be heard and decided together. Thus, the Court exercised its power under Section 447 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and transferred the appeal to this Court.
The matter has now been listed on 20-03-2026.
Appearances:
For Petitioner – Mr. Ritesh Kumar Bahri (APP), Ms. Divya Yadav
For Respondent – Ms. Vrinda Bhandari (DHCLSC), Ms. Nitya Jain
