The two judgments-one pronounced on 16 February 2026[1] and the other on 27 February 2026[2], though arising from distinct factual circumstances, converge upon a common theme: the systemic strain upon the High Courts of India due to inadequate judicial strength, infrastructure, and support staff. In the first judgment, the Division Bench of Allahabad High court lamented that the appellant had languished in prison for nearly twenty-three years before being acquitted, observing that his “real ordeal” would begin only upon release. The Court underscored that mere conferences and meetings cannot remedy the malaise, what is required is hard work supported by adequate judicial manpower.
While delivering Judgment in Raees(supra), the Division Bench noted – “Appellant is languishing in jail since last about 23 years. He is directed to be set free forthwith, if not wanted in any other case… Before parting with this case we feel that real punishment of appellant has not come to an end. His real ordeal will begin after he is released from jail… It is sad commentary on our criminal justice delivery system and requires introspection and real remedial measures like increasing number of judges, their supporting staff and infrastructure. There is not short cut to hard work required for deciding criminal appeals. Just holding conferences and meetings can never ameliorate the situation.”
This touching reflection underscores how justice delayed becomes justice denied, not by judicial indifference but by systemic insufficiency. Similarly, in Chandralekha Singh(supra), the learned Single Judge candidly recorded his physical exhaustion after hearing matters late into the evening, compelled by the Supreme Court’s direction to expedite, and confessed his inability to dictate judgment immediately due to fatigue. These reflections are not incidental, they are judicial self-disclosures of the crippling burden borne by judges, compelled to balance the scales of justice under conditions of scarcity and strain.
The backdrop to these pronouncements is the judge-population ratio in India, which remains gravely compromised. With approximately 21 judges per million population, India lags far behind advanced jurisdictions where ratios often exceed 50–100 judges per million. The Law Commission of India, in its 120th Report (July 1987)[3], had recommended raising the ratio to at least 50 judges per million to ensure timely justice. The Commission observed:
“The judge strength in India is grossly inadequate. Unless the ratio is raised to at least 50 judges per million population, the arrears cannot be tackled and timely justice cannot be ensured.”
Yet, even decades later, India continues to languish at approximately 21 judges per million population, far below the recommended standard and significantly behind advanced jurisdictions where ratios often exceed 50–100 judges per million. This inadequacy directly translates into mounting arrears, delayed trials, and prolonged incarceration, as exemplified in the case where an appellant spent over two decades in prison before his acquittal. The Rule of Law, which is the sentinel of liberty, falters when the machinery of justice is clogged by arrears and crippled by vacancies.
The Supreme Court of India has, on a number of occasions, emphasized the urgency of filling judicial vacancies. In Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of U.P.[4], the Supreme Court of India confronted the chronic problem of judicial arrears and the inadequacy of judge strength. The Court recognized that pendency of cases could not be reduced merely by procedural innovations or administrative adjustments; the root cause lay in the structural deficit of judges relative to the population and case load.
The Court directed both the Union and the States to take immediate and concrete steps to augment the strength of judges, emphasizing that the constitutional promise of timely justice was being undermined by vacancies and delays in appointments. The Bench observed that unless the sanctioned strength was filled expeditiously, the justice delivery system would continue to falter, resulting in denial of justice to citizens. The Court also highlighted that the judge-population ratio in India was far below international standards, and that the Law Commission’s recommendations to raise the ratio had not been implemented in earnest.
The significance of this pronouncement lies in its constitutional framing: the Court treated the filling of judicial vacancies not as an administrative convenience but as a constitutional necessity flowing from Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty) and Article 39A (equal justice and free legal aid). By linking pendency to fundamental rights, the Court elevated the issue of judge strength to one of constitutional urgency. Further, In Malik Mazhar Sultan v. U.P. Public Service Commission[5], the Supreme Court was seized of the chronic delay in filling posts in the subordinate judiciary, which forms the backbone of the justice delivery system. Recognizing that pendency at the trial level is the fountainhead of arrears in appellate courts, the Court laid down specific timelines and a structured calendar for the recruitment and appointment of judges in the district and subordinate courts. The Court mandated that the process of issuing advertisements, conducting examinations, interviews, and final appointments must be completed within a fixed schedule, thereby ensuring that vacancies do not remain unfilled for years. The Court stressed that delay in appointments is not a mere administrative lapse but a direct denial of justice, since every vacant post translates into thousands of cases left unheard and litigants left in limbo.
This pronouncement was a watershed moment for the Indian judicial history because it transformed the issue of judicial vacancies from an administrative concern into a constitutional imperative. By linking the filling of posts to the fundamental right of access to justice under Article 21 and the directive principle under Article 39A, the Court underscored that the State bears a positive obligation to ensure that courts are adequately manned. The timelines laid down in Malik Mazhar Sultan(supra) were intended to institutionalize efficiency and prevent the executive from treating judicial appointments as expendable or secondary.
Together, Malik Mazhar Sultan(supra) and subsequent pronouncements form a constitutional reminder that the State’s obligation is not limited to creating posts but extends to ensuring that they are filled expeditiously, that infrastructure is augmented, and that courts are empowered to discharge their sacred duty. The judiciary has repeatedly emphasized that the judge-population ratio in India is grossly inadequate, and unless appointments are made in a timely manner, the constitutional promise of justice will remain unfulfilled.
In essence, these pronouncements elevate the issue of judicial vacancies to the level of constitutional accountability. They remind us that the temple of justice cannot stand tall if its pillars are left incomplete, and that the majesty of law is diminished when courts are crippled by vacancies. The State must therefore act with urgency, for every day of delay is a day of denial to countless citizens awaiting justice.
These judgments are not merely adjudications of individual causes but mirror reflections of institutional distress. They remind us that the temple of justice cannot stand tall if its pillars are few and frail. The majesty of law is diminished when judges, overburdened and fatigued, are compelled to reserve judgments not for want of merit but for want of strength, and the promise of justice enshrined in our Constitution becomes a mirage when systemic inadequacy delays its delivery. The curative lies not in rhetoric but in expeditious filling of sanctioned posts, augmentation of infrastructure, and strengthening of support staff.
Unless the judge-population ratio is elevated to a dignified standard, the constitutional pledge of justice will remain unfulfilled for countless citizens. These judgments, therefore, stand as judicial cries for relief, solemn reminders that justice delayed by systemic inadequacy is justice denied, and that the State must act with urgency to restore the majesty of the Rule of Law.
References:
SM Haider Rizvi, Advocate, Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow.
[1] Raees v State of U.P. (Criminal Appeal No. 83/2005), Judgment and Order Dated 16.02.2026.
[2] Chandralekha Singh v. Canara Bank Regional Office, Lucknow (Matters under Article 227 No. 3164/2025), Judgment and Order Dated 27.02.2026.
[3] https://www.scribd.com/doc/317018372/Law-Commission-Report-No-120-Manpower-planning-in-Judiciary-A-Blueprint
[4] 2012 (2) SCC 688
[5] AIRONLINE 2006 SC 345