1. Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., (2025) 7 SCC 1

Before constitutional bench: Sanjiv Khanna CJI, B.R. Gavai CJI, P.V. Sanjay Kumar J, K.V., Viswanathan J, A.G. Masih J.

Brief Facts

Gayatri Balasamy was appointed as Vice President (M&A Integration Strategy) at ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. on 27 April 2006. On 24 July 2006, she tendered her resignation alleging sexual harassment by the Chief Executive Officer of the company, though the resignation did not take effect and was followed by letters of termination issued about a year later. Criminal complaints were filed by both sides, including allegations under the Indian Penal Code and the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, 1998 by Balasamy, and counter-complaints of defamation and extortion by the company. Upon the matter reaching the Supreme Court, the parties were referred to arbitration, pursuant to which an arbitral tribunal awarded a sum of ?2 crore in favour of Balasamy. Dissatisfied, she invoked Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Madras High Court. A Single Judge enhanced the compensation by ?1.6 crore, which was subsequently reduced by the Division Bench to ?50,000, leading Balasamy to approach the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition.

Issues Involved

The principal issues before the Court were whether the powers of a court under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 include the power to modify an arbitral award; if such a power of modification exists, whether it can be exercised only in cases where the arbitral award is severable and a part thereof is capable of being modified; whether the power to set aside an award under Section 34 of the Act, being a larger power, includes within it the power to modify an arbitral award and, if so, to what extent; whether the power to modify an arbitral award can be read into or implied from the power to set aside an award under Section 34; and whether the judgment of this Court in Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem (2021) 9 SCC 1 lays down the correct law, in light of earlier decisions in which courts had either modified or accepted modification of arbitral awards.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

By a 4:1 majority, the Constitution Bench held that Courts exercising power under Section 34 and Courts hearing appeals thereunder have no power to ‘modify’ an award. The Court clarified that the power to modify is not a lesser power to that of the power to set aside, as the two operate in separate spheres and are not of the same genus. It was further held that the inherent power under Section 151 CPC cannot be used to modify awards, nor can the doctrine of implied powers be invoked, as doing so would be contrary to the express statutory scheme of Section 34. The Court ruled that Article 142 of the Constitution cannot be exercised to give a go-by to substantive statutory provisions, and therefore cannot be used to modify arbitral awards. While affirming that interest awarded also cannot be modified, the Court recognised a narrow exception permitting correction of computation, clerical and typographical errors or other errors of similar nature”on the principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit. The Court also held that severance of invalid portions of an award is permissible under Section 34, and that the power under Section 34(4) to remit matters to the arbitral tribunal may be exercised even suo motu. The judgment in M. Hakeem was affirmed as laying down the correct law, subject only to the limited exception recognised in the present judgment. Justice K.V. Viswanathan dissented.

2. Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor & the President of India, In re, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2795

Before constitutional bench: B.R. Gavai CJI, Surya Kant CJI, Vikram Nath J, P.S. Narasimha J, A.S. Chandurkar J

Brief Facts

On 13 May 2025, the President of India, Droupadi Murmu, invoked the Supreme Court’s advisory jurisdiction under Article 143 of the Constitution, seeking its opinion on questions of constitutional importance concerning the powers of the Governor and the President under Articles 200 and 201. The reference arose in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s judgment in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025), where the Court had held the Governor’s prolonged inaction on ten State Bills to be illegal, prescribed timelines for assent, and exercised powers under Article 142 to deem assent to the pending Bills. The judgment attracted criticism for allegedly breaching the separation of powers, particularly since Articles 200 and 201 do not prescribe timelines or modes of exercise of discretion. Against this backdrop, the President referred fourteen questions seeking clarity on the justiciability of gubernatorial and presidential discretion, judicial regulation of constitutional powers, and the scope of Article 142. A Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice B.R. Gavai was constituted to answer the reference.

Issues Involved

The reference raised questions as to the constitutional powers and limitations of the Governor under Article 200; whether the decisions of the Governor and the President under Articles 200 and 201 are subject to judicial review; whether courts can regulate the exercise of constitutional powers by prescribing timelines or procedures where the Constitution is silent; the scope of the Supreme Court’s advisory jurisdiction under Article 143 and its constitutional powers more generally; when a State Bill becomes law and whether courts may intervene prior to assent; and whether the Supreme Court can exercise its discretionary powers under Article 142 to substitute or supplant the constitutional functions of the Governor or the President, including by granting “deemed assent” to Bills.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

The Constitution Bench opined that the Governor has only three constitutional options under Article 200, namely, to assent to the Bill, to reserve it for the consideration of the President, or to withhold assent and return the Bill to the Legislature with comments, the last option being unavailable in the case of Money Bills. While the Governor enjoys discretion in choosing among these options and is not bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, the discharge of the Governor’s function under Article 200 is not justiciable, and courts cannot undertake a merits review of such decisions. However, in cases of prolonged, unexplained and indefinite inaction, courts may issue a limited mandamus directing the Governor to discharge his constitutional function within a reasonable time, without commenting on the merits. The Court clarified that Article 361 provides personal immunity to the Governor, but does not oust the Court’s jurisdiction over the constitutional office itself. Importantly, the Court held that in the absence of constitutionally prescribed timelines, it is impermissible for courts to judicially prescribe timelines for the exercise of powers under Articles 200 and 201. Applying the same reasoning, the Court held that the President’s assent under Article 201 is also not justiciable, and judicially imposed timelines are constitutionally impermissible. The Court further ruled that courts cannot adjudicate upon the contents of a Bill before it becomes law, and that proceedings under Article 143 do not amount to judicial adjudication. The Bench also clarified that Article 142 cannot be used to substitute or supplant the constitutional powers of the Governor or the President, and that the Constitution does not recognise the concept of deemed assent. A State law cannot come into force without the Governor’s assent under Article 200, and the Governor’s legislative role cannot be supplanted by any other constitutional authority. Several ancillary questions were returned unanswered as being irrelevant or overly broad in the context of the reference.

3. Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2257

Before J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Brief Facts

In Jane Kaushik v. Union of India considered a writ petition filed by a transwoman teacher who was dismissed by private schools in Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat after she disclosed her gender identity. The petitioner alleged systemic discrimination, institutional apathy, and the failure of the Union and State governments to effectively implement the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 and the 2020 Rules. The case brought into sharp focus the gap between the constitutional recognition of transgender rights in NALSA v. Union of India (2014) and their actual realisation on the ground. The petitioner also challenged the lack of grievance redressal mechanisms, absence of equal opportunity policies, and the omission of reasonable accommodation frameworks, which together rendered her fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 illusory.

Issues Involved

The Court framed the issues as whether a positive obligation is cast upon the Union and the States under the Constitution of India and the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 read with the Rules to prevent discrimination against transgender persons; whether the inaction and omissions on the part of the Union and State authorities led to discrimination against the petitioner; whether the actions and omissions of the private educational institutions resulted in discrimination against the petitioner on the ground of her gender identity; and if the answers to the foregoing issues were in the affirmative, whether the petitioner was entitled to compensation for the violation of her fundamental rights.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

The Supreme Court held that a positive obligation is cast upon the Union of India and the States under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, as well as under the 2019 Act and the Rules, to prevent discrimination against transgender persons and to secure their “full and effective participation in society.” The Court found that the inaction, omissions and bureaucratic apathy of the Union and the concerned States had directly contributed to discrimination faced by the petitioner, observing that it is not only State action but also State inaction that is amenable to constitutional scrutiny when it results in the failure to protect fundamental rights. The Court further held that the conduct of the private schools amounted to discrimination on the ground of gender identity, noting that the 2019 Act gives horizontal application to constitutional rights by imposing enforceable duties on both State and non-State actors.

The Bench clarified that reasonable accommodation is implicit in the 2019 Act and constitutes a positive obligation, notwithstanding the absence of an express statutory mechanism akin to the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. It reiterated that no transgender person is required to seek an employer’s permission to undergo gender-affirming procedures such as SRS, save where the nature of employment is intrinsically gender-specific. Holding that denial of compensation would render fundamental rights a “hollow promise,” the Court awarded compensation of ?50,000 each against the two schools, the Union government, and the States of Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat, on the ground that the petitioner’s suffering was a direct consequence of constitutional and statutory failures. The Court also constituted an Advisory Committee to frame a comprehensive equal opportunity policy, marking a shift from mere recognition of ‘rights’ to insistence on enforceable institutional ‘responsibility’.

4. Om Prakash v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 47

Before M.M. Sundresh and Aravind Kumar, JJ

Brief Facts

The case arose from the conviction of Om Prakash for an offence of culpable homicide amounting to murder committed in 1994. During his trial in 2001, the appellant stated his age as 20 years, on the basis of which the trial court presumed him to be a major and sentenced him to death. This conviction and sentence were successively upheld by the High Court and the Supreme Court, and even his review, curative and mercy petitions were rejected. However, during the pendency of his mercy petition before the President of India, medical evidence including an ossification test and age certificate conclusively established that the appellant was approximately 14 years old at the time of the offence. Despite this, the courts had consistently failed to properly adjudicate his plea of juvenility, leading to prolonged incarceration of nearly 25 years before the matter was finally reconsidered.

Issues Involved

The principal issue before the Supreme Court was whether a plea of juvenility under Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 could be entertained even after the final disposal of the case, including dismissal of review and curative petitions, and whether the failure of the courts to determine such a plea at earlier stages amounted to a miscarriage of justice. Ancillary to this was the question of whether judicial errors and procedural lapses could deprive a person of the statutory protections guaranteed to juveniles, and whether granting relief would amount to impermissible interference with the President’s commutation order.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

The Supreme Court held that there was no dispute that the appellant was a juvenile at the time of the offence and that the consistent failure of the courts to determine his plea of juvenility constituted a grave miscarriage of justice. Interpreting Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act purposively, the Court held that a plea of juvenility can be raised at any stage, even after final disposal, and must be given full effect irrespective of prior procedural lapses. Applying the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, the Court ruled that judicial mistakes cannot prejudice the rights of an accused under a social welfare legislation. Accordingly, while maintaining the conviction, the Court set aside the sentence to the extent it exceeded the maximum permissible punishment under the Juvenile Justice law, ordered the appellant’s release, and directed the State Legal Services Authority to facilitate his rehabilitation and reintegration, emphasizing the State’s obligation to protect his right to life and dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution.

5. Amlesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1370

Before Sanjay Karol and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.

Brief Facts

The appeal arose from an interim order passed by the Patna High Court while considering the appellant’s application for regular bail in a case concerning the disappearance of his wife. An FIR was registered in August 2022 alleging dowry harassment, wrongful confinement and abduction, with suspicion that the appellant and his family were responsible for the wife’s disappearance. While the appellant claimed that his wife had gone missing during a journey and that he had lodged a missing complaint, she remained untraced. His bail application was rejected by the Sessions Court relying, inter alia, on confessional statements of co-accused. When the appellant approached the High Court for bail, the High Court accepted the submission of the investigating officer that narco-analysis tests would be conducted on all accused persons and witnesses, and adjourned the matter. Aggrieved by the acceptance of this submission, the appellant approached the Supreme Court contending that such a direction violated settled constitutional law.

Issues Involved

The Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court could have accepted the investigating officer’s submission to conduct narco-analysis tests while adjudicating a bail application; whether the report of a voluntary narco-analysis test or information derived therefrom could form the sole basis of conviction in the absence of other corroborative evidence; and whether an accused possesses an indefeasible right to seek a narco-analysis test as part of the right to lead evidence in defence.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in accepting the submission to conduct narco-analysis tests, as involuntary administration of such tests is unconstitutional and violates Articles 20(3) and 21, as conclusively laid down in Selvi v. State of Karnataka. The Court further held that even voluntary narco-analysis tests, though permissible subject to strict safeguards, cannot have their reports admitted as substantive evidence, and any information discovered pursuant thereto under Section 27 of the Evidence Act cannot, by itself, form the sole basis of conviction. On the question of whether an accused has a right to demand such a test, the Court clarified that there is no indefeasible right to undergo narco-analysis; at best, an accused may voluntarily seek it at an appropriate stage, subject to judicial scrutiny of consent, safeguards and surrounding circumstances. Consequently, the impugned order of the High Court was set aside and the bail application was directed to be decided independently in accordance with law.

6. XXX v. Union of India 2025 INSC 943

Before Dipankar Datta J, A.G. Masih J

Brief Facts

In March 2025, a fire incident at then Delhi High Court Judge Yashwant Varma’s official residence led to the discovery of wads of burnt currency. Former CJI Sanjiv Khanna constituted a three-member in-house committee to investigate, which concluded that Justice Varma had “tacit or active control” over the store room where the cash was found. Justice Varma, later transferred to the Allahabad High Court, challenged the committee’s report before the Supreme Court through a writ petition in which he concealed his identity. He alleged procedural irregularities, including the uploading of photos and video footage of the burnt currency, and questioned the constitutionality of the in-house procedure, the authority of the CJI to forward findings, and his lack of a personal hearing. The petition was heard on 30 July 2025, with Senior Advocates Kapil Sibal and Mukul Rohatgi representing him, while the Court reserved judgment until 7 August 2025.

Issues Involved

In The Supreme Court considered multiple issues: (i) whether Justice Varma’s writ petition could be entertained in view of his belated approach and conduct, (ii) whether the in-house procedure has legal sanction, (iii) whether the inquiry under the procedure constitutes a parallel, extra-constitutional mechanism for judge removal, (iv) whether Paragraphs 5(b) and 7 of the procedure violated Articles 124, 125, 217, 218 or any fundamental rights of a High Court Judge, (v) whether the CJI or the committee deviated from the procedure, and (vi) whether the requirement to forward the committee report to the President and Prime Minister is constitutional.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

The Bench dismissed Justice Varma’s petition, holding that the in-house procedure is constitutionally valid and legally sanctioned, filling a gap in the Constitution regarding judicial accountability short of impeachment. The Court observed that the procedure is preliminary and fact-finding, not punitive, and does not prevent the Judge from exercising rights in subsequent parliamentary removal proceedings. The Bench held that the CJI has a significant moral and constitutional responsibility to forward reports to the President and Prime Minister and may endorse findings in appropriate cases, and that lack of a personal hearing is not a procedural violation. Justice Varma’s belated challenge was considered not bona fide, and his acquiescence to the uploading of evidence did not vitiate the inquiry. The Court emphasized that judicial independence requires accountability and that the procedure strikes a legitimate balance between the two.

7. Surendra Koli v. The State Of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 INSC 1308

Before the bench comprising Justice Uday Umesh Lalit and Justice Vineet Saran, Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Brief Facts

The case originated from the infamous Nithari murders in Noida, where children had gone missing and turned up dead, resulting in the arrest of Surendra Koli, a domestic help, and his master, Moninder Singh Pandher. The trial court had sentenced Koli to death, and this was affirmed by the Allahabad High Court based largely on his confessional statements and the recovery of bones.

Issues Involved

Whether the conviction could be sustained when the prosecution relied mainly on inadmissible confessions and weak circumstantial evidence. The Court examined whether the evidence met the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt or entitled the accused to the benefit of doubt.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

The Supreme Court has later overturned that conviction in this specific instance. The bench consisting of Justice Uday Umesh Lalit and Justice Vineet Saran held that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, since confessions made to the police (and so illegal under the provisions of the law), recoveries were dubious and could not be reliably ascribed to the victim, forensic science evidence was inconclusive, and that serious defaults were noticed during investigations; nevertheless, it acquitted Koli while reaffirming that a fair inquiry and scrupulous observance of evidence standards must characterize criminal trials.

8. Asaduddin Owaisi v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2459

Before a Division Bench of CJI B.R. Gavai and Justice A.G. Masih, Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Brief Facts

The Waqf (Amendment) Act of 2025 was contested before the Supreme Court through a number of petitions filed before the court, including one filed by Asaduddin Owaisi, challenging the constitutional validity of a number of new provisions. The petitioners claimed that a number of new provisions contravened rights over religious practice, minority rights, as well as the autonomy of Waqf institutions. The petitioners directed their attack at a number of new provisions having to do with the eligibility of a person to establish a waqf, the decision of property disputes, the membership of Waqf boards, as well as the prohibition of a number of kinds of land.

Issues Involved

1. Whether the provision under Section 3(r) of the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, requiring an individual to be a practitioner of the Islam religion for at least five years before forming a waqf, is violative of Articles 14, 25, and 26 of the Indian Constitution.
2. Whether Section 3C, which vests power in government revenue officers to decide disputes relating to waqf property, violates the doctrine of separation of powers and the right to judicial adjudication.
3. Whether mandatory registration of waqfs and restrictions on declaring protected monuments or tribal land as waqf infringe constitutional or statutory rights.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

In September 2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed the interim judgement in petitions seeking a blanket stay on the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025. While the Court refused a general stay, it stayed specific controversial provisions. The Bench stayed Section 3(r) that said one must practice Islam for at least five continuous years before creating a Waqf. The Bench thought there were no verification mechanisms in the Act. However, it added that the provision can be enforced once there are mechanisms as it was not prima facie arbitrary or discriminatory. It also stayed Section 3C, holding that entrusting property title disputes to the government’s revenue officers violates the separation of powers. The Court ruled that such disputes require judicial or quasi-judicial resolution.

While confirming compulsory registration of Waqfs, and that only owners were to dedicate properties, the Court retained the bans on declaring protected monuments or tribal lands as Waqf. On the issue of administration of the Waqf Boards, the Court placed ceilings on non-Muslim representation at four in the Central Council and three in State Boards and suggested that wherever possible, the CEOs come from the Muslim community.

9. Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Power and Steel Limited, 2025 SCC Online SC 1010

Before a three-judge Bench comprising Chief Justice of India B.R. Gavai, Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, and Justice K. Vinod Chandran, Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Brief Facts

In this case, Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd. (BPSL) was undergoing an insolvency process as per the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and JSW Steel’s resolution plan with a value of ?19,700 crore was sanctioned back in 2021. It got delayed because of enforcement cases filed by the ED, administrative hurdles, and opposition from the past promoters. In 2025, the case was dealt by a two-judge Bench, deciding upon the liquidation of BPSL on the grounds of failure to execute the resolution plan as per the time frame set by the law. It got challenged, and this time a three-judge Bench reassessed as to whether there was an applicability of the principle of liquidation despite having done substantial compliance.

Issues Involved

Whether Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd. needs to be liquidated for the failure in implementation of the resolution plan despite approval being accorded in pursuance of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, or whether such failure owing to circumstances that are beyond the control of the resolution applicant, could result in continuation of the process of resolution in keeping with the intention of revival of the corporate entity.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

A two-judge Bench of Justice Bela M. Trivedi and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma on 2 May, 2025 directed the liquidation of Bhushan Steel despite its ?19,700 crore acquisition by JSW in 2021 under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). This was criticized as undermining the resolution process and the scheme under the IBC.

Overturning the Order, a three-judge Bench reiterated that the IBC’s main objective is the revival of sick companies and liquidation as a last resort. The Bench espoused submissions of JSW and the CoC that delays were caused because of attachments by the Enforcement Directorate, regulatory impediments and obstruction by the former promoters. It held that JSW should not be deprived of its right due to factors beyond its control. The Court held that the IBC is not a mere check list but a living scheme which demands both speed and sensitivity to economic realities.

10. Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1330

Before a Division Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice K.V. Chandran.

Brief Facts

The case emerged out of a constitutional challenge to the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, in which the Madras Bar Association asserted that the Parliament had repealed the clauses regarding the appointment, tenures, qualifications, and service terms of the members of the tribunals that had previously been set aside by the Supreme Court in the case of Madras Bar Association (2020) and Madras Bar Association (2021). The petitioners submitted that in spite of the judicial directions, the Parliament had attempted to circumvent the binding effect of the constitutional decisions by reinstating the same provisions through the process of legislative reform.

Issues Involved

1. Whether Parliament could reintroduce provisions previously declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court through the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021.
2. Whether the impugned provisions relating to appointment, tenure, qualifications, and service conditions of tribunal members violated judicial independence and separation of powers.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

A Division Bench of the Justices B.R. Gavai and K.V. Chandran struck down the essential provisions of the Tribunals-Reforms Act, 2021, holding that the Parliament had brought back the provisions which were previously declared to be unconstitutional by the Court. They also held that the principles and directions laid down in Madras Bar Association-4 (2020) and Madras Bar Association-5 (2021) shall remain applicable to all matters pertaining to appointment, qualifications, terms, and conditions of service of the members and chairmen of the tribunals.

Insofar as it is pertinent to place this particular challenge within the jurisprudence that already exists within this tribunal, “The Judgement observes that this challenge cannot be treated in isolation, issues pertaining to appointment, qualifications, tenure, service conditions having been already determined by this Court in S.P. Sampath Kumar vs. Union of India 1987, Madras Bar Association 2014, and Rojer Mathew 2019”. On the substance, the court holds that a number of challenged clauses were copied worded from the former Tribunals Reforms Ordinance. And where a law has errors that can be remedied by mere relocation, it can no longer be described as a legislative override “in the strictest sense.” It reiterated that tribunals discharge functions traditionally exercised by courts and must therefore be governed by the same standards of independence. Striking down Sections 3 to 7 of the Act, the Court extended protection to appointments made prior to the enactment of the 2021 Act.

11. Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 799

Before the Division bench of Supreme Court comprising Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh.

Brief Facts

In this particular case, the petitioner, Vihaan Kumar, was arrested in relation to offenses under the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner appealed the legality of his-arrest to the Supreme Court, relying on a prospective violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Indian Constitution. In the case, the petitioner argued that the cause of the-arrest was not communicated to him at the time of the-arrest and that the petitioner was treated in an inhuman manner due to being handcuffed and shackled to a hospital bed. In contrast, the State argued that the cause of the-arrest was orally conveyed, procedural regularity was complied with, and any procedural irregularity in the-arrest was waived by the subsequent remand and chargesheet.

Issues Involved

Whether the failure to communicate the grounds of arrest to the appellant violated Article 22(1) of the Constitution.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

The Division Bench of the Supreme Court held that the legality of the arrest of the appellant for the offences under the IPC on the allegations of the violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution for the non-communication of the reasons for the arrest and ill-treatment while in custody; the appellant argued that he was neither told the reason for the arrest nor handcuffed and chained to the hospital bed, while the State argued that there was procedural compliance and that the further remand and filing of the chargesheet cured the illegality. The appeal has been held to be allowed as the arrest was illegal since the State did not satisfy the requirement that the reason for the arrest must be communicated as soon as may be under Article 22(1), and that the appellant’s handcuffing and chaining to the hospital bed violated the dignity provision under Article 21. The Court repelled the contention that the subsequent orders of remand or the filing of the chargesheet could legitimatize the unconstitutional arrest, as violations of the constitution at inception Render all Subsequent Custody nugatory. Consequently, the Court ordered the appellant’s release, quashed all remand orders, and directed the State to frame guidelines prohibiting such custodial practices, reaffirming that procedural safeguards are essential to protect personal liberty and cannot be treated as mere formalities.

12. City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price, In re, (2025) 9 SCC 12

Before a Division Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan.

Brief Facts

The Supreme Court of the land took suo motu cognizance of a report published by a newspaper on the sharp and alarming increase of attacks by stray dogs and specifically of children, senior citizens, and vulnerable members of society within the National Capital Region (NCR). It was disclosed that there is a steep rise in dog bite cases and deaths, and a complete failure of the administrative authorities to effectively control animal populations. The Court analyzed the implementation of the Animal Birth Control Rules of 2023 by all concerned authorities and found complete administrative inertia on the part of those responsible, continued to release stray dogs on to the streets, and absence of adequate facilities.

Issues Involved

1. Whether the continued presence and release of stray dogs in public spaces under the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 violates the fundamental rights of citizens under Articles 19(1)(d) and 21 of the Constitution.
2. Whether the State’s failure to effectively control the stray dog population amounts to a breach of its constitutional duty to protect life, safety, and free movement.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

The court declared that the “State’s failure to regulate the stray dog population clearly constitutes a serious violation of the right to life and the liberty of movement, as it cannot prioritize public safety at the cost of what it calls misguided compassion and administrative tardiness.” The court disagreed with the idea that the sterilization and release programs sufficiently mitigated this risk when it declared that “life and dignity take precedence over all other considerations” and that “animals cannot be accorded ‘rights’ akin to those of human beings.” The court declared that the continued release of stray dogs on city streets was unconstitutional and ordered that stray dogs be removed “immediately from public spaces,” that “sufficient shelters” be provided with a focus on “sterilization and adequate care without re-releasing them into the streets,” and that “severe punishment” should be provided to those obstructing this policy. The court clearly believed that effective governance requires an active protection of citizens, particularly those who are vulnerable to harm, and that the continued failure to take meaningful action when faced with an increased risk of harm constituted a breach by the State of its constitutional duty under Article 21.

13. Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1578

Before M.M. Sundresh and N. Kotiswar Singh, Jj.

Brief Facts

It was an interlocutory application filed by the State of Haryana seeking modification of a prior Supreme Court order dated 21.01.2025 concerning service of notices under Section 41A CrPC (now Section 35 BNSS). The Supreme Court dismissed the application and confirmed the earlier directive.The State of Haryana challenged the January 2025 order, which mandated all States and UTs to issue Standing Orders requiring police to serve notices under Section 41A CrPC/Section 35 BNSS strictly per prescribed CrPC/BNSS modes, excluding WhatsApp or other electronic means. This stemmed from earlier Delhi High Court guidelines in Rakesh Kumar v. Vijayanta Arya DCP (2021 SCC OnLine Del 5629) and Amandeep Singh Johar v. State NCT Delhi (2018 SCC OnLine Del 13448), upheld in the original Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022) 10 SCC 51. Haryana argued electronic service prevents evasion and saves resources, citing BNSS provisions like Sections 64(2) proviso, 71, and 530.

Issues Involved

Whether notices under Section 35 BNSS (equivalent to Section 41A CrPC) can be served via electronic modes like WhatsApp, given BNSS provisions allowing electronic service for court summons (Sections 63, 64, 71) and certain investigation steps (Sections 94, 193). The Court examined if electronic service aligns with legislative intent, distinguishing investigation notices (executive acts impacting liberty) from court summons (judicial acts). It also considered Article 21 protections against arbitrary arrests.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

The Supreme Court held that electronic communication (e.g., WhatsApp) cannot serve as a valid mode for Section 35 BNSS notices, as BNSS consciously excludes investigations from electronic procedures under Section 530 to safeguard personal liberty under Article 21. Notices must follow traditional personal service per Chapter VI BNSS/CrPC, unlike court summons requiring seals/digital signatures or specific investigation reports. IA No. 63691/2025 was dismissed, confirming the 21.01.2025 order and upholding prior guidelines.

14. BGM and M-RPL-JMCT JV v. Eastern Coalfields Limited 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1471

Before P.S. Narasimha and Manoj Misra, JJ.

Brief Facts

It involves a dispute over whether Clause 13 of a contract for transportation and handling of goods constitutes a valid arbitration agreement under Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against the Calcutta High Court’s rejection of an application under Section 11 for arbitrator appointment.

Appellant BGM and respondent Eastern Coalfields Limited entered a contract for transportation/handling of goods, where disputes arose during execution. Clause 13 of the General Terms and Conditions (part of the e-tender notice) outlined a multi-stage dispute resolution: company-level settlement, then Area CGM/GM, then a Director-chaired committee, followed by AMRCD for CPSEs/government disputes or, for non-government parties, “the redressal of the dispute may be sought through ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996”. Appellant invoked this as an arbitration agreement via Section 11 application, which the High Court dismissed, leading to the appeal.

Issues Involved

Whether Clause 13 constitutes an arbitration agreement under Section 7 of the 1996 Act, given the word “may” suggesting optionality. Sub-issues included: scope of Referral Court’s prima facie examination under Section 11(6A); if “may be sought” implies binding obligation or mere possibility requiring further consent; and interplay with Clause 32 fixing court jurisdiction. The Court applied principles from Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements (2024), Jagdish Chander (2007), and Mahanadi Coalfields (2022).

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

Clause 13 does not constitute an arbitration agreement, as “may be sought” indicates an enabling provision for future agreement on arbitration, not a present consensus ad idem to refer disputes to arbitration to the exclusion of courts. Referral Courts must prima facie examine existence under Section 11(6A) without mini-trials, weeding out non-existent agreements. Appeal dismissed; no arbitration reference warranted.

15. Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2196

Before B.R. Gavai, C.J. and Aravind Kumar, Satish Chandra Sharma, K. Vinod Chandran and M.M. Sundresh, Jj.

Brief Facts

This is a Constitution Bench judgment interpreting Article 233 of the Constitution on eligibility for direct recruitment as District Judges, overruling parts of prior decisions like Dheeraj Mor (2020) and clarifying that judicial officers with prior Bar experience can compete against the Bar quota. The Court addressed a reference from a three-Judge Bench on whether in-service judicial officers qualify under Article 233(2). A batch of civil appeals, writ petitions, and review petitions challenged High Court rules barring in-service judicial officers (Civil Judges with 7+ years prior Bar practice) from applying for direct recruitment to District Judge posts reserved for advocates. Petitioners argued exclusion violated Articles 14 and 16, citing experience from both Bar and Bench. Respondents relied on precedents like Chandra Mohan (1966) and Deepak Aggarwal (2019), claiming direct recruitment is exclusively for practicing advocates not in judicial service. The three-Judge Bench in Dheeraj Mor referred substantial questions to the Constitution Bench on 12-08-2025, including eligibility timing and whether judicial service requires separate criteria. Decided on 09-10-2025 by CJI B.R. Gavai and four other Judges.

Issues Involved

• Whether judicial officers with 7+ years prior Bar practice (or combined) qualify for direct recruitment as District Judges against Bar quota under Article 233(2).
• Whether eligibility is assessed at application, appointment, or both.
• Whether Article 233(2) prescribes eligibility for in-service judicial officers.
• Whether prior Bar practice counts post-judicial appointment, and if rules excluding them violate Articles 14/16. The Court analyzed “has been for not less than seven years an advocate or a pleader” in persons “not already in the service,” distinguishing from promotion under Article 233(1), referencing Rameshwar Dayal (1961), Chandra Mohan (1966), and Shetty Commission recommendations.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

Article 233(2) enables direct recruitment from two streams—judicial service (no extra qualifications beyond consultation under 233(1)) and advocates/pleaders with 7 years’ standing (requiring High Court recommendation)—without barring judicial officers from Bar quota if they had 7 years’ prior practice. “Has been” (present perfect) covers past practice; no continuous practice or “not in service at application” required. Overrules Dheeraj Mor (45,47), Satya Narain Singh (1985), and Vijay Kumar Mishra (2016) to that extent; rules excluding eligible judicial officers ultra vires Articles 14/16. Directions: States/High Courts amend rules for combined experience; ongoing processes allow participation; prior invalid exclusions rectified.

16. Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1912

Before Dipankar Datta and Manmohan, JJ.

Brief Facts

This challenges High Court orders on whether the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) and Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) apply to minority institutions and in-service teachers.Multiple appeals arose from Bombay and Madras High Court judgments concerning minority institutions’ resistance to TET mandates for teacher appointments and promotions. Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust, a minority society, challenged a Maharashtra Government Resolution making TET mandatory for primary teachers, upheld by Bombay HC. Other cases involved Tamil Nadu teachers appointed pre-RTE seeking promotions without TET, and authorities insisting on TET compliance even in minority schools. The appeals questioned TET’s applicability to minority institutions under Article 30 and in-service teachers appointed before 2011 NCTE notifications.

Issues Involved

Whether states can mandate TET qualification for teachers in minority institutions without violating Article 30 rights. Whether pre-2011 in-service teachers need TET for promotions or continued service. Validity of Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust (2014) exempting all minority institutions (aided/unaided) from the entire RTE Act.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

The Court held RTE Act provisions apply to all schools except minority institutions pending larger Bench review of Pramati, questioning its blanket exemption and referring key issues like RTE’s impact on Article 30 and Article 29(2). TET is mandatory for new appointments/promotions in non-minority schools; in-service non-minority teachers with <5 years to retirement continue without TET but cannot get promotions, while others must qualify within 2 years or face retirement. Appeals relating to non-minority in-service teachers disposed with these directions under Article 142; minority cases tagged for larger Bench.

17. Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1576

Before B.R. Gavai, C.J. and Augustine George Masih, J.

Brief Facts

This involves challenges to the Telangana High Court’s Division Bench order setting aside a Single Judge’s direction on pending disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule against MLAs who defected from Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS) to Indian National Congress (INC).Telangana Assembly elections occurred in November 2023; Danam Nagender, Venkata Rao Tellam, and Kadiyam Srihari won as BRS candidates but allegedly joined INC in March-April 2024. Disqualification petitions under Para 2(1)(a) of Tenth Schedule were filed before Speaker in March-April 2024 (and one in July), but no notices issued even after 5+ months, prompting writ petitions. Single Judge (9 Sep 2024) directed Secretary to place petitions before Speaker for scheduling hearings within 4 weeks; Division Bench (22 Nov 2024) set it aside, holding courts cannot direct timelines pre-decision.

Issues Involved

Whether High Courts/Supreme Court can direct Speakers (acting as Tribunal under Tenth Schedule) to decide disqualification petitions within fixed timelines, given Kihoto Hollohan’s bar on pre-decision judicial review and “quia timet” actions. Scope of judicial intervention for Speaker inaction frustrating anti-defection law’s purpose. Reconciliation of Constitution Bench precedents (Kihoto Hollohan, Rajendra Singh Rana, Subhash Desai) with later rulings like Keisham Meghachandra Singh directing time-bound decisions.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

Set aside Division Bench order; restored Single Judge directions as Speaker’s 7+ month inaction (notices issued only post-SLPs) warranted judicial nudge without final merits review. Directed Telangana Speaker to decide all pending disqualification petitions (including 7 others in WPC 82/2025) by 31 Aug 2025, exercising Article 142 to prevent “operation successful, patient died” scenario undermining Tenth Schedule. Reiterated Speakers act as Tribunals bound by expedition (3 months ordinarily per Keisham); courts can aid prompt decisions absent exceptional circumstances, distinguishing true “quia timet” injunctions.

18. Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India (CREDAI) v. Vanashakti 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2474

Before B.R. Gavai, C.J. And Ujjal Bhuyan And K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.

Brief Facts

This involves a review petition challenging the Supreme Court’s May 16, 2025 judgment that struck down provisions allowing ex post facto environmental clearances (EC). The case centers on environmental regulations under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.The 2006 EIA Notification mandated prior EC for specified projects. The 2017 Notification and 2021 Office Memorandum (OM) allowed ex post facto EC for violations, with a six-month window (extended to April 2018), penalties, remediation, and closure for non-permissible projects. Writ petitions challenged these as illegal; the May 2025 judgment (JUR/Vanashakti) quashed them but protected existing ECs, prompting CREDAI’s review petition Diary No. 41929/2025.

Issues Involved

• Validity of 2017 Notification and 2021 OM permitting ex post facto EC, conflicting with prior EC mandate in 2006 Notification.
• Review grounds: JUR overlooked parts of precedents like Common Cause v. Union of India (2017), Alembic Pharmaceuticals (2017), and ignored Electrosteel Steels (2021), D. Swamy (2022), Pahwa Plastics (2022) upholding such measures; public interest in avoiding demolition of completed projects (e.g., airports, hospitals).
• Tension between precautionary principle, sustainable development, and economic/public interest impacts of quashing.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

In a 2:1 split (CJI Gavai and J. Chandran allowing; J. Bhuyan dissenting), the review succeeded: JUR recalled, writ petitions restored for rehearing by larger bench. Majority emphasized balanced approach per precedents, avoiding “counterproductive” demolitions causing more harm; protected ongoing projects via clarification under existing EC safeguard. Dissent urged dismissal, upholding JUR’s environmental jurisprudence primacy.

19. Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1439

Before Vikram Nath, Sanjay Karol and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.

Brief Facts

On May 14, 2011, two young lovers from the SC Pallar community—D-1 (Ezhil Muthalvan) and D-2 (Kasturi)—were brutally murdered at Suruli Falls, Tamil Nadu. The appellant-convict (Kattavellai @ Devakar), a coconut cutter, allegedly arrived armed with a sickle, first confronted another couple (PW-5 and Bhagyalakshmi) demanding jewelry, then approached D-1 and D-2 with similar demands. When all refused, he allegedly killed both victims and raped D-2. The bodies were discovered on May 19 in decomposed state; D-1 had suffered near-total neck severance; D-2 bore evidence of rape (vaginal tear, 5cm × 3cm) and multiple chop wounds. The appellant was arrested on May 28 following a suicide attempt and gave an alleged voluntary confession. Police recovered a sickle, clothes, and gold ornaments from his house. The Trial Court (March 7, 2018) convicted him under Sections 302 IPC (2 counts), 376 IPC (rape), and 379 IPC (theft), imposing death penalty, life imprisonment, and 7 years rigorous imprisonment respectively. The Madras High Court affirmed the conviction on March 13, 2019.

Issues Involved

Whether the chain of circumstantial evidence without eyewitnesses formed a complete and unbreakable chain excluding all hypotheses except appellant’s guilt per Panchsheel Principles. Whether PW-5’s unexplained six-day silence and testimony were reliable for the last-seen theory. Whether the TIP conducted after identity disclosure violated the Budhsen principle. Whether DNA evidence was admissible given ten-day FSL delay and chain of custody documentation gaps. Whether the confession, recovery of articles, and robbery motive were established. Whether non-examination of material witness Bhagyalakshmi and failure to investigate named alternate suspects created fatal gaps. Whether faulty investigation vitiated Article 21 fair trial rights and rendered the capital conviction unreliable.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

The Supreme Court held that the chain of circumstantial evidence was incomplete and failed to exclude hypotheses consistent with the appellant’s innocence. PW-5’s testimony was unreliable—his six-day silence despite knowing victims went missing contradicted genuine concern, and his baseless elopement assumption undermined credibility. The TIP was invalid as the appellant’s identity was pre-disclosed, violating Budhsen principle. DNA evidence was inadmissible due to grave chain of custody failures: 10-day FSL delay, absent documentation, and contradictory expert testimony. The confession and recovered articles lacked reliability—no independent arrest witnesses, no hospital records for alleged suicide attempt, and items bore no forensic linkage to the crime. Critically, victims’ missing ring and mobile phone went unexplained, inconsistent with robbery motive. Non-examination of material witness Bhagyalakshmi (sole link to victims and PW-5) was fatal; adverse inference drawn under Takhaji Hiraji principle. Four named alternate suspects remained uninvestigated. Faulty investigation throughout—poor inter-agency coordination, open-air postmortem, documentation gaps, delayed evidence transmission, absent arrest witnesses—compromised Article 21 fair trial rights.

Conviction vacated; clean acquittal granted. Appellant directed released forthwith if not required in other cases. Court issued nationwide binding DNA Evidence Guidelines (48-hour FSL dispatch requirement; mandatory Chain of Custody Register; DGP compliance directions). Court recommended legislative compensation framework for wrongful incarceration followed by acquittal, noting over 13 years custody pre-acquittal constituted Article 21 violation.

20. Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1467

Before– P.S. Narasimha and Joymalya Bagchi, Jj.

Brief Facts

Small-scale industries registered with District Industries Centre, Nagpur supplied transformers to Maharashtra State Electricity Board between 1993-2004. Due to payment delays by the respondent, appellants filed references in 2005-06 before the Industry Facilitation Council under the 1993 Act. When the MSMED Act, 2006 repealed the 1993 Act, the proceedings were transferred to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council. By award dated January 28, 2010, the Facilitation Council allowed the appellants’ claims and awarded interest on delayed payments. The respondent challenged the award under Section 34 of the ACA, and the Commercial Court set it aside on October 26, 2017, holding the claims were barred by the Limitation Act, 1963. The Bombay High Court Full Bench upheld this decision, holding that the Limitation Act applies to arbitration proceedings under the MSMED Act. The appellants appealed before the Supreme Court.

Issues Involved

Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to conciliation proceedings under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act and whether time-barred debts can be referred to conciliation and recovered through settlement agreements. Whether the Limitation Act applies to arbitration proceedings under Section 18 of the MSMED Act and what effect disclosure of unpaid amounts under Section 22 of the MSMED Act has on extending the limitation period. Whether Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act (which includes Section 43 of the ACA in deeming arbitration “as if” pursuant to an arbitration agreement) prevails over Section 2(4) of the ACA (which excludes Section 43 from statutory arbitrations), and which statute controls in case of conflict between the special law (MSMED Act) and general law (ACA).

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

The Supreme Court held that the Limitation Act does not apply to conciliation proceedings under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act. Conciliation is a non-adjudicatory out-of-court process fundamentally distinct from litigation and arbitration, where the conciliator facilitates voluntary settlement without imposing decisions. The Limitation Act applies only to suits, appeals, and court proceedings, not to out-of-court processes. Time-barred claims must not be excluded from conciliation: the statute of limitation bars only the remedy (right to sue), not the substantive right to recover. A settlement agreement through conciliation is valid under Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, and creditors can recover time-barred debts through contractual settlement. The supplier’s right subsists even after limitation expires.

However, the Court held that the Limitation Act applies to arbitration proceedings under Section 18 of the MSMED Act. Section 18(3) contains a deeming fiction requiring referral to arbitration “as if” pursuant to an arbitration agreement under Section 7(1) of the ACA, making all ACA provisions applicable including Section 43. The Court resolved the conflict between Section 2(4) of the ACA (excluding Section 43) and Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act (including Section 43) by holding that Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act prevails. The non-obstante clause in Section 18 and express overriding language in Section 24 of the MSMED Act evidence legislative intent that MSMED Act provisions override inconsistent ACA provisions. Therefore, Section 43 applies to MSMED Act arbitrations, making the Limitation Act applicable to arbitral proceedings under the MSMED Act. Extension of limitation based on disclosure under Section 22 must be examined case-to-case. Appeal partly allowed. The Bombay High Court’s decision on applicability of the Limitation Act to conciliation proceedings was set aside, but its decision on applicability to arbitration proceedings was upheld. Result: (1) time-barred claims can be settled through conciliation under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act; (2) time-barred claims referred to arbitration under Section 18(3) following failed conciliation are subject to the Limitation Act.

21. Kaushal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1473

Before Vikram Nath, Sanjay Karol And Sandeep Mehta, JJ.

Brief Facts

An FIR was registered in 2022 at Police Station Gegal, Ajmer for offences under Sections 147, 323, 341, 325, 307, 427 read with Section 149 IPC against multiple accused. Two accused were arrested; Accused 2 was granted bail by the Rajasthan High Court on 16-12-2022, noting that the allegation of inflicting the lethal injury was against Accused 1, whose case was distinct. Accused 1 then sought bail; his first application was dismissed, after which he moved a bail application under Section 439 CrPC before the Sessions Court, which was listed before the appellant, a Judicial Officer in the District Judge Cadre, who granted bail. The Sessions Judge later observed that Accused 1’s counsel had misled the court while seeking bail; Accused 1 challenged that before the High Court. While rejecting Accused 1’s bail, the Single Judge of the High Court passed strong strictures against the appellant-judge, holding that he had granted bail in a grossly inappropriate and cavalier manner, ignoring the accused’s criminal record and allegedly acting in disobedience of the High Court’s decision in Jugal v. State of Rajasthan, 2020 SCC OnLine Raj 2691. The appellant approached the Supreme Court challenging these strictures.

Issues Involved

Whether the Single Judge of the High Court was justified in passing adverse strictures and scathing observations against the appellant Judicial Officer, without giving him an opportunity to explain or show cause, for having granted bail to Accused 1. Incidentally, what approach higher courts should adopt when commenting on conduct of subordinate judicial officers, and what systemic mechanism should exist to ensure disclosure of criminal antecedents of accused persons at the stage of bail.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

The Supreme Court held that the strictures passed by the High Court against the appellant were uncalled for and liable to be set aside. Relying on ‘K’, A Judicial Officer, In re, (2001) 3 SCC 54 and Sonu Agnihotri v. Chandra Shekhar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3382, the Court reiterated that higher courts should ordinarily refrain from making adverse comments on the conduct and calibre of judicial officers while deciding judicial matters, particularly without affording them an opportunity of explanation. It noted that the High Court’s criticism was premised on the Jugal case, which had already been reversed by the Supreme Court in Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3763. The Court therefore set aside the strictures and modified the impugned High Court order to that extent, while allowing the appeal.

At a systemic level, the Court observed that proper disclosure of criminal antecedents of accused persons in bail matters is a recurring concern. Referring to Rule 5 of Chapter 1-A(b), Volume V of the Punjab and Haryana High Court Rules and Orders, it opined that every High Court should consider incorporating a similar rule in its High Court Rules and/or Criminal Side Rules to obligate accused persons to disclose involvement in any other previously registered criminal cases. The Court directed that a copy of its order be sent to the Registrar Generals of all High Courts to enable consideration of such rule-making where not already in place.

22. Shubha v. State of Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1426

Before Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Aravind Kumar

Brief Facts

In Shubha v. State of Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1426, the deceased B.V. Girish, a 26-year-old software engineer at Intel, was engaged on 30.11.2003 by the appellant Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar, a 20-year-old 5th semester B.A. LL.B. student at BMS Law College, Bengaluru, both belonging to neighbouring families who had long-standing cordial relations, with the marriage fixed for 11.04.2004. Shubha was, however, personally unwilling to marry Girish and had expressed her dissatisfaction with the match and with his simple lifestyle to her close friend PW-23, while maintaining an intense friendship and frequent telephonic contact with her junior in law college, Arun Verma (A-1). On the evening of 03.12.2003, Shubha persuaded Girish to take her for dinner to T.G.I. Friday’s near his office; after dinner, they stopped at the “Air View Point” on Airport Ring Road to watch aircraft landings, where Girish was suddenly attacked and struck on the head with a steel rod by an assailant who fled, and Shubha, with the help of passers-by, shifted him in a car to Manipal Hospital, where he succumbed to his injuries at about 8:05 a.m. on 04.12.2003. An FIR under Section 302 IPC was initially registered against unknown persons; during investigation the police arrested A-1, A-2 (Venkatesh, a 19-year-old loader), A-3 (Dinesh @ Dinakaran, a 28-year-old relative of A-1) and A-4 Shubha on the prosecution case that, as Shubha did not want the arranged marriage, she confided in A-1, who, with A-3 and A-2, conspired to and did eliminate Girish so that the marriage would not take place.

Issues Involved

The Supreme Court addressed whether alleged eyewitnesses PW-15 and PW-16 were credible given delays and contradictions, if motive was proved via PW-8/11/23 despite tainted testimonies, whether CDRs were admissible under Section 65-B Evidence Act and showed conspiracy, if recoveries of weapon/scooter under Section 27 were valid, and if the remaining circumstantial chain met Sharad Birdhichand Sarda standards to convict all four under Section 302 r/w 120-B IPC (plus Section 201 for Shubha), alongside the scope of Article 161 pardon power for young offenders.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

Supreme Court discarded unreliable eyewitnesses PW-15/16, rejected tainted motive evidence from PW-8/11 but accepted PW-23’s account proving Shubha’s opposition to marriage; upheld CDR admissibility under Section 65-B showing conspiracy communications, valid recoveries of weapon/scooter under Section 27, Shubha’s incriminating conduct (deleted SMSes, Section 201 conviction), and A-1’s false alibi; held circumstantial chain met Sharad Birdhichand Sarda test to affirm all four’s conviction under Section 302 r/w 120-B IPC (life sentence) plus Shubha’s under Section 201 IPC; directed 8-week window to file Article 161 mercy petitions to Karnataka Governor with sentence suspension till decision, emphasising reformative justice for young offenders.

23. Dharmrao Sharanappa Shabadi v. Syeda Arifa Parveen 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2155.

Before Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Aravind Kumar

Brief Facts

In Dharmrao Sharanappa Shabadi v. Syeda Arifa Parveen, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2155, Khadijabee obtained a 1987 decree (Ex. P-1) declaring her owner of 24 acres 28 guntas in Sy. No. 107 at Kusnoor village, Gulbarga; she allegedly made an oral gift/hiba of 10 acres to plaintiff (her claimed sole daughter) on 05.12.1988 with possession delivery, followed by a 05.01.1989 memorandum (Ex. P-8); Khadijabee died on 29.11.1990, her husband Abdul Basit mutated the full extent in his name on 23.05.1991 (Ex. D-2), sold it via five registered deeds (Exs. D-3 to D-7) on 25.02.1995 to defendants (bona fide purchasers, including her ex-servant), whose names were mutated (Abdul Basit died on 09.09.2001; plaintiff filed OS No. 212/2013 on 28.10.2013 for title declaration, permanent injunction and voiding the sale deeds after alleged 14.10.2013 dispossession attempt, claiming defendants’ vendor “Abdul Bas s/o Syed Hussain” was fictitious and distinct from AbdulBasit.

Issues Involved

Whether courts below perversely appreciated evidence under Article 136 by accepting plaintiff’s status as Khadijabee’s daughter via Section 50 Evidence Act oral testimony (PWs 2-3) without documents or credibility testing, and improper signature comparison under Section 73. Whether High Court erred in reversing Trial Court’s rejection of oral hiba (for want of possession delivery proof) without plaintiff’s cross-appeal, granting her absolute 10 acres plus 3/4th share in balance, contrary to Banarsi v. Ram Phal. Whether oral gift/hiba of 10 acres was validly proved under Mohammedan law (declaration, acceptance, possession), given Khadijabee’s post-gift full mutation (Ex. P-2), Abdul Basit’s mutation/sale, defendants’ continuous ROR possession since 1995, and Ex. P-8 inconsistencies (thumb impression vs. her Urdu signature elsewhere). Whether suit was barred by limitation under Articles 58/59 (3 years from right accrual), given 23 years post-Khadijabee’s death, 18 years post-sale deeds, constructive notice via public mutations/sale deeds, and no continuing cause of action till 2013 “dispossession”.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

Supreme Court re-appreciated evidence under Article 136 (Mahesh Dattaray Thirthakar), finding perversity: rejected plaintiff’s daughter status as unproved, as PW2/3 testimonies failed Section 50’s conduct-opinion triple test (Dolgobinda Paricha; Chandu Lal), lacked credibility (biased relatives, improvements, no documents like birth/school/ration records despite claims), and Trial Court’s Section 73 signature comparison between disputed Ex. P-8 and Exs. D-3 to D-7 was improper (Fakhruddin). Held oral hiba invalid for absent possession proof (actual/constructive), as Khadijabee mutated full extent post-gift (Ex. P-2), Abdul Basit mutated/sold entire land, defendants enjoyed ROR/cultivation/taxes/loans since 1995 (Exs. D-9 to D-43), no contemporaneous acts like plaintiff’s mutation/rent collection (contra Rasheeda Khatoon; Hafeeza Bibi), and Ex. P-8 sham (inconsistent execution, boundary errors). High Court exceeded jurisdiction by reversing hiba rejection and enhancing decree without cross-appeal (Banarsi). Suit barred by limitation: cause arose by 1995 sales/constructive notice (public records, Section 3 TPA; Noorul Hoda), not continuing till 2013; registered sales presumed valid (Prem Singh), unrebutted. Allowed appeal, set aside courts below, dismissed suit; no costs.

24. [X] v. State of Bihar & Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1490.

Before Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta

Brief Facts

Victim ‘X’ and other female inmates were housed in Uttar Raksha Grih (women’s protection home), Gaighat, Patna; the accused (respondent No. 2), who was Superintendent of the home, allegedly administered intoxicating medicines and injections to the victims and orchestrated their sexual exploitation by influential outsiders, with unidentified men allowed inside the protection home to gain sexual favours from the vulnerable inmates, while those who resisted were injected with intoxicants; an FIR was registered in Mahila P.S. Case No. 17 of 2022 under Sections 341, 323, 328, 376, 120-B read with Section 34 IPC, Sections 3/4 Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act 1956, and Sections 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va) SC/ST Act, based on a High Court’s suo moto cognizance of a newspaper report narrating the ordeals faced by the female inmates, with the investigation monitored by the High Court.

Issues Involved

Whether the High Court’s bail order granting release to the accused (a person in authority who misused her position to sexually exploit vulnerable inmates of a protection home) was legally sustainable, despite the grave nature of allegations, the risk of witness intimidation, the accused’s reinstatement to another protection home, and the non-compliance with Section 15A(3) SC/ST Act mandate requiring victim’s hearing in bail proceedings.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding

The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s cryptic bail order (dated 18.01.2024) was perverse and amounted to travesty of justice because it was passed without assigning reasons, failed to consider the gravity of allegations that shook the conscience of the Court (a protector turned rogue, exploiting destitute women in state-run protection home), ignored the risk of witness tampering by a person in authority with demonstrated clout (reinstatement as Superintendent of another protection home despite ongoing prosecution), and violated Section 15A(3) SC/ST Act by not impleading or hearing the victim-appellant. Relying on Shabeen Ahmad v. State of U.P. and Ajwar v. Waseem, the Court held that while bail ordinarily should not be cancelled, an unreasoned/perverse order or one disregarding serious allegations and societal impact is susceptible to interference; the present case was exceptional, warranting extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136, as the accused’s release would adversely affect fair trial and public faith in justice. The Supreme Court quashed the High Court’s bail order, cancelled the accused’s bail, directed her surrender before trial court within four weeks (with liability of bail bond cancellation and custody if she fails), and mandated the trial court and district administration to provide proper protection and support to the victim ladies, while permitting the accused to renew bail prayers before appropriate forum only if supervening circumstances arose.

*Advocate, Supreme Court of India and High Courts.
The acknowledges the work of Asmi Tyagi, Nandini Agarwal, Ananya Sharma and Rishi.