The recent decisions of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, and the Supreme Court of India in the case of Devraj Verma @ Golu v. State of U.P.[1] have raised serious questions about how courts exercise their discretion in bail matters. On 10 October 2025, the High Court granted bail to a husband accused in a dowry death case. However, in Chetram Verma v. State of U.P[2], the Supreme Court overturned that order and directed the accused to surrender immediately.

The contrast between these two rulings is not simply a matter of procedure; it touches upon the very essence of personal liberty and the delicate balance that must be maintained between judicial discretion and judicial restraint.

The High Court’s order was indeed marked by restraint. It recorded the submissions of counsel, noted the applicant’s incarceration since April 2025, his lack of criminal antecedents, and, crucially, refrained from commenting on the merits of the case. This approach is consistent with the triple test laid down by the Supreme Court itself:

1. Whether the accused is likely to abscond;

2. Whether he is likely to tamper with evidence;

3. Whether he is likely to commit a similar offence if released.

The High Court, applying these parameters, found no compelling reason to continue pre-trial incarceration. In doing so, it adhered to the principle that “bail is the rule and jail the exception.” This maxim, reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand[3], underscores that liberty cannot be curtailed merely on the gravity of allegations, absent compelling circumstances.

The Supreme Court, however, castigated the High Court’s order as “shocking and disappointing,” holding that the High Court failed to consider the nature of the crime, the punishment under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, the relationship between the accused and the deceased, the place of occurrence, the postmortem report indicating strangulation, and most importantly, the statutory presumption under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (erstwhile Section 113-B of the Evidence Act).

While these are undoubtedly relevant considerations at the stage of trial, the Supreme Court’s insistence that they must weigh decisively at the stage of bail risks conflating pre-trial liberty with pre-trial conviction. The presumption under Section 118 is a trial presumption, not a bail presumption. To import it wholesale into bail proceedings is to erode the distinction between suspicion and proof, between accusation and adjudication.

The Supreme Court’s order, though animated by concern for dowry deaths, appears to transgress the boundaries of appellate correction. Bail orders are inherently discretionary, and unless perversity or manifest illegality is demonstrated, higher courts traditionally exercise restraint. By branding the High Court’s order as a “travesty of justice” and directing immediate surrender, the Supreme Court risks demoralizing the subordinate judiciary, suggesting that adherence to established bail parameters may yet invite censure if the higher court’s sensibilities are not satisfied.

This is judicial overreach, not in the sense of passion for justice, but in the sense of curtailing the legitimate discretion of the High Court. As Justice Cardozo once warned, “The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by”[4] Judicial passion must be tempered by judicial restraint, lest liberty itself be engulfed.

Article 21 of the Constitution enshrines the right to life and personal liberty. Pre-trial incarceration, absent compelling necessity, is an affront to this guarantee. The High Court’s order, cautious and limited, respected this constitutional fidelity. The Supreme Court’s intervention, though well-intentioned, risks substituting judicial discretion with judicial diktat.

The jurisprudence of bail must remain anchored in the principle that liberty is the norm, and its curtailment the exception. To erode this principle under the weight of statutory presumptions or emotive rhetoric is to weaken the very edifice of criminal justice.

The dialogue between the High Court and the Supreme Court in these twin judgments is emblematic of a larger tension in Indian criminal jurisprudence: the balance between safeguarding liberty and addressing societal concerns. While dowry deaths are a grave social evil, the remedy cannot lie in pre-trial punishment masquerading as bail denial.

The Supreme Court’s order, in this instance, reflects judicial overreach, curtailing the High Court’s discretion and demoralizing the subordinate judiciary. The hope remains that future pronouncements will restore equilibrium, reaffirming that bail jurisprudence is not about appeasing societal outrage but about upholding constitutional fidelity.

As Justice Krishna Iyer once reminded us, “The issue of bail is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitized judicial process.”[5]

In closing, it may be concluded that while the Supreme Court’s concern for the gravity of dowry deaths is both legitimate and socially imperative, its intervention in this particular instance appears to have overlooked the ground realities of bail jurisprudence and the discretion legitimately vested in the High Court. The High Court had carefully applied the established parameters—the triple test of absconding, tampering, and repetition of offence, without venturing into the merits of the case, thereby respecting the constitutional mandate under Article 21 that liberty is the rule and its curtailment the exception.

By substituting its own assessment for the High Court’s restrained exercise of discretion, the Supreme Court blurred the distinction between pre-trial liberty and pre-trial conviction, importing trial presumptions into bail proceedings. Such an approach risks unsettling the delicate balance between judicial hierarchy and judicial independence, potentially demoralizing subordinate courts that act in fidelity to precedent. Bail jurisprudence, as Justice Krishna Iyer reminded us, is not about appeasing societal outrage but about harmonizing liberty, justice, and public safety within a socially sensitized judicial process. A more restrained approach from the apex court, sensitive both to constitutional fidelity and to the legitimate discretion of the High Court would have better served the cause of justice, ensuring that the fight against social evils like dowry deaths does not come at the cost of eroding the foundational principle that liberty must remain the norm.

References:

*Advocate, Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow.

[1] Criminal Misc Bail Application No. 8097 of 2025, Judgment and Order Dated 10.10.25

[2] Criminal Appeal No. 770 of 2026, Judgment and Order Dated 09.02.2026

[3] AIR 1977 SC 2447

[4] Cardozo The Nature of Judicial Process, (1932), p. 170.

[5] Gudikanti Narasimhulu And Ors vs Public Prosecutor, High Court Of Andhra Pradesh (1978) 1 SCC 240