The Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that an application seeking extension of time for making an arbitral award under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is maintainable before the High Court when the arbitrator has been appointed by the High Court under Section 11 of the Act.
Deciding an application filed by Premco Rail Engineering Limited, Justice Pavan Kumar Dwivedi rejected the objection raised by IIT Indore that only the principal civil court had jurisdiction to extend time under Section 29A. The Court examined the scope of Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act in the context of an arbitrator appointed by the High Court under Section 11. The Court held that the expression “Court” in Section 29A must be interpreted contextually, keeping in mind that the power to extend time includes the power to examine the conduct of the arbitrator and, if necessary, substitute the arbitrator, which is in substance an appointment function.
The Court observed that substitution of an arbitrator under Section 29A(6) is not a mere incidental power but one that has substantive consequences, and that the Act vests the power of appointment of arbitrators in domestic arbitrations with the High Court under Section 11. In this context, the Court held that the definition of “Court” under Section 2(1)(e) must be read along with the qualifying phrase “unless the context otherwise requires”.
Applying a contextual interpretation, the Court held that where the arbitrator has been appointed by the High Court under Section 11, the application seeking extension of time under Section 29A would also lie before the High Court, since the exercise of powers under Section 29A may involve consideration of substitution of the arbitrator.
The Court noted that under the statutory scheme, the power to appoint an arbitrator in domestic arbitrations vests exclusively in the High Court under Section 11. Since Section 29A(6) empowers the Court, while extending time, to substitute the arbitrator, such power cannot be exercised by a court which does not otherwise have jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator. Reading Section 29A in conjunction with Section 11 and the phrase “unless the context otherwise requires” in Section 2(1)(e), the Court held that where the arbitrator has been appointed by the High Court, the High Court alone is competent to entertain an application for extension of time
On facts, the Court recorded that the arbitral proceedings had concluded, final arguments had been heard, and only the pronouncement of the award remained. Since the respondent had not raised any grievance regarding the conduct of the arbitrator and had confined its objection to maintainability of the application to extend time, the Court extended the time for conclusion of the arbitral proceedings up to 15 February 2026.
Accordingly, the application under Section 29A was allowed.
Appearances
Shri Aditya Garg, learned counsel for the applicant.
Shri Abhishek Malviya and Shri Rishi Paliwal, learned counsel for the respondent [R-1].
