The Patna High Court has held that an Executive Officer of a Municipal Corporation, while deciding mutation proceedings, acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and falls within the definition of a “Judge” under Section 2 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. Consequently, such an officer is entitled to the protection from civil or criminal proceedings under Section 3 of the said Act for any act or order made in the discharge, or purported discharge, of their judicial functions.
The Court clarified that no criminal prosecution can be initiated against a quasi-judicial officer merely for passing an order that may be erroneous. Such errors are to be corrected through the appellate process, and initiating prosecution in such circumstances, without evidence of mala-fide or corrupt motive, constitutes a vexatious prosecution.
The Court also explained that the grant of sanction for prosecution under Section 197 CrPC is a solemn act requiring the application of mind by the sanctioning authority. Thus, a sanction order that is cryptic, non-speaking, and fails to consider the protections available to the public servant is bad in law and cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the Court quashed the FIR, the sanction order, and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom in relation to the petitioner.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Sandeep Kumar noted that the petitioner passed the stay order in his capacity as the Executive Officer while discharging his official duty, upon the matter being remanded from an appellate authority. After extensively reviewing the scope of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985, the Bench observed that the definition of a “Judge” under Section 2 of the 1985 Act is wide and includes any person empowered by law to give a definitive judgment.
Therefore, citing various precedents, the Bench affirmed that revenue officers deciding mutation cases function as quasi-judicial authorities and are entitled to the protection afforded by the 1985 Act. The Bench also distinguished between a merely ‘wrongful order’ and an act that warrants criminal proceedings. Essentially, the Bench pointed out that an order passed in good faith, even if erroneous, cannot be the basis for prosecution unless there is prima facie evidence of recklessness, corrupt motive, or acting to unduly favour a party.
The Bench found that launching a criminal prosecution solely for passing a stay order, which was an appealable order, “squarely amounts to mala-fide prosecution”, and heavily criticized the sanction order, describing it as totally cryptic and non-speaking in nature and therefore, unsustainable.
Thus, the Bench observed that the sanctioning authority must apply its mind to the facts and evidence, and the order must ex facie disclose this consideration. It concluded that the impugned sanction order failed to mention any material that would warrant stripping the petitioner of the protection available to him and was granted mechanically.
Briefly, the dispute concerns a three-storeyed building in Rajendra Nagar, Patna, which Dr. Yadav acquired from her late husband in 1985. The complainant discovered in 2012 that the property had been illegally mutated in 2005 in the name of Kumar Gyanendra, who was falsely shown as the son of Dr. Yadav’s late husband but was actually the son of Kumar Indradev, a former power of attorney holder. The complainant filed a criminal case against Kumar Indradeo and Kumar Gyanendra, and also an appeal against the mutation order before the Patna Municipal Corporation. The appellate authority, however, remanded the matter back to the Executive Officer for fresh consideration.
As the petitioner, Mr. S. Kumar, was the Executive Officer at the relevant time, the complainant alleged that the petitioner, in connivance with others, obtained a false report and subsequently passed a cryptic order, staying the mutation proceedings until the disposal of a pending Title Suit concerning the same property, with the intent to unduly favour Kumar Gyanendra. This led to the filing of a complaint which was forwarded for investigation, resulting in an FIR.
Later, the Department of Law, Government of Bihar, granted sanction for the petitioner’s prosecution, to which the petitioner opposed, contending that the stay order was passed in the discharge of his quasi-judicial duties, as a civil suit regarding the property’s title was already pending. He argued that the actual fraud occurred in 2005, long before he was posted to that office, and that he is protected from such prosecution by the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985, and Section 197 of the CrPC.
Appearances:
Advocates Rajesh Kumar Mishra and Rohit Raj, for the Petitioner
APP Jharkhandi Upadhyay, for the State
