The Supreme Court has clarified that the period of limitation for taking cognizance of an offence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, as prescribed by Section 468 of the CrPC, commences from the date the identity of all offenders becomes known to the competent authority (i.e., the Drugs Inspector) after conducting the necessary investigation, in accordance with Section 469(1)(c) of the CrPC. It does not necessarily commence from the date of the initial complaint by a private individual.
The Apex Court held that the mandatory enquiry under Section 202(1) of the CrPC, which is required before issuing process to an accused residing outside the Magistrate’s territorial jurisdiction, is not applicable when the complaint is filed in writing by a public servant acting in the discharge of their official duties. This is derived from a harmonious interpretation of Section 202 with the proviso to Section 200 of the CrPC, which acknowledges the distinct status of a public servant as a complainant.
A Two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice S.V.N. Bhatti observed that the offence under Section 27(d) of the 1940 Act is punishable with imprisonment for a term that may extend to two years, which attracts a three-year limitation period for taking cognizance under Section 468(2)(c) of the CrPC. The Bench determined that the commencement of this period was governed by Section 469(1)(c) of the CrPC, which states the period begins on the ‘first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier’.
The Bench noted that while a private complaint was made on January 05, 2006, the competent authority, the Drugs Inspector, had to undertake a verification process to establish the exact identity of all the accused persons. This process concluded, and the identity of all accused was established for the first time on April 18, 2006. Therefore, the limitation period began on this date. The complaint was filed on January 20, 2009, which was within the three-year period, and thus, the limitation bar does not apply.
On the second question regarding the mandatory enquiry under Section 202 of the CrPC, the Bench observed that Section 202 must be read harmoniously with Section 200 of the Code. The proviso to Section 200 exempts a Magistrate from examining a complainant on oath if the complaint is made in writing by a public servant acting in the discharge of their official duties.
Relying on the precedent of Cheminova India Limited v State of Punjab [2021 SCC OnLine SC 573], the Bench observed that the legislature in its wisdom has itself placed the public servant on a different pedestal. The objective of the Section 202 CrPC enquiry is to prevent the harassment of innocent individuals. Hence, the Bench concluded that this objective is sufficiently met when the complainant is a public servant acting in their official capacity, as is the case with the Drugs Inspector. Therefore, the mandatory enquiry under Section 202(1) was not required in this specific factual scenario.
Briefly, in October 2005, a Medical Officer informed one Joy Mandi about a discrepancy in the labelling of a drug allegedly manufactured by Panacea Biotec Ltd. (the Respondents). Subsequently, Joy Mandi filed a complaint with the Drug Inspector. The core allegation was a mismatch between the outer carton and the inner vial of the drug. The outer carton was labelled as ‘Easy five, Pentavalent vaccine’, which is a combination of five vaccines including one for Hepatitis (HbSAg 10 mcg). However, the vial inside was labelled as ‘Tetravalent Vaccine Easy Four’, a combination of four vaccines that does not contain the Hepatitis vaccine.
This discrepancy led to the allegation that the drug was misbranded and not labelled in the prescribed manner under the Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945.
Following an enquiry, the Drug Inspector filed a complaint case before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), for offences under Sections 18(a)(i) read with 17(b) and 17(c) of the Act, punishable under Section 27(d) of the 1940 Act. The CJM issued summons to the Respondents, and after a series of legal proceedings, including a direction from the High Court to consider the delay in filing the complaint, the CJM condoned the delay and issued fresh summons.
The Respondents challenged this summoning order before the High Court, which quashed the complaint, reasoning that the CJM had failed to conduct the mandatory statutory enquiry under Section 202 of the CrPC, as the Respondents resided beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the CJM.
Appearances:
AORs S. S. Shroff and Harshad V. Hameed, along with Advocates Aashish Gupta, Aditya Mukherjee, Krishna Tangirala, Naman Kumar, Dileep Poolakkot, Ashly Harshad, Mahabir Singh, Dr. Arunender Thakur, and Anshul Saharan, for the Appellant
AORs K. Rajeev, Harshad V. Hameed, and S. S. Shroff, along with Advocates Shinoj K. Narayanan, Niveditha R. Menon, Aditya Verma, Tarun Kumar, Aashish Gupta, Aditya Mukherjee, Krishna Tangirala, and Naman Kumar, for the Respondent
