Introduction

The jury trial in Post-Independent India became largely defunct following the decision in K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (1959)[1], which exposed significant limitations in the operation of the jury system within the Indian criminal justice framework. However, though the jury trials continued to exist in form for a brief period thereafter, their practical application steadily declined. The enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 marked the formal discontinuance of jury trials in the Indian Criminal Legal System.

Notwithstanding more than five decades having elapsed since the jury trial was formally excised from India’s criminal justice system, the continued reliance on

collective officer adjudication in courts-martial suggests a residual, albeit transformed, presence of jury-derived principles within Indian Military Justice System.

Indian Military Justice System: Constitutional Basis and Rationale

The Indian military justice system is historically rooted in British military law, which was introduced in India during the colonial period as part of the British Crown’s

framework for maintaining discipline within the armed forces. The court-martial system and allied principles of military discipline were thus institutionalised in India under colonial rule.

Following Independence, the Indian legislature consciously retained and adapted this inherited framework to suit the constitutional and institutional requirements of a sovereign republic. This resulted in the enactment of service-specific statutes, namely the Army Act, 1950, the Air Force Act, 1950, and the Navy Act, 1957, which continue to govern military discipline and court-martial proceedings within the Indian Armed Forces.

These enactments were designed to ensure strict discipline, operational efficiency, and a cohesive command structure, recognising that the unique nature of military service necessitates a legal regime distinct from civilian criminal law. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld this rationale. In Ram Sarup v. Union of India[2], the Supreme Court recognised that the maintenance of discipline in the army is a paramount consideration guiding military authorities in decisions relating to trial and procedure under the Army Act. Similarly, In Union of India v. Charanjit S. Gill[3], the Supreme Court held that adherence to rank hierarchy in the composition of a court-martial, particularly in the appointment of the Judge Advocate, is not a mere technicality but goes to the root of the validity of the proceedings and must be strictly observed.

Courts-Martial under the Army Act, 1950: Types and Composition

Under the Army Act, 1950, the military justice system in India is administered through a graded structure of Court Martial, designed to address offences of varying degrees of gravity while maintaining discipline within the armed forces. The kinds of Court Martials as under the scheme of the Army Act are mentioned at Section 108 of the Act. The subsequent sections provide the power of the competent authority to convene the said Court Martials, the warrants as held with such prescribed officers, their composition, factors leading to dissolution of a Court Martial and other such ancillary provisions. same are discussed hereunder:-

1. Summary Court Martial (SCM): A Summary Court Martial is the most expeditious form of military trial, governed by Sections 116 and 120 of the Act and Rules 129 to 134 of the Army Rules, 1954. It is intended for minor offences requiring immediate disciplinary action, particularly during active service. An SCM is presided over by the Commanding Officer of any Corps, department or detachment of the regular Army, who alone constitutes the Court. There are no members or Judge Advocate, and the commanding officer alone records findings and awards punishment. Owing to its summary nature, procedural safeguards and sentencing powers are limited. But still the SCM has the power to grant Rigorous Imprisonment upto one year and dismissal from service.

2. Summary General Court Martial (SGCM): A Summary General Court Martial under Section 109 is convened when assembling a General Court Martial is impracticable, especially during active service. It consists of minimum three members, the senior most being called Presiding Officer and the other two commissioned officers performing the duties of members. The SGCM is conducted under Rules 37 to 41 of the Army Rules, 1954, and the presence of a Judge Advocate is not mandatory in terms of sec 129 of Army Act, 1950. The finding and sentence is arrived at by way of voting being carried out by members wherein the junior most member votes first and the decision of the majority being followed. The finding and sentence of the SGCM is subject to confirmation by the confirming authority. The SGCM can award a death sentence as well as other punishments as prescribed under Army Act sec 71.

3. District Court Martial (DCM): A District Court Martial under Section 110 of the Act tries offences more serious than those triable by an SCM, but less serious than those triable by an SGCM or GCM. A DCM cannot try an officer or a Junior Commissioned Officer, and its sentencing powers are circumscribed: it cannot award a sentence of imprisonment exceeding two years under Section 111(2) of the Act. It comprises a Presiding Officer and at least two commissioned officers who have held a commission for not less than two whole The presence of a Judge Advocate is not mandatory under Rule 115 of the Army Rules, 1954. It is governed by Rules 40 to 57 of the Army Rules, 1954. The determination of guilt or innocence is made by majority vote of the members, with the junior most member voting first. The finding and sentence of the DCM are subject to confirmation by the confirming authority.

4. General Court Martial (GCM): The General Court Martial is the highest and most formal military judicial forum, constituted under Section 109 read with Section 113 of the Army Act, 1950, and convened to try the gravest offences. It comprises a Presiding Officer and a minimum of four commissioned officers, each of whom must have held a commission for not less than three whole years, and of whom not less than four must be of a rank not below that of Captain. The mandatory presence of a Judge Advocate is required under Section 129 of the Army Act, 1950. The Judge Advocate’s role is to advise the members on questions of law, evidence, and procedure; in particular, the Judge Advocate sums up the evidence and delivers a legal opinion before the court retires to deliberate in closed session, but does not participate in the deliberation itself or in the determination of guilt or sentence. The determination of guilt or innocence is taken by majority vote of the members, with the junior most officer voting first, underscoring the jury-like structure of court-martial adjudication.

QUASI-JURY MODEL IN INDIAN MILITARY JUSTICE

Despite the formal abolition of the jury system from India’s civilian criminal justice framework, Court Martial proceedings under the Army Act, 1950 retain several jury-like features in both structure and decision-making. In a District Court

Martial and General Court Martial, the determination of guilt or innocence is

entrusted not to a legally trained judge but to a panel of commissioned officers, who act as members of the Court and collectively perform a function analogous to that of a jury. These members are lay adjudicators in matters of law, though experienced in military discipline, and arrive at their findings through deliberation and majority voting, as governed under Section 113 to 129 of the Army Act, 1950, rather than through unanimity or reasoned judicial analysis. The Judge Advocate, though legally qualified, plays only an advisory role limited to guidance on questions of law and procedure and does not participate in the final decision-making process. Further, the findings of a Court Martial are not accompanied by detailed, reasoned judgments akin to civilian courts, but only with brief reasons in support of finding thereby mirroring the traditional jury verdict, which declares guilt or innocence without

disclosing the reasoning process. These characteristics collective lay decision-making, majority verdicts, absence of detailed reasoning, and a legally trained advisor without decisional authority underscore the continued presence of a quasi-

jury model within India’s military justice system, notwithstanding the complete abolition of jury trials in ordinary criminal courts.

Constitutional Concerns: Articles 14, 21 and Natural Justice

The structure of court-martial proceedings continues to raise constitutional concerns under Articles 14 and 21, and within the broader framework of the doctrine of natural justice. The Supreme Court In Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi v. Union of India[4], the Supreme Court held that the procedure prescribed by the Army Act for court-martial proceedings operates under a special statutory regime, and to the extent it derogates from Article 21, Parliament has modified those rights through Article 33, given the exigencies of military service. While courts-martial perform a judicial function, their procedure is shaped by the imperatives of military discipline and operational efficiency, and therefore does not mirror the full architecture of safeguards associated with civilian criminal trials as held in Union of India v. Major

A. Hussain[5]. A significant limitation on transparency was affirmed in S.N. Mukherjee

V. Union of India [6], a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that neither the court-martial itself nor the confirming authority is required under the Army Act to record reasons for findings and sentences, except where a recommendation to mercy is made. While the Court preserved the jurisdiction of superior courts under Articles 32 and 226, the absence of a reasons requirement has been identified as a structural constraint on the depth of judicial scrutiny available to an aggrieved accused. Further, the Judge Advocate’s role remains advisory; the determination of guilt and imposition of sentence lies decisively with the members of the court Union of India v. Charanjit S. Gill[7]. These structural features implicate natural justice because the hierarchical composition of courts-martial may generate a reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of the accused. In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India[8], the Supreme Court underscored that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done, reaffirming that fairness is an indispensable component of military adjudication. Although the constitutional validity of courts-martial has been broadly upheld, the relative absence of civilian-style procedural guarantees continues to generate sustained debate regarding procedural fairness, equality, and transparency in the military justice system.

Comparative Analysis: The United Kingdom Model

In the United Kingdom, military justice has undergone significant reform to ensure greater judicial independence and compliance with fair-trial standards. Under the modern framework established by the Armed Forces Act, 2006, Court Martial are presided over by a civilian Judge Advocate who is legally qualified and independent of the military chain of command. While a panel of military officers may determine facts, the civilian judge controls proceedings, rules on law and procedure, and delivers reasoned rulings. Appeals lie before the Court Martial Appeal Court, composed of senior civilian judges. This hybrid model is widely regarded as reconciling military discipline with constitutional guarantees of fairness, transparency, and judicial accountability.

CONCLUSION & WAY FORWARD

The persistence of jury-derived features within India’s military justice system, despite the abolition of jury trials in civilian courts, reveals an unresolved tension between military necessity and constitutional fairness. While courts-martial serve an indispensable role in maintaining discipline and operational effectiveness, their quasi-jury structure raises concerns regarding transparency, impartiality, and procedural parity under Articles 14 and 21, especially in light of the fact that the Judge Advocate and the jury members are serving under the same convening authority who has decided that the Accused be tried by a Court Martial, thus not entirely negating the threat of command influence.

A re-examination of the court-martial system under the Army Act, 1950 is warranted. Mandatory reasoned judgments would enhance transparency and facilitate meaningful appellate review. Reducing command influence by insulating members from the immediate chain of command would strengthen impartiality. Further, enhancing the role of the Judge Advocate beyond its advisory character by vesting greater authority on questions of law and procedure would improve adjudicatory quality. Drawing from hybrid models in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the United States, India may preserve military discipline while reaffirming constitutional values within its military justice framework.

*Udit Thakran, Advocate. He can be reached at uditthakran98@gmail.com

[1] 1961 SCC OnLine SC 69

[2] AIR 1965 SC 247

[3] (2000) 5 SCC 742

[4] AIR 1982 SC 1413

[5] (1998) 1 SCC 537

[6] (1990) 4 SCC 594)

[7] SUPRA NOTE 3

[8] (1987) 4 SCC 611