Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has reiterated that an offence of rape under Section 375 of the IPC is said made out on the grounds of a ‘false promise to marry’ only if it is established that the promise was made by the accused from the very beginning with no intention of fulfilling it, and was made solely to obtain consent for sexual relations. Crucially, the Apex Court has held that where the complainant is already married and thus legally barred from marrying the accused, a promise of marriage cannot serve as an inducement for sexual intercourse that vitiates consent.
The Apex Court strongly asserted that the law prohibits bigamous unions, and therefore, a promise to marry a person who already has a living spouse is legally unenforceable. In such circumstances, particularly when the complainant is aware of this legal impediment, she cannot claim that her consent was obtained under a ‘misconception of fact’, as the two contradictory facts, being married and being promised marriage, cannot coexist.
A Two-Judge Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan therefore held that the offence alleged against the accused-appellant under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC was not made out, even when taking the allegations in the FIR at face value. The Court found that it was not expedient or in the interest of justice to permit the prosecution to continue. Accordingly, the order of the High Court was set aside, and the FIR and the subsequent Chargesheet, and all proceedings arising from Sessions Case, were quashed.
The Supreme Court observed that the facts indicated a ‘classic case of a consensual relationship turning acrimonious’. It noted that the complainant is a thirty-three-year-old married woman, an advocate by profession, and not a naïve person incapable of making her own decisions.
The Supreme Court has clarified that a contractual dispute arising from a breach of a commercial agreement, such as a Joint Venture Agreement, is fundamentally civil in nature. Thus, no criminal proceedings should be initiated for such disputes, especially when the contract itself provides for civil remedies like indemnification and adjustment of funds.
To establish the criminal offense of cheating under Section 420 of the IPC in a contractual matter, the Court said it is essential to prove that a false representation was made dishonestly and fraudulently at the very inception of the contract. Hence, where the agreement does not contain the alleged false representation and instead includes clauses like indemnity, the element of initial dishonest intent is negated.
A Two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Manoj Misra emphasized that an inordinate and unexplained delay in filing an FIR concerning a contractual dispute is a crucial factor that indicates the dispute is of a civil nature and that the criminal proceedings are an abuse of the process of law. The absence of prompt reporting suggests a lack of initial dishonest intention, which is a key ingredient for offenses like cheating.
When assessing a petition to quash an FIR, particularly in cases arising from contractual disputes, a court should not confine its analysis to the FIR’s contents alone, rather, it is empowered to consider admitted and undisputed documents, such as the underlying contract, to determine the true nature of the dispute and prevent the abuse of the criminal justice system for settling civil scores, added the Court.
The Supreme Court has clarified that a conviction for a serious offence like murder can be sustained on the basis of ocular evidence that is found to be consistent, trustworthy, and reliable, even if the eyewitnesses are related to the deceased. Essentially, the Court ruled that the non-recovery of the weapon of assault is not fatal to the prosecution’s case and is not a sine qua non for conviction, especially when direct evidence is corroborated by other evidence on record.
Further, the Court emphasised that any procedural irregularity, such as an alleged defect in the examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1972, does not ipso facto vitiate the trial unless it is demonstrated by the accused that the error has caused actual and material prejudice, resulting in a failure of justice.
A Two-Judge Bench of Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar found the testimony of the four eyewitnesses examined by the prosecution to be consistent, reliable, and confidence-inspiring. It observed that the presence of these witnesses at the scene of the incident was natural, and their evidence could not be discarded merely on the ground that they were related to the deceased. Also, any minor inconsistencies in their statements were deemed insufficient to weaken the prosecution’s case.
The Supreme Court has held that in cases where an offence is alleged to have been committed by members of an unlawful assembly with a common object, the principle of vicarious liability under Section 149 of the IPC applies. At the bail stage, it is erroneous for a court to require the prosecution to prove the specific overt act or injury attributed to each individual accused. The Court clarified that the collective nature of the act and the common object are the primary considerations, and a detailed dissection of individual roles is a matter for trial.
At the same time, the Apex Court observed that a superior court has the authority to set aside a perverse or unreasoned order granting bail, even if the accused has not misused the liberty of bail. This is distinct from the cancellation of bail for post-bail misconduct. The Apex Court also clarified that interference is justified when the lower court has ignored relevant material, based its decision on extraneous considerations, or failed to appreciate the gravity of the offence and its impact on society.
A Two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta emphasised a clear distinction between the cancellation of bail due to misuse of liberty under Section 439(2) of the CrPC and the reversal of a bail order by a superior court on grounds of perversity. The Bench observed that a bail order can be interfered with, if it is based on extraneous considerations, ignores relevant material, or fails to consider the nature and gravity of the offence.
The Supreme Court has clarified that in a case based entirely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete chain of circumstances. So, when a statement leading to recovery is made when the accused is not in police custody, Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not attracted. At best, such conduct may be admissible under Section 8 as a link in the chain of circumstances, but it is a weak piece of evidence and cannot by itself sustain conviction.
The Court held that matching of DNA evidence may conclusively establish the identity and death of the deceased, but unless the remaining circumstances firmly connect the accused to the crime, conviction cannot be sustained. Also, where the last seen theory is contradicted by documentary evidence and unexplained delays, and where serious doubts arise regarding arrest and investigation, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.
“What has been established beyond doubt is only the death of the child whose vertebrae and teeth, recovered from a canal, matched with the DNA profiles obtained from the sample taken from the biological parents. The knowledge of the accused, which led to the detection of the bone remnants though not acceptable under Section 27 would all the same be acceptable evidence under Section 8, which by itself is a weak piece of evidence”, pointed out the Court.
A Two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice K. Vinod Chandran observed at the outset that a botched investigation had left many questions unanswered and that the conviction rested purely on conjectures. The Bench found that the missing complaint was lodged only on October 11, 2018, although the child was allegedly taken on October 05, 2018. Further, the First Information Statement recorded that the child went missing at 09:00 P.M. on October 06, 2018, which was after the appellant had already been arrested.
While affirming the conviction of the appellants passed by the Trial Court, the Supreme Court has held that the quantum of sentence could be modified in the interest of justice based on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. The Court reasoned that considering the totality of circumstances, including the significant lapse of time since the offence (nearly four decades), the advanced age of the surviving appellants, the prolonged pendency of proceedings, the period of incarceration already undergone by them is more than the statutory minimum sentence of six months contemplated under the proviso to Section 135(1)(b)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 as it then existed.
A Two-Judge Bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta noted that the appellants’ primary contention, that a conviction cannot be based solely on statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, had already been rejected by the High Court. The Bench concurred with the High Court’s finding that such statements, if made voluntarily, are admissible in evidence and are not barred by the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
In a criminal appeal filed before the Supreme Court challenging an order of the Madras High Court denying the applicant regular bail, a Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice K. Vinod Chandran released the appellant on bail and set aside the impugned order.
The appellant was accused of offences punishable under Section 8(c) read with Sections 20(b)(ii)(C), 22(c), 23, 28, and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), read with Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962. The amount of contraband substance allegedly seized from the appellant was stated to be above the commercial quantity prescribed.
However, the Court found that the appellant had been in custody for 4 years, 1 month, and 28 days. Considering the length of the incarceration suffered by the appellant, and the fact that another accused person in an identical situation had been granted bail, the Court was inclined to grant bail to the appellant.
Allahabad High Court Order a ‘Travesty of Justice’; Supreme Court Cancels Bail in Dowry Death Case
The Supreme Court set aside the bail granted by the Allahabad High Court to a man accused of causing the dowry death of his wife within three months of marriage, holding that the High Court’s order was “one of the most shocking and disappointing” bail orders it had come across in recent times
A Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan allowed an appeal filed by the father of the deceased woman and cancelled the bail granted to the accused husband, in connection with an FIR registered at Kotwali Bhinga Police Station, Shrawasti district, Uttar Pradesh, for offences under Sections 85 and 80(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
High Courts
The Bombay High Court held that once the prosecution successfully proves the core and fundamental facts that lead to the proof of the commission of an offence under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO), a presumption is raised against the accused as per Section 29. The burden of proof then shifts to the accused to rebut this presumption.
In this specific case, the Court found that the accused had failed to rebut this presumption, either through the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses or by presenting any other evidence. Consequently, finding no reason to interfere with the trial court’s judgment, the appeal was dismissed and the conviction was upheld.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice R.M. Joshi noted that in cases involving sexual assault against a child under the POCSO Act, the court is required to give due weightage to the child’s evidence. If any doubt arises from other evidence or circumstances, the court should then look for corroboration. The Bench found that the prosecution had successfully established that the victim was a minor, through her testimony and birth certificate, a fact that was not challenged by the defence.
Acid Attack on Minor Without Sexual Intent Attracts Section 326A IPC, Not POCSO: Bombay High Court
The Bombay High Court has clarified that the testimony of a hostile witness is not to be rejected in its entirety, and the court can rely on the part of the testimony that is found to be credible and is corroborated by other reliable evidence. In this case, the victim’s statement in her cross-examination by the APP was accepted as it was strongly corroborated by the scientific evidence, i.e., Chemical Analysis.
The Court pointed out that where the prosecution presents strong incriminating evidence against an accused, such as chemical residues from the crime found on his clothes, and the accused’s presence at the scene is established, the onus shifts to the accused under Section 313 of the CrPC to provide an explanation. An absence of explanation can be considered a strong circumstance that supports the finding of guilt.
Moving ahead, the High Court held that for an offence to be punishable under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offence Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), the act must be committed with sexual intent and fall within the definition of ‘sexual assault’. Hence, an act of violence against a minor, such as an acid attack, without any accompanying sexual intent, does not attract the provisions of the POCSO Act.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice R.M. Joshi acknowledged that the primary prosecution witnesses, including the victim, her father, and other independent witnesses, did not support the prosecution’s case during their examination-in-chief and were declared hostile. However, the Bench relied on the established legal principle that the evidence of a hostile witness need not be entirely discarded and can be considered to the extent it is reliable and relevant.
The Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) has asserted that a police officer’s failure to conduct a proper and fair investigation into a suspicious death, particularly by not visiting the actual scene of the incident, not drawing a spot panchanama there, and not seizing crucial evidence despite being aware of the location of the incident, constitutes a prima facie case of disobeying the law under Section 166 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Urmila Joshi Phalke clarified that the indispensable ingredients of Section 166 IPC are met when a public servant acts in disobedience of legal directions concerning the conduct of his duties. In such circumstances, where the allegations in the FIR and the supporting material disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and suggest an attempt to shield suspects, the High Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings.
Quashing such proceedings against a police officer would be against the public interest and would deplete public confidence in the criminal justice system. Therefore, the officer must face trial to determine the veracity of the allegations, added the Court.
The Bombay High Court reiterated the well-settled factors for considering a bail application, including the existence of a prima facie case, the nature and gravity of the accusation, and the danger of justice being thwarted. Applying these factors to the present case, and citing the decision of Lavesh vs. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2012) 8 SCC 730], the Court reasoned that an absconding accused who is not available for investigation is not entitled to the extraordinary remedy of pre-arrest bail.
Further, relying on Sumitha Pradeep vs. Arunkumar C.K. [(2022) 17 SCC 391], the Court held that filing of a charge-sheet is only one of the circumstances to be considered, and the absence of a need for custodial interrogation does not by itself become a ground to grant anticipatory bail, especially when a strong prima facie case exists.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed that anticipatory bail is an exceptional remedy that should not be granted routinely in serious cases, as it may hamper the investigation. Hence, no case was made out for the grant of pre-arrest bail.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Madhav J. Jamdar observed that although the Applicant was not named in the FIR, his role was revealed during the investigation. It was noted that the Applicant’s own statement, recorded in a complaint he filed, shows he was acting in connivance with the main accused.
The Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) that the power of a Magistrate under Section 323 of the CrPC to commit a case to the Court of Sessions must be exercised by forming a reasoned opinion, based on the evidence on record, that the case warrants a trial by the higher court. The Court clarified that the mere fact that an offence is punishable with a sentence exceeding the Magistrate’s powers is not, in itself, a sufficient ground for committal without an application of mind to the evidence.
The procedure for such committal should be guided by the principles analogous to those in Section 325 of the CrPC, which mandate the formation of an opinion of guilt after considering the evidence. Therefore, a Magistrate committing a case must record skeletal reasons, derived from the evidence, to justify the opinion that a punishment more severe than they are empowered to inflict, might be necessary, added the Court.
The High Court held that the Chief Judicial Magistrate had failed to apply the principles of Sections 323 and 325 of the CrPC correctly. The committal of the case to the Court of Sessions was deemed unjustified due to the absence of an opinion based on the evidence recorded during the trial. Consequently, the Court quashed the order of the CJM, and remanded the proceeding back to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, with a direction to first form an opinion based on the skeletal evidence and then, if deemed necessary, commit the case to the Court of Sessions in accordance with the law.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Pravin S. Patil observed that that while Section 323 of the CrPC empowers a Magistrate to commit a case to the Court of Sessions at any stage of the proceedings, this power is not to be exercised mechanically. The Bench opined that for a Magistrate to form the view that a case “ought to be tried by the Court of Sessions”, it is necessary to discuss the evidence on record and formulate an opinion of guilt.
In a bail application filed before the Allahabad High Court seeking release of the applicant facing trial under Sections 305(a), 331(4), 317(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), a Single Judge Bench of Justice Arun Kumar Singh Deshwai prescribed guidelines to be followed in cases of grievous injury to the accused in police encounter and granted bail to the applicant.
In a previous hearing, the Court found that the matter was related to a police encounter in which the applicant sustained grievous injuries. By an order dated 13-01-2026, the Court directed the AGA to seek instructions as to whether a First Information Report (FIR) had been registered regarding the police encounter as per the Supreme Court’s decision in People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 10 SCC 635.
In an application filed before the Bombay High Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, to challenge the proceedings in a summary criminal case filed by the Inspector of Legal Metrology pending before the 5th Joint Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate First Class, a Single Judge Bench of Justice Urmila Joshi-Phalke quashed the complaint as well as the impugned proceedings against the applicant.
Considering Section 49 of the Legal Metrology Act, 2009, the Court noted that no person had been nominated to exercise the powers as required under sub-section (2) and that no statement had been made by the complainant to counter the said contention. It was said that Section 49, sub-section (1) provides a complete mechanism to fix the vicarious liability of the Managing Director/Directors in case of the offences committed by the company.
The Bombay High Court has emphasised that in a case resting entirely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances that unequivocally points to the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with any other possible hypothesis. The Court reasoned that the “last seen together” circumstance is not a strong piece of evidence when there is a considerable and unexplained time gap between the point when the accused and deceased were last seen together and the discovery of the body, as this allows for the possibility of intervention by a third party.
Furthermore, the Court held that the burden of explanation under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act does not shift to the accused unless the prosecution has first successfully established the foundational incriminating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence of recovery based on a disclosure statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is inadmissible if the statement is vague and does not meet the legal requirements of specificity regarding the article, the place, and the authorship of concealment.
The Division Bench comprising Justice Sarang V. Kotwal and Justice Sandesh D. Patil found the evidence of the primary witness to be vague and unreliable, noting his admission that he was under the influence of alcohol and did not know what had transpired. The Bench observed a significant time gap of 15 to 16 hours between the deceased being last seen with the Appellant and the discovery of the body, which weakened the “last seen together” theory, especially since the approximate time of death was not properly established.
In a criminal appeal filed before the Delhi High Court against a judgment of the Trial Court to convict the appellant under Sections 302/397/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) read with Section 120-B IPC as well as a sentencing order dated 31-01-2009 whereby he was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with fine, a Division Bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Ravinder Dudeja took note of the serious delay in the matter and laid down guidelines for post-conviction/bail follow up.
The Court perused the records and stated that the present case was one in which the appellant continued to enjoy the fruits of liberty for a period of thirteen years, even after his appeal against conviction was dismissed by this Court. The Court noted that during the pendency of his appeal, the appellant’s sentence was suspended for 2 months by an order dated 13-12-2010, after which the Trial Court accepted the bond furnished by the appellant, but he did not surrender. Thereafter, by a judgment dated 19-09-2012, the criminal appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed.
The Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench) has clarified that a preventive detention order is legally unsustainable if the detaining authority, while aware that the detenu is on bail for the predicate offences, fails to place on record and consider the bail orders to subjectively assess the sufficiency of bail conditions in preventing future prejudicial activities. This failure constitutes non-application of mind and violates the constitutional right to effective representation. Accordingly, the Court quashed the detention order and directed that the petitioner (detenue) be released forthwith if not required in any other offence.
The Court also invalidated the detention if it is based on alleged offences under Section 4 of the Arms Act, but there is no evidence of a Central Government notification prohibiting the possession of the specific arms in the relevant area, as such a notification is a prerequisite for constituting the offence. The Court also negated the grounds for detention which was passed relying on in-camera statements that are vague, cyclostyled, and lack proper verification, as such statements cannot form a credible basis for subjective satisfaction.
The Division Bench comprising Justice Sandipkumar C. More and Justice Abasaheb D. Shinde observed that preventive detention is an exceptional measure that curtails fundamental rights and must strictly adhere to legal procedures and constitutional safeguards. The Bench noted that while the detaining authority was aware that the petitioner had been released on bail in the two predicate offences, the record did not contain the bail applications or the bail orders.
In an appeal filed before the Gujarat High Court under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), against a judgment and order of acquittal dated 01-08-2012 by the Sessions Judge, Surendranagar, for offences punishable under Sections 498(A), 306, and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), a Single Judge Bench of Justice Sanjeev J Thaker endorsed the findings of the Trial Court and affirmed the acquittal of the accused while dismissing the present appeal.
The Court noted the statement of the deceased’s father, who had deposed that when they took sweets to their daughter’s matrimonial home after she had given birth to a child, a dispute arose, and the accused husband had assaulted the deceased’s mother with a stick. However, the Court also noted the statement of the deceased’s mother and found material contradictions between the statements.
Considering the entire case of the prosecution, the Court stated that none of the witnesses of the prosecution had stated the kind of mental and physical cruelty meted out by the accused on the deceased, and that the prosecution had been unable to prove that the accused persons were guilty. The Court stated that there were merely allegations of harassment without any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused, which compelled the deceased to commit suicide.
Further, the Court said that words uttered in the heat of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. Hence, the Court held that the Trial Court had rightly held that there was no positive evidence to prove that the accused, overtly or covertly, instigated the deceased in a manner that left no other option for her but to commit suicide.
Bombay HC Clarifies Procedure for Executing Warrants Outside Issuing Court’s Jurisdiction Under BNSS
The Bombay High Court has emphasised that Section 80(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) stipulates that when a warrant is to be executed outside the issuing court’s jurisdiction, the court may forward it to the Executive Magistrate, District Superintendent of Police, or Commissioner of Police of the concerned jurisdiction. That authority is then responsible for endorsing the warrant and causing it to be executed. This provision provides a formal and effective channel for ensuring the execution of inter-state warrants.
Therefore, the Court held that a fresh Non-Bailable Warrant should be issued against Respondent No. 2. In line with the procedure outlined in Section 80 of the BNSS, the Court directed its registry to forward the warrant by R.P.A.D. to the Commissioner of Police, Varanasi, to ensure its execution. Additionally, the Court requested the Additional Solicitor General to suggest measures to ensure that Bailable and Non-Bailable Warrants are executed in a time-bound manner to facilitate the expeditious disposal of long-pending Execution Applications, particularly those filed by financial institutions and nationalized banks.
The ruling is based on the procedural mechanism for the execution of warrants outside the local jurisdiction of the issuing court, as prescribed by the BNSS, 2023.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Madhav J. Jamdar observed with concern that the Execution Application has been pending since 2015 due to the non-execution of the Non-Bailable Warrant issued against Respondent No. 2. It noted that despite multiple reminders sent by the Court’s registry and direct telephonic contact with the concerned police inspector in Varanasi, no execution report was filed.
The Bombay High Court has held that the incident of abusing in caste occurred at a public place and within public view, with an intention to humiliate the informant, attracts the offence under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
The Court reiterated that as the provision of Section 18 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes, Act, 1989 with express language excludes the applicability of Section 438, CrPC, it creates a bar against grant of anticipatory bail in absolute terms in relations to the arrest of a person who faces specific accusations of having committed the offence under the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Act. The benefit of anticipatory bail for such an accused is taken off.
Since, offence under the Atrocities Act prima facie appears to establish as against appellant Nos. 1 and 2, but it does not establish against appellant Nos. 3 and 4, therefore, interim order granted by this Court to the extent of appellant Nos. 1 and 2 needs to be recalled. However, the said interim order can be extended to the extent of appellant Nos. 3 and 4.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Y. G. Khobragade observed that the incident of uttering in casteist language as well as on the character of respondent No.3 / informant at the public place within the public view by saying abusive words, showing the intention of the accused No.2 appears about insulting the respondent No.3 in the public view, attracts the provisions of Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act.
Delhi HC Imposes ₹1 Lakh Costs on Man for Misleading Family Court, Falsely Claiming Bachelor Status to Obtain Divorce Decree
In a petition filed before the Delhi High Court for seeking the quashing of First Information Report (FIR) filed for commission offences under Section 498A/406/34/494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and proceedings on the ground that the complainant (respondent 2) (wife) had compromised the dispute with petitioner 1 (husband) as well as petitioner 2 (mother-in-law), a Single Judge Bench of Justice Girish Kathpalia dismissed the petition imposing exemplary costs of Rs. 1,00,000/- on the petitioners for misleading authorities while issuing directions regarding the same.
The Court noted that even though the marriage between the husband and wife was void since the husband was already married, his marriage with the respondent wife had also been dissolved by way of a decree of divorce with mutual consent. It was found that the Family Court was misled into passing the divorce decree. Upon perusing a copy of the divorce petition under Section 13B (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, it was found that the marital status of the husband had been pleaded as bachelor.
Finding that the petitioner has no previous involvement in the offence under the NDPS case and the nominal roll reveals that the petitioner does not have any criminal antecedents, the Delhi High Court enlarged the petitioner on bail. Since the trial is evidently proceeding at a snail’s pace, with no possibility of its culmination in near future, the Court said that the delay cannot be attributed to the petitioner.
The Court opined that the veracity and evidentiary value of the alleged WhatsApp chats and CDRs are matters to be tested during the course of the trial, as the same are not substantive piece of evidence and can only be used for corroboration. At this stage, the said material cannot be treated as conclusive proof of the petitioner’s guilt to deny him the concession of bail.
The Court noted that the petitioner has been in custody for more than two years as per the nominal roll, and out of 31 cited witnesses, only 2 witnesses have been examined till date. Thus, the Court admitted the petitioner to regular bail, subject to his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court, and further subject to various conditions.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Vikas Mahajan observed that the Court is required to examine the material on record only to form a prima facie opinion as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty of the offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail, as mandated under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
In an application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) before the Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court seeking quashing of an order dated 28-03-2014 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Ambedkar Nagar, chargesheet dated 10-06-2015, and summoning order dated 21-11-2015 arising out of a Non-Cognizable Report (NCR) under Sections 352, 504, and 427 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), a Single Judge Bench of Justice Rajeev Bharti dismissed the application holding that no ground for interference had been made out.
The Court perused the decisions by Co-ordinate benches in Navin Chandra Pandey v. State of U.P., 1995 All LJ 1688, as well as Brij Lal Bhar v. State of U.P., 2006 (4) ALJ 731, and followed the latter decision wherein it was held that there is no legal bar on the first informant to move an application under Section 155(2). It was stated that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the procedural provisions governing investigation must be interpreted to advance justice, not to frustrate legitimate prosecution.
The Calcutta High Court has held that a dispute arising from a purely contractual relationship, governed by the terms of an agreement, cannot be converted into a criminal proceeding for cheating or criminal breach of trust where the essential ingredients of these offences are absent. The Court clarified that specifically, there must be evidence of dishonest intention from the inception for cheating and a clear entrustment of property for criminal breach of trust.
Furthermore, the Court clarified that an alleged violation of regulatory guidelines (like those from the RBI) does not automatically give rise to penal consequences under the Indian Penal Code for a matter rooted in a contract. The Court also reaffirmed the legal principle that charges for cheating (Section 420 IPC) and criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) cannot be sustained simultaneously for the same transaction. The Court therefore allowed the criminal revisional application and quashed the proceedings against the petitioners.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Chaitali Chatterjee Das observed that the subject matter of the complaint arose purely out of an alleged violation of the terms and conditions of the loan agreements between the parties. It noted that the relationship was governed by these agreements, which also contained an arbitration clause that the complainant did not invoke. Thus, the Bench affirmed the principle that a contractual dispute or a mere breach of contract per se should not lead to the initiation of a criminal proceeding.
In a criminal appeal filed before the Allahabad High Court against the judgment and order passed by the Special Judge, Bijnor, under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, in a matter regarding commission of offences under Sections 304B/302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, a Division Bench of Justice Salil Kumar Rai and Justice Vinai Kumar Dwivedi partly allowed the appeal by reducing the sentence of the appellants to the time that they had already served and maintained the finding of the Trial Court.
The Court perused the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and found that it was proved that the deceased had died in her matrimonial home under unnatural circumstances by suffering 80% burn injuries. It was noted that the Trial Court had relied on the dying declaration, and hence, the burden was on the appellants to explain the circumstances in which the deceased sustained said injuries, which they were unable to do.
In a bail application filed before the Delhi High Court seeking grant of regular bail in a case arising out of a First Information Report (FIR) for the commission of an offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), a Single Judge Bench of Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma questioned the genuineness of the promise extended by the applicant and refused to grant him bail.
The Court noted that the parties had known each other since college and had been in a relationship for several years. Considering the evidence on record, the Court stated that the applicant had, on several occasions, assured the prosecutrix of marriage and had represented that there was no impediment to their marriage. The Court perused the couple’s chats and further noted that the applicant had sought the birth details of the prosecutrix and assured her that the horoscopes had matched.
In a criminal petition filed before the Delhi High Court for the grant of leave to appeal against the judgment dated 12-02-2018 by the Metropolitan Magistrate, a Single Judge Bench of Justice Amit Mahajan granted the State leave to appeal and transferred the respondent’s appeal to this Court by exercising power under Section 447 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).
The Court perused the impugned judgment and stated that although the Magistrate found that the respondent had caused the death of the victim, warranting his conviction under Section 304A of the IPC, he had been acquitted for an offence under Section 279 of the IPC since it was unclear as to how or in what manner the accused had acted by driving the truck prior to the incident. It was noted that the only factor considered by the Magistrate was that the speed of the vehicle was not too high or excessive.
In a criminal appeal filed before the Uttarakhand High Court under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to challenge a judgment and order dated 30-08-2011 by the Sessions Judge, Udham Singh Nagar whereby the appellant had been convicted for an offence punishable under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 7 years along with Rs. 10,000/- as fine, a Single Judge Bench of Justice Ashish Naithani set aside the impugned judgment and acquitted the appellant.
The Court stated that to establish a charge under Section 306 of the IPC, the prosecution must establish that a person committed suicide and that the accused abetted the commission of said suicide. It was said that, as per the Supreme Court, mere harassment, ordinary domestic discord, or casual remarks cannot amount to instigation unless there is a clear mens rea and a proximate nexus between the conduct of the accused and the act of suicide.