Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has clarified that the power to summon an additional accused under Section 319 of the CrPC is an extraordinary power that should be exercised sparingly. The standard for its exercise is that the evidence on record must be more than prima facie but does not need to meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required for conviction. The evidence must be ‘strong and cogent’, creating a reasonable likelihood of the proposed accused’s involvement.
The Apex Court also pointed out that while considering a Section 319 application, a court should not conduct a ‘mini-trial’ by undertaking a detailed evaluation of witness credibility or by overemphasizing minor contradictions and plausibility issues. The evidence should be assessed based on its cumulative effect, not in a fragmented manner. Sworn oral testimony from multiple witnesses naming an individual can be considered strong and cogent evidence, sufficient to summon that individual, even if there are inconsistencies that may be resolved during the trial.
A Two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih delineated three levels of evidentiary standards in criminal proceedings. The lowest is the prima facie standard for framing charges. The highest is proof beyond a reasonable doubt for conviction. For summoning an additional accused under Section 319 CrPC, an intermediate standard applies, which requires the evidence to be ‘strong and cogent’. This standard is more than a mere prima facie case but does not require the evidence to be sufficient for conviction. The Court must assess if the evidence, if unrebutted, reasonably indicates the involvement of the proposed accused.
The Supreme Court has upheld the conviction of appellant who is found guilty of commission of offences both under Sections 498A and 302 IPC, finding that the dying declaration of the deceased wife, certified as reliable by attending medical professionals, is strongly corroborated by the direct and unwavering testimony of a natural eyewitness and further supported by circumstantial evidence recovered from the scene of the crime.
The Court ruled that the testimony of doctors certifying the deceased’s conscious and fit state to make a statement will override contrary statements from non-medical witnesses. The collective and clinching nature of such evidence is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and justifies the reversal of a trial court’s acquittal that was based on minor discrepancies.
A Two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice S.V.N. Bhatti noted that the evidence established frequent quarrels over money and that the appellant used to treat the deceased with cruelty. This was deemed sufficient to establish that the appellant was frustrated and possessed a motive to commit the crime.
The Bench considered the testimony of the 16-year-old daughter of the appellant and the deceased, as ‘crucial and material’, as she gave a clear account of the quarrel, her father’s threat, and the act of him pouring kerosene and setting her mother on fire. The Bench found no inconsistencies in her statement and no reason to believe she would falsely depose against her own father.
Supreme Court Lays Procedural Norm To Avoid Misuse Of Bail Concession
While adding to the guidelines prescribed in the case of Anokhi Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2019) 20 SCC 196], the Supreme Court has laid down a new procedural norm to be followed in cases, where convicts released on bail after suspension of sentence, neglect to cooperate with the court to impede a decision on their appeal. The Court stated that whenever an appellate court appoints an amicus curiae to represent a convict whose counsel is absent, it should also consider issuing a notice to the convict. This notice should be sent to the address mentioned in the appeal memorandum and served through the jurisdictional police station. The notice must intimate the convict about the appointment of the amicus and that they may provide necessary instructions to the amicus.
The Court further clarified that if the service report indicates the convict was not found or refused notice, pasting the notice on the outer wall of the premises would be sufficient compliance. If the convict remains dormant, the High Court may proceed to decide the appeal with the assistance of the amicus. This process would serve to eliminate any future pleas of unfairness and would also help ascertain if the appeal survives for a decision or has abated, thereby saving judicial time.
A Two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma acknowledged the appellant’s argument that he suffered prejudice because the amicus urged a ground for conviction under a lesser charge, which was not part of the original appeal memorandum, thereby preventing the High Court from considering the grounds for a complete acquittal.
Reiterating established principles on dying declarations, the Supreme Court has emphasized that while a credible dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction, it must inspire the full confidence of the court and be free from any suspicion of tutoring, prompting, or imagination. If there is any iota of suspicion, the court must look for corroboration.
The Apex Court ruled that an acquittal is justified when the prosecution’s case is founded entirely on a motive that is subsequently demolished during the trial and on multiple dying declarations that do not inspire confidence due to suspicious circumstances, the interested nature of witnesses, and gross deficiencies in the investigation. An investigation that is selective, fails to examine crucial independent witnesses, does not conduct basic forensic analysis to rule out alternative causes of death, and is marked by procedural lapses like a delayed FIR, is fatal to the prosecution, added the Court.
Further, the Apex Court explained that a trial is vitiated and causes incurable injustice if the court fails to put each specific piece of incriminating evidence to the accused during their examination under Section 313 of the CrPC. The standard of proof in a criminal trial is not a ‘maybe true’ but a ‘must be true’, established by legal, reliable, and unimpeachable evidence leading to a finding of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence, the appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal of the accused by the High Court was affirmed.
Accused Implicated Only Through SIM Registered in His Name; Supreme Court Grants Bail in NDPS Case
The Supreme Court has granted bail to an accused booked under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, observing that his alleged involvement in the offence was based primarily on a SIM card registered in his name, which was recovered from another person. The Bench of Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar allowed the special leave petition challenging the Rajasthan High Court’s order denying regular bail.
The petitioner had been in custody since 19 March 2025 in connection with an FIR registered by the Narcotics Control Bureau, Jaipur, for offences under Sections 8 and 29 of the NDPS Act. After hearing the parties, the Court noted that the petitioner had been implicated on the basis of a SIM card used in the commission of the offence which was issued in his name but was recovered from another individual.
The Supreme Court of India has held that the acquittal of a co-accused and the failure to establish a charge of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the IPC does not automatically result in the acquittal of another accused on a substantive charge under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act), particularly when a separate charge for the substantive offence has been framed and there is direct and corroborated evidence of demand and acceptance against that accused. The Apex Court explained that the testimony of a complainant in a trap case is not that of an accomplice and can form the basis for a conviction if the court, after careful scrutiny, finds the witness to be truthful and reliable.
Further, the evidence of independent witnesses who may have turned partially hostile cannot be discarded in its entirety; rather, the court is entitled to consider and act upon the creditworthy parts of their testimony that provide corroboration to the prosecution’s case, such as the recovery of tainted money from the accused and the positive results of scientific tests, added the Court.
A Two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice K. Vinod Chandran found the demand was not proven due to inconsistencies in witness testimony regarding the initial demand amount. It observed that while there was a discrepancy regarding the October 2010 demand, the prosecution witness was consistent about the demand of Rs. 5 lakhs made by the second accused. This specific demand prompted the complaint to the CBI and was corroborated by the complaint itself and the testimony of the Trap Laying Officer (TLO).
In a criminal appeal filed before the Supreme Court seeking anticipatory bail in connection with a First Information Report (FIR) registered for offences punishable under Sections 414, 413, 420, 120-B, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), and Sections 61(2) and 132(1)(b) of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, a Bench comprising Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice Prasanna B. Varale granted anticipatory bail to the appellant.
The prosecution asserted that, upon intercepting a truck carrying vehicle scraps, it was found that the vehicle scraps were stolen and that the documents tendered for inspection were also forged. It was submitted that the purchaser, the vehicle-owner, and the driver had already been enlarged on bail at different stages.
The Supreme Court has set aside a High Court order directing a de novo trial in a 2007 murder case, holding that procedural defects in framing charges cannot invalidate a trial in the absence of demonstrated prejudice. A Bench of Justice R. Mahadevan and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah held that the trial had substantially complied with legal requirements, observing that “the record affirmatively establishes that the accused were fully aware of the nature of the accusations and had an effective opportunity to defend themselves.”
Thus, the Court held that the absence of a signature on the charge was not a serious legal defect but only a procedural lapse. Reiterating the statutory position under Sections 215 and 464 CrPC, the Court clarified that such an irregularity falls within the scope of curable defects under the CrPC and does not invalidate the trial unless it causes prejudice. Since no failure of justice was shown, the Court concluded that the trial remained valid and the defect did not affect its legality.
In an appeal filed before the Supreme Court challenging Allahabad High Court’s judgment dated 27-06-2022, whereby the prayer for quashing a First Information Report (FIR) filed under Section 3(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (1986 Act), and the review filed for the order was rejected, a Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice K. Vinod Chandran set aside the impugned judgment and quashed the said FIR due to procedural irregularity.
The Court stated that for a gang chart to be approved, the written recommendations of the Nodal Officer and the Additional Superintendent of Police (ASP) must be signed by the Superintendent of Police (SP) and the District Magistrate (DM). It was noted that neither the recommendations nor the signatures were visible on the FIR along with the gang chart. The Court noted the State’s contention that the Nodal Officer, as well as the ASP, had signed the same with the recommendations on 20-05-2022, and that the SP and DM had approved it by signing on 26-05-2022 and 28-05-2022, respectively.
The Supreme Court has held that an accused who is charged with an offence under Section 302 of the IPC cannot be convicted for an offence under Section 364 of the IPC by taking recourse to Section 222 of the CrPC. The Court reasoned that Section 364 IPC is not a ‘minor offence’ in relation to Section 302 IPC. The two are separate and distinct offences, are not cognate, and their essential ingredients are not common.
Therefore, convicting an accused under Section 364 IPC without framing a specific charge for it, when the original charge was for Section 302 IPC, is a violation of fair trial norms and is not legally sustainable, added the Court.
A Two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Aravind Kumar and Augustine George Masih observed that the primary issue was whether the respondent could be convicted under Section 364 IPC when the charge was framed only under Section 302 IPC. The Bench upheld the view of the High Court that had overturned the conviction, stating that convicting the accused for the said charge without prior notice would cause serious prejudice.
The Supreme Court has clarified that a mere breach of contract or the failure to fulfil a promise, especially in a high-risk commercial venture, does not automatically give rise to a criminal offence of cheating under Section 420 of the IPC. For an offence of cheating to be established, it is imperative for the complainant to demonstrate that the accused possessed a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the very inception of the transaction when the inducement was made.
The Apex Court ruled that the subsequent dishonour of a post-dated cheque, issued to discharge a pre-existing liability rather than as an initial inducement, is insufficient in itself to prove the existence of such dishonest intention from the beginning. Where the facts of a case primarily disclose a civil dispute, criminal proceedings should not be sustained, and the High Court ought to exercise its inherent powers to quash them to prevent an abuse of the process of law.
On criminal breach of trust, a Two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Manoj Misra concurred with the High Court’s finding that no offence under Section 406 IPC was made out because the essential element of ‘entrustment’ of property was absent in the transaction between the parties. On cheating and dishonest intention, the Bench reiterated that a crucial ingredient for the offence of cheating is the existence of a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise or inducement.
In an appeal filed before the Supreme Court against an order dated 18-09-2025 by the High Court of Bombay, whereby respondent 1 was granted bail, a Bench comprising Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice R. Mahadevan set aside the impugned order and directed respondent 1 to surrender within a week.
Respondent 1 was alleged to be in a relationship with the appellant’s daughter (deceased), who was engaged to another person. Upon gaining knowledge of her engagement, respondent 1 circulated intimate photographs of the deceased on social media and also forwarded them to her prospective groom. Thereafter, the wedding was called off, which led to the suicide of the deceased.
High Courts
Conviction Cannot Rest on Incomplete Chain of Circumstances; Bombay HC Acquits Man in Murder Case
The Bombay High Court set aside a murder conviction and life sentence, holding that the prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances necessary to sustain guilt in a case based entirely on circumstantial evidence.
The Court emphasised that a conviction in a circumstantial evidence case requires a complete and unbroken chain pointing only to the guilt of the accused, which was clearly absent in the present case. The court observed that “establishing one or two circumstances beyond reasonable doubt is not sufficient to hold that the entire chain of circumstances is complete…there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.”
In a petition filed before the Jharkhand High Court regarding the investigation being conducted of a 12-year-old girl child’s rape and brutal murder, a Division Bench of Justice Sujit Narayan Prasad and Justice Anubha Rawat Choudhary directed the institution of a suo motu case as a public interest litigation, reprimanded the improper investigation being conducted, and issued notice with other directions.
A copy of a news published in a daily newspaper ‘Hindustan’, dated 29-03-2026, was presented before the Court by the Amicus Curiae, regarding the commission of rape of a 12-year-old girl child and her brutal murder that took place in Hazaribagh on 24-03-2026. It was submitted that the tongue of the victim was cut and that there were serious injuries to her private parts.
Considering the sensitivity of the issue and the lethargic attitude of the police, the Court took cognizance of the incident with a direction to institute a suo motu case as a public interest litigation. The Court requested the Member Secretary of the Jharkhand State Legal Services Authority (JHALSA) to join the proceedings. Thereafter, the Court also requested the Superintendent of Police (S.P.), Hazaribagh, to join the proceedings virtually, who stated that endeavours were being made to ensure a proper investigation.
In a petition filed before the Delhi High Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), seeking quashing of a First Information Report (FIR) registered under Sections 289/125(a) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) as well as the proceedings arising from the same, a Single Judge Bench of Justice Prateek Jalan allowed the petition while quashing the FIR as well as the proceedings against the petitioner company.
The Court referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303, Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466, and stated that the High Court may invoke its inherent jurisdiction even in cases involving non-compoundable offences to quash criminal proceedings on the basis of a settlement, but such exercise is discretionary. The Court stated that, when considering the quashing of such proceedings, it must be examined whether the allegations constitute gross negligence and the required element of mens rea, so that the probability of conviction is present.
The Gauhati High Court has held that properties which have no nexus to a criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence cannot be regarded as proceeds of crime, and attachment of property acquired prior to the commission of the crime would not fall within the definition of the proceeds of crime.
However, in view of there being a disputed question of fact with regard to when the property had been purchased and keeping in mind the fact that the property had allegedly being registered in the name of the appellant only during the period of commission of the crime, the said disputed question of fact would have to be proved by way of evidence. Till the time it is proved that the property had been bought prior to the commission of the crime/offence, the Court is not inclined to allow the present petition.
The Division Bench comprising Justice Michael Zothankhuma and Justice Kaushik Goswami observed that the attached property is required to have a connection with the crime in question. The enforcement authority has to be able to trace the attached property to the criminal act relating to the scheduled offense, in terms of Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). Only a property which is connected with the proceeds of the crime can be attached and the only exception to the above, is when the property derived out of criminal activity is taken out of India and held outside India.
The Madras High Court (Madurai Bench) has held that initiating criminal proceedings containing grave and unsubstantiated allegations against a spouse and their family members subsequent to the filing of a divorce petition, coupled with neglecting the spouse and children, constitutes cruelty. The Court asserted that such subsequent conduct of pursuing a domestic violence petition on merits without withdrawing it nullifies any presumption that the prior acts of cruelty were condoned by a brief resumption of cohabitation.
Consequently, the High Court set aside the order of the Family Court, and dissolved the marriage between the appellant and the respondent on the ground of cruelty.
The Division Bench comprising Justice G.K. Ilanthiraiyan and Justice R. Poornima observed that although the appellant (husband) raised allegations of adultery against the respondent, he failed to implead the alleged adulterer as a party to the proceedings, but primarily sought dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty. The Bench noted that the respondent (wife) filed domestic violence case, making allegations of harassment and dowry demand against the appellant and his parents, only after the appellant filed the divorce petition.
In a petition filed before the Allahabad High Court by two adults staying in a live-in relationship, a Division Bench of Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Tarun Saxena granted interim protection from arrest to the couple and restrained the family members of petitioner 1 from causing harm to the parties or from contacting them directly/indirectly.
Petitioner 1 was a major as per the First Information Report, however the informant stated that she was taken away after being coaxed by petitioner 2. It was argued before the Court that petitioner 2 was a married man and hence, it was an offence for him to stay with another woman.
The Court said that when a married man stays with an adult in a live-in relationship with the consent of such adult, he cannot be prosecuted for any offence. It was stated that if there is no offence under the law, social opinion and morality would not guide the Court in protecting citizens’ rights.
In a criminal revision filed before the Kerala High Court challenging an order dated 11-12-2018 by the Sessions Court, Alappuzha, whereby a prayer for discharge by the 5th accused was disallowed, a Single Judge Bench of Justice G. Girish affirmed the impugned order and dismissed the revision petition.
The Court noticed the records and stated that there were specific allegations regarding the rape committed by the petitioner upon the minor girl in a hotel room. The Court said that the minor girl’s statement may have certain contradictions or inconsistencies, but stated that it was not possible to embark upon probability at the stage of framing of charges. It was stated that the trial court would decide whether the prosecution would succeed in establishing the charges levelled against the petitioner after meticulously analysing the evidence.
In an appeal filed by the State before the Delhi High Court challenging an acquittal by the Trial Court, a Single Judge Bench of Justice Chandrasekharan Sudha refused to take a lenient approach and sentenced the respondent to rigorous imprisonment along with fine under Section 109 read with 376, Sections 366, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) as well as simple imprisonment under Section 323 of IPC while directing Delhi State Legal Services Authority to award appropriate compensation to the victim.
The Court referred to Parameshwari v. State of T.N., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 209, to state that the compensation payable to the victim is only restitutory and that it cannot be considered as a substitute for punishment. It was stated that the respondent played an active role in luring PW3, facilitated the commission of rape, remained present during the act, and also threatened her. It was noted that even after the offence, the respondent did not show any reformation as she was subsequently found to be involved in multiple criminal cases and was in judicial custody.
In a revisional application filed before the Calcutta High Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), seeking quashing of criminal proceedings as well as the charge sheet filed regarding the said proceedings pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Second Court, Port Blair, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, a Single Judge Bench of Justice Tirthankar Ghosh refused to interfere with the proceedings and dismissed the application.
The Court noted that the petitioner had been charged under Sections 354A/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), and had preferred a discharge application before the trial court, which refused to discharge the petitioner. Considering the witness statements, the Court found consistency in the accusations. Considering the materials on record, the Court stated that it would be unwise to accept the petitioner’s contention that the investigation was a result of a mala fide complaint for vengeance.
In an application in a suit filed before the Delhi High Court under Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) for initiating perjury proceedings against defendant 1 for making false statements on oath, a Single Judge Bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad dismissed the application while holding that the same had been filed only to derail the Court and to harass defendant 1.
The Court observed that on 15-07-2025, defendant 1 was asked by this Court to file an affidavit disclosing all assets received by him upon the demise of his father, and the plaintiff was directed to file the Joint Schedule of Properties. Thereafter, plaintiff 1 filed an application stating that defendant 1 had failed to comply with the said order, as he had not disclosed the bank accounts and financial investments of the business. By an order dated 12-11-2025, defendant 1 was directed to file an additional affidavit disclosing the same.
Delhi HC Denies Quashing of FIR against Lalu Prasad Yadav for Procuring Land in Lieu of Railway Jobs
In a writ petition filed by Lalu Prasad Yadav before the Delhi High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), for quashing a First Information Report (FIR) registered under Sections 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), read with Sections 11, 12, 13(1)(d), and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, charge sheets dated 07-10-2022, 01-07-2023, and 07-06-2024, as well as three cognizance orders, a Single Judge Bench of Justice Ravinder Dudeja dismissed the petition and held that Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act is prospective and that the bar under it would not be applicable to the present case.
The Court noted the petitioner’s submission that the absence of prior approval before the initiation of the preliminary enquiry and the registration of the FIR rendered the entire investigation non est in law, and that no independent challenge was laid to the factual foundation of the allegations or the existence of material collected during the investigation.
The Court found that Section 17A, introduced by Act 16 of 2018, does not display any legislative intent to operate retrospectively by any express or necessary implication. It was said that a provision restricting the initiation of an enquiry or investigation against a public servant regarding recommendations made in the discharge of official functions affects the power of investigation and cannot be retrospectively applied unless the statute mandates it.
The Delhi High Court has dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of two men accused of murder, holding that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt in a case riddled with contradictions, doubtful recovery of the weapon and serious investigative lapses. The Division Bench of Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Madhu Jain upheld the trial court’s decision acquitting the accused of offences under Sections 302/34 and 323/34 IPC.
The case stemmed from the recovery of a man’s body near Punjabi Bagh Metro Station in November 2010. The prosecution alleged that a quarrel at a liquor shop over refusal to supply a particular brand of country liquor escalated into a fatal assault. Two co-workers of the deceased, projected as injured eyewitnesses, claimed that the accused attacked the deceased with an iron rod and assaulted them when they intervened.
In an application filed before the Calcutta High Court under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), seeking anticipatory bail for a crime registered under Sections 137(2)/140(3)/351(2)/76/64(2)(f)(m)/115(2)/126(2)/3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), a Single Judge Bench of Justice Jay Sengupta granted an anticipatory bail to the petitioner while holding that his custodial interrogation was not required.
The petitioner was the maternal grandfather of the alleged victim, who used to be tortured at her in-laws’ place. The petitioner, along with other relatives, rescued the victim and filed a complaint for a First Information Report (FIR) to be lodged against the husband and in-laws. After staying at her parental house for some time, she went back to her matrimonial house and lodged an FIR alleging sexual assault by the petitioner in collusion with other relatives. It was also alleged that the petitioner had forced her to file the previous FIR.
In a petition filed before the Delhi High Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), seeking quashing of a First Information Report (FIR) dated 07-03-2019 under Section 308 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) on grounds of settlement between the petitioner and respondent 2 (complainant), a Single Judge Bench of Justice Prateek Jalan allowed the petition and quashed criminal proceedings against the petitioner.
The petitioner was an orphan being looked after by the Missionaries of Charity in Delhi. Respondent 2 and her husband applied to the District Judge, Delhi, for their appointment as her guardian under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (G&W Act), when she was three months old. The application was allowed, and the couple was appointed as the petitioner’s guardians until she attained the age of majority.
In an application filed before the Delhi High Court seeking anticipatory bail regarding a First Information Report (FIR) registered under Sections 376(2)(n)/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), a Single Judge Bench of Justice Prateek Jalan allowed the application and granted anticipatory bail to the applicant, subject to a few conditions.
The Court noted that the NCR also was regarding physical assault, but no allegation of rape was made. The allegation of rape was made for the first time in her complaint dated 15-09-2025, based upon which, the said FIR was registered.
The Court stated that there was a possibility that a physical relationship may have been made without a promise of marriage and that the pre-marriage rituals, the duration of the relationship, as well as the contents of the complaint dated 22-07-2025, rendered prima facie plausibility to the applicant’s case. Hence, the Court allowed the application.
The Bombay High Court has clarified that an offence of cheating, as defined under section 415 of the Indian Penal Code, requires a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the very beginning of the transaction. Thus, the Court ruled that a mere breach of contract or a subsequent failure to keep up a promise is not sufficient to constitute the criminal offence of cheating.
As in the present case, there was no evidence of deception at the inception or any fraudulent act by the petitioner company, the Court said that its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, should be exercised to quash criminal proceedings to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This power can be used when unimpeachable documents produced by the accused substantially wipe out the allegations in the FIR, even if the investigation is still in progress.
The Court went on to explain that an investigation initiated against ‘unknown’ persons after a lengthy preliminary enquiry, without identifying any specific accused, amounts to a ‘roving and fishing inquiry’. Hence, the continuance of such a criminal proceeding cannot be permitted on the ground that the investigating agency may find the culprits at some future date.
Delhi High Court has refused to entertain a writ petition filed by an absconding proposed detenue seeking quashing of a detention order issued under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA Act).
The case arose out of allegations that export incentive scrips issued by the Director General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) were fraudulently manipulated through unauthorised access to the Customs Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) system, causing an estimated loss of approximately ₹73.55 crores to the exchequer. The petitioner was alleged to have been part of a larger conspiracy involving tampering with licence values and routing funds through shell entities.
Madras HC Grants Bail in Case of Abetting Suicide of Man who Caught his Wife Cheating with Accused
In a criminal original petition filed before the Madras High Court under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), seeking bail, a Single Judge Bench of Justice C. Kumarappan granted bail to the petitioner subject to certain conditions.
It was submitted that when the deceased person returned to his home, he witnessed that his wife was in a compromised position with the petitioner, and disturbed by this occurrence, the deceased committed suicide. Hence, the petitioner was arrested and remanded to judicial custody on 06-02-2026 for committing an offence under Section 108 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).
The Court noted that such things may cause some disturbance in an individual’s mind, but could not find any other external factor so as to bring prima facie material for the abetment of suicide. It was also noted that the deceased person’s wife was not an accused in the matter and that the petitioner had been languishing in jail since 06-02-2026.
The Allahabad High Court has upheld the conviction of a man for attempting to murder his wife, affirming a 1985 trial court judgment and directing him to surrender to serve his sentence. The Court dismissed the criminal appeal filed by the appellant challenging his conviction under Section 307 of the IPC, holding that the prosecution had successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt primarily on the basis of the testimony of the injured wife.
Justice Abdul Shahid emphasised that the injured witness, being the wife of the accused, was a “sterling witness” whose testimony carried strong evidentiary value and could not be doubted merely due to minor inconsistencies or lack of independent corroboration. The Court ruled: “It is highly improbable that she have any doubt about identification of her husband. It is also highly improbable that she has falsely implicated her husband in the said offence.”
Conviction Under Section 324 IPC unsustainable without Proven Medical Evidence: Delhi HC
The Delhi High Court partly allowed the appeal and modified the conviction of the appellant from Section 324 IPC to Section 323 IPC, holding that the prosecution failed to establish the use of a “dangerous weapon” due to lack of properly proved medical evidence.
The Court noted that medical documents such as post-mortem reports or MLCs do not constitute substantive evidence by themselves. It reiterated that only the testimony of the doctor who prepared such documents qualifies as substantive evidence. These documents can ordinarily be used only for corroboration or contradiction unless the conditions under Section 32(2) of the Evidence Act are satisfied.
In a bail application filed before the Delhi High Court seeking regular bail regarding a First Information Report (FIR) filed for offences under Sections 308/318(4)/319 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), a Single Judge Bench of Justice Girish Kathpalia denied bail to the applicant based on the nature of cyber fraud and the expanse of the digital arrest in similar cases while dismissing the applications. The case of the prosecution was that the applicant, along with two co-accused persons, committed cyber fraud by carrying out a digital arrest of the complainant, who was an elderly lady.
In a couple of applications filed before the Delhi High Court seeking anticipatory bail regarding a First Information Report (FIR) filed for offences under Sections 420/463/464/465/468 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), a Single Judge Bench of Justice Girish Kathpalia denied grant of anticipatory bail to the applicants and directed them to surrender before the Investigating Officer.
The applicants collected almost Rs. 12,00,000/- from individuals with an assurance that they would get them a job in the railways. The complainant was also defrauded by the applicants. Three people had agreed to pay Rs. 12,00,000/-, which was to be paid stage wise. The applicant called all of them to her office in a school and gave them forms, instructing them to practice filling the same and that original forms would be shared before the senior railway officials.
The Court stated that this was not a simple case of fraud played on a gullible individual. It was said that a number of young aspirants were cheated, many of whose parents spent their entire life savings so that their ward gets a job with the railways. Further, the Court noted that the victims were taken to different offices and training centres, and stated that this would not have been possible without complicity of railway officials. It was said that this vast network of fraud must be thoroughly investigated and that the requirement of the Investigating Officer for custodial interrogation of the applicants was justified.
In a criminal appeal filed before the Delhi High Court to challenge an order dated 30-10-2023 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Karkardooma Courts whereby the appellant was convicted for an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), a Division Bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Ravinder Dudeja set aside the impugned orders and acquitted the appellant of the charges framed against him.
Placing heavy reliance on the statement of the uncle, the Trial Court found that the prosecution was able to establish that it was the appellant who had stabbed the deceased and that the knife had been recovered at the behest of the appellant. Hence, the Trial Court found the appellant to be guilty of an offence under Section 302 of the IPC.
The Court stated that on the testimony of a sole witness, conviction can be sustained, provided the witness is wholly reliable and his testimony is of stellar quality. Although the Trial Court had relied heavily on the testimony of the uncle, the Court found that the same was inconsistent, concerning his very presence at the crime scene. The Court found his presence at the place of the incident was not corroborated by his brother’s statement.
In a bail application filed before the Delhi High Court seeking regular bail in a case registered against her for the commission of offence under Sections 8, 21, 23, and 28 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), a Single Judge Bench of Justice Manoj Jain disposed of the application while granting bail to the applicant.
The Court referred to Section 103(8) of the Customs Act and did not find any clear hint of specific willingness or admission from the bare contents of the notice. It was noted that the applicant was told that, if she so desired, her personal and baggage searches could be conducted before a Magistrate, a Gazetted Officer, or any lady officer of customs, and she consented to be searched by any such officer.
The Court found that the translated copy generated through AI did not contain her response and that it merely contained her signatures and the signatures of the person who explained the contents to her. Hence, the Court said that it was not clear whether the applicant was actually apprised of her legal rights in a manner desired and whether the search was conducted as per her response.
The Bombay High Court has clarified that the power of judicial review in a writ petition challenging an arrest under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) must be exercised with caution, and a court will not interfere unless there is manifest arbitrariness or gross non-compliance with the statutory safeguards provided under Section 19 of the PMLA.
The Court explained that the offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the PMLA is an independent offence concerning the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime. It is not a prerequisite for a person to be arraigned as an accused in the predicate scheduled offence to be prosecuted under the PMLA.
Accordingly, the High Court held that the ‘reasons to believe’ required for an arrest under Section 19(1) of the PMLA can be founded upon tangible material gathered during an investigation, such as the seizure of disproportionate assets and incriminating statements. The sufficiency or adequacy of such material is not to be scrutinized in-depth by a court at the initial stage of the investigation.
In a criminal writ petition filed before the Bombay High Court seeking quashing of a First Information Report (FIR) registered by the Joint Secretary (Law), Law Department, Secretariat against the petitioner and her husband for offences punishable under Section 304-A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), a Single Judge Bench of Justice Ashish S. Chavan allowed the petition and quashed the FIR as well as the proceedings against the petitioner.
The Court found it imperative to refer to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dr. Suresh Gupta v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. (2004) 6 SCC 422 and Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (2005) 6 SCC 1, and stated that the Supreme Court had categorically differentiated the jurisprudential concept of negligence in civil and criminal law by observing that what may be negligence in criminal law may not be negligence in civil law.
Further, the Court stated that to prosecute a medical professional for negligence under criminal law, it must be shown that the accused did something or failed to do something that no medical professional, in the exercise of ordinary sense and prudence, would have done or failed to do. It was stated that the negligence or incompetence alleged against the medical professional must show disregard for the life and safety of his patient so as to amount to a crime against the State.