During the hearing, Justice Jyomalya Bagchi posed a question to Solicitor General Tushar Mehta on whether courts can distinguish between an individual’s assertion of faith and the existence of that faith within a denomination, without entering into the substance of the belief itself.

Responding, SG Tushar Mehta submitted that while the existence of a belief within a religious denomination may be examined by courts using established legal tools, the validity, rationality, or scientific basis of that belief lies outside judicial scrutiny, as matters of faith may not conform to scientific temper or empirical verification. He highlighted that Article 25 protects faith even where it may not align with scientific reasoning, and courts cannot test religious beliefs on standards of rationality or scientific logic. He clarified a two-step approach: while courts may examine whether a belief is actually held by a denomination or section thereof, they cannot adjudicate upon the truth, validity, or essentiality of that belief

He further clarified that the Court may determine, as a matter of fact, whether a particular belief is genuinely held by a section or denomination, but not whether such belief is “essential” in a theological sense. According to him, if a practice appears irrational or socially undesirable, the appropriate remedy lies in legislative intervention under social reform, rather than judicial determination of essentiality.

He further stressed that even long-standing religious practices are subject to legislative intervention under Article 25(2)(b), which expressly empowers the State to enact laws for social welfare and reform, including regulating or prohibiting practices considered undesirable.

Mr Mehta also suggested that where disputes arise on whether a practice qualifies as religious at all, such questions are better suited for adjudication in civil suits, where parties can lead evidence and expert testimony. He cautioned against deciding such issues solely on affidavits in writ proceedings under Articles 32 or 226.

Mr Mehta rejected the view that Article 26 operates as a standalone right, submitting that Articles 25 and 26 must be read harmoniously with each other and with other fundamental rights, and cannot be treated as isolated or overriding provisions.

Emphasising that India is marked by both inter-religious and intra-religious plurality, he illustrated how Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism each comprise multiple denominations, sects, and doctrinal variations. This internal diversity, he argued, makes it constitutionally inappropriate to identify any singular or universally binding “essential” practice, reinforcing the need for judicial restraint in matters of faith.

During the hearing, Mr Mehta also took strong exception to the framing of the Sabarimala issue through the lens of patriarchy. He argued that Indian society has historically accorded women a position of respect and reverence, and cautioned against importing Western notions of gender inequality into the Indian constitutional context.

He further clarified that earlier constitutional and statutory interventions on temple entry were aimed at eliminating caste-based exclusion, and not gender-based distinctions. Taking objection to the 2018 Sabarimala judgment’s reference to “untouchability”, he submitted that Article 17 cannot be invoked in the context of menstruation.

Defending the Sabarimala practice, Mr Mehta characterised it as a sui generis denominational practice, stressing that Ayyappa temples across the country permit entry of women, with the restriction limited to one specific temple. He argued that not all religious practices can be tested on the touchstone of individual autonomy or dignity, and that certain practices such as dress codes or entry conditions in places of worship must be viewed as expressions of faith and denominational belief.

In his post-lunch submissions before the nine-judge Bench, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta placed significant reliance on the Court’s early Constitution Bench judgments, particularly Shirur Mutt and Venkataramana Devaru, to argue that the Constitution does not permit courts to determine the “essentiality” of religious practices. He submitted that these rulings recognise that matters of religion include not only doctrines but also rituals, observances, and modes of worship, and that it is primarily for the religious denomination itself to decide what constitutes its practices. Mehta contended that the later evolution of the essential religious practices doctrine represents a judicial departure from this position.

He further argued that Articles 25 and 26 must be harmoniously construed, emphasising that while denominations enjoy autonomy in matters of religion under Article 26(b), such rights are not absolute and may be subject to laws enacted for social reform under Article 25(2)(b). At the same time, he cautioned that this balance must be carefully maintained, and that courts must assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether giving precedence to one right would effectively nullify the other.

Referring to Devaru, Mr Mehta highlighted that denominational rights may yield to the right of temple entry in certain contexts, but not to the extent that the denomination’s core religious practices are extinguished. He stressed that the constitutional scheme requires a doctrine of harmonious construction, rather than hierarchy, between competing religious freedoms.

Additionally, he reiterated that judicial review in matters of religion must remain limited, and that courts cannot undertake theological inquiries into what is essential to a religion. According to him, such determinations lie within the domain of the faith itself, subject only to constitutional limitations such as public order, morality, health, and legislative reform.

The matter will be heard tomorrow.