The Supreme Court has held that in an eviction suit under the State Rent Act, the landlord is required to plead only the material facts constituting the landlord-tenant relationship and the statutory grounds for eviction; and evidence such as share certificates, family arrangements, and other supporting materials forms part of proof and need not be specifically pleaded in the plaint. The Court clarified that where the plaint in substance discloses the plaintiff’s status as co-landlord and the statutory eviction grounds, and the parties have proceeded to trial with full knowledge of the case and led evidence thereon, the suit cannot be defeated in appeal on an objection of deficient pleadings.
The Court further laid down that a co-owner having an interest in the land and building and being entitled to receive rent falls within the statutory definition of “landlord,” and that a share certificate in respect of land carries, in the absence of contrary intention, an interest in the building constructed thereon by operation of Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Consequently, such co-owner is competent to maintain an eviction suit.
The Court also held that subsequent events may be taken into account in eviction proceedings, and that an oral family arrangement or settlement among co-owners can be relied upon to explain later developments affecting bona fide requirement and availability of accommodation. At the same time, temporary occupation by the landlord of some family premises during pendency of litigation does not by itself defeat bona fide need, particularly where such occupation is provisional and the available accommodation is insufficient. On the facts, the Appellant had proved bona fide requirement, the tenants’ alternate accommodation, and greater hardship in her favour; hence the High Court erred in reversing the concurrent decrees of eviction.
A Two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Manmohan framed the substantial questions of law around what constitutes a pleading, the distinction between pleading and proof, and whether those tests were satisfied in the present case. It reiterated that pleadings must contain only material facts in summary form and not the evidence by which those facts are proved, drawing the distinction between facta probanda and facta probantia. The Bench emphasised that pleadings are meant to give fair notice of the case and define the points in issue, and that their sufficiency must be assessed having regard to the nature of the proceeding.
The Bench held that in a suit for eviction under the State Rent Act, the landlord is required to plead and prove only two essential aspects: the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship and the statutory ground for eviction. On examining the plaint, the Court found that Appellant-Plaintiff No. 1 had specifically averred that she, along with other family members, was landlord of the building and had sought recovery of possession on the statutory grounds of bona fide requirement, comparative hardship, and alternate accommodation. Accordingly, the plaint contained the necessary material facts, while the affidavit-in-evidence, family arrangement, and share certificates were matters of proof and were not required to be pleaded as evidence in the plaint itself.
The Bench further observed that even assuming some deficiency in pleading, such objection could not be permitted to defeat the suit at the appellate stage where the parties knew the case, went to trial on that basis, and led evidence on the relevant issues. It held that where the pleadings in substance contain the necessary averments and the parties were conscious of the issue and led evidence thereon, the absence of more elaborate pleadings cannot be raised for the first time in appeal as a ground to non-suit the plaintiff.
On title and status as landlord, the Bench held that the share certificates, though relating to the land, also carried with them an interest in the building standing thereon by virtue of Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, there being no case that the building belonged to any third party. Since the Appellant’s evidence that the certificates had been transferred in favour of her and her siblings on July 05, 1987 remained unchallenged, the Bench concluded that she had proved that she was a holder of the share certificates, had an interest in the land, and was a co-owner of the building at the time of institution of the suit.
Applying Section 5(3) of the Act, the Bench held that being a co-owner and being entitled to receive rent, including on behalf of her mother, Appellant-Plaintiff No. 1 fell within the statutory definition of “landlord.” The Bench thus rejected the respondents’ objection that there was a foundational jurisdictional defect in the suit for want of specific pleading of landlordship.
The Bench also accepted that subsequent events can, in appropriate cases, be taken into account so as to make the relief just and meaningful, provided fairness to both sides is maintained. It therefore permitted reliance on the subsequent oral family arrangement or settlement among the co-owners, and held that such arrangement could be oral and unregistered and yet be recognised in law. The Bench treated the arrangement as a subsequent development explaining the Appellant’s occupation of Flat Nos. 5 and 6 and her continuing need for the suit premises, rather than as an impermissible new foundation of the suit.
On bona fide requirement, the Bench found that the Appellant had both pleaded and proved that she had no other premises in Mumbai, that her family consisted of her husband and two children, that the available family accommodation in Flat Nos. 5 and 6 was insufficient, and that her temporary co-occupation of those flats after her father’s death did not negate her bona fide need. It reaffirmed that the tenant cannot dictate to the landlord which premises should be used by the landlord.
On comparative hardship and alternate accommodation, the Bench observed that the relevant inquiry after the death of Virginia Lacerda was whether her successors to the tenancy had alternative accommodation. It found that Defendant No. 1 owned Flat No. F-129 in Madhuvana Society, Defendant No. 2 owned Flat No. D-82 in the same society, and Defendant No. 3 was in occupation of one of those flats. The Bench also treated the sale of Defendant No. 2’s flat during the pendency of the suit as conduct indicating an attempt to avoid eviction. It therefore held that greater hardship would be caused to the Appellant if eviction were refused, especially since she continued to have no accommodation available for her use in Mumbai, while Respondent No. 1 was residing and working in Pune and owned property there.
Briefly, the appeal arose from the Bombay High Court’s judgment, by which the High Court set aside the concurrent judgments of the Small Causes Court and the Appellate Bench, dismissed the landlord’s eviction suit, and directed restoration of possession of Flat No. 2, Memorare Building, Chembur, Mumbai, to Respondent No. 1.
The land on which the suit building stood had been leased for 99 years by St. Anthony’s Homes Cooperative Society Ltd. to the parents of Appellant-Plaintiff No. 1, who constructed the Memorare Building consisting of six flats. Five share certificates were initially issued in favour of the parents, and those share certificates were transferred into the joint names of Appellant-Plaintiff No. 1, Respondent No. 2-Plaintiff No. 2, and other family members. The suit premises was Flat No. 2 in the said building.
A sub-tenancy agreement in respect of Flat No. 2 was executed by the Appellant’s father in favour of Augustine Lacerda. Upon Augustine Lacerda’s death on December 07, 1969, the sub-tenancy devolved upon his widow Virginia Lacerda. After Virginia Lacerda died, the eviction suit was instituted in July 1993 by Appellant-Plaintiff No. 1 and Respondent No. 2-Plaintiff No. 2 against her legal heirs on the grounds of bona fide requirement coupled with comparative hardship under Section 13(1)(g) read with Section 13(2), acquisition of alternate accommodation under Section 13(1)(l), and change of user under Section 13(1)(k) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.
The Appellant’s case was that at the time of filing of the suit, only Flat Nos. 5 and 6 were available to the co-landlords, and those flats were occupied by her parents. Her father died on February 24, 1994 after institution of the suit. She pleaded and deposed that she had no other accommodation in Mumbai, had shifted to Mumbai during the pendency of the suit, and was residing temporarily in Flat Nos. 5 and 6, while under an oral family arrangement those flats were meant for the brothers’ use and Flat No. 2 was to be available to her upon eviction of the tenants.
The Trial Court decreed eviction in favour of Appellant-Plaintiff No. 1, holding that her need was bona fide, that the tenants had acquired alternate suitable accommodation, and that comparative hardship tilted in her favour, though the claim of Plaintiff No. 2 was rejected and the ground of change of user was also rejected. The Appellate Bench dismissed the tenants’ appeal. The High Court, however, in revision accepted the tenants’ challenge and set aside the concurrent decrees, principally on the premise that the Appellant had not properly pleaded her status as landlord.
Appearances:
Siddharth Bhatnagar, Sr. Adv., Pritha Srikumar Iyer, AOR, Arun Srikumar, Adv., Nadeem Afroz, Adv., Ritwik Gupta, Adv., for the Appellants
Prashant Shrikant Kenjale, Adv., Upendra Mahadik, Adv., Damini Vishwakarma, Adv., B Dhananjay Balaji, Adv., M/s Juristrust Law Offices, AOR, Naveen Hegde, AOR, Bhargavi Bhardwaj, Adv., for the Respondents
