Senior Advocate Shyam Divan, appearing before a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court, advanced his arguments on the interpretation of fundamental rights, urging the Court to adopt a composite and evolving approach to Part III of the Constitution.
Referring to the landmark judgment of I.R. Coelho (Dead) by Lrs. v. State of Tamil Nadu. Citation: (2007) 2 SCC 1, Mr Divan emphasized that fundamental rights cannot be viewed in isolation but must be read together to effectively protect individual liberty.
He submitted that the Court’s concern should be with safeguarding the “space and liberty reserved to citizens”, which, according to him, is better achieved through a collective reading of rights rather than in silos.Mr Divan also revisited the concept of the “golden triangle” comprising Articles 14, 19 and 21, and suggested that the Court may consider expanding its scope. In this context, he argued that the right to freedom of religion under Articles 25 and 26 may also merit inclusion within this core basic structure.
Mr Divan raised concerns about judicial overreach, submitting that even court orders must remain within constitutional limits of Article 25:
“while exercising adjudicatory powers in the non-judicial review situations, courts must ensure that their judgments comport to the contours of the right to freedom of religion. Incursions by the state prohibited by part 3 of the constitution ought not to come through court orders and judgments.”
He also highlighted the importance of denominational autonomy, arguing that the freedom to manage religious affairs under Article 26 is fundamentally about autonomy and should be protected from excessive state interference.
“A central notion in human rights law is personal autonomy and by extension to group autonomy. The freedom to manage religious affairs under article 26 allows every religious group. These rights are essential to safeguard the autonomous functioning of religious groups, denominations and sections.
The right to autonomy in managing religious affairs protected under article 26 applies to all religious groups and is subject only to three specific areas of permissible incursion, namely public order, morality and health. And our final point, state incursion into the right to freedom of religion is permissible only for stated constitutional purposes that are essentially secular in character. The incursion cannot result in excessive government entanglement which fails the test of proportionality. Denominational autonomy is sacrosanct and must be preserved, or I should have said ought to be preserved by and protected by this court.”