Senior Advocate Jaideep Gupta, appearing for the State of Kerala, continued his submission on the 14th day of the Sabarimala reference. He argued that constitutional courts are duty-bound to determine whether a practice constitutes an essential religious practice when adjudicating claims under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

Continuing his submissions, Mr Gupta relied extensively on precedents, including Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal, Shirur Mutt, Seshammal, Devaru, and Abhiram Singh @ Abhadoot Jagdishwaranand, contending that while courts must exercise restraint in religious matters, adjudication on essential practices cannot be avoided.

Referring to the Anandamargi Tandav dance case, Mr Gupta submitted that this Court had recognised the Tandav dance as an essential religious practice but nevertheless held that performing it publicly was not essential. “The Court accepted the religious practice, but held that public performance was not integral,” he argued.

Addressing concerns raised during the hearing regarding judicial scrutiny of religious practices, Gupta cited observations from Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal, where the Court acknowledged that determining essential religious practices is “neither an easy nor an enviable task,” but one constitutionally entrusted to courts acting as arbiters under Articles 25 and 26.

“I bow down that all restraints must be exercised while dealing with religious practices. Citizens’ emotions are involved. But sometimes it has to be done,” Mr Gupta submitted, emphasising that courts evaluate evidence and doctrine rather than substituting personal views.

On the distinction between religious and secular activities under Article 25, Gupta argued that no rigid test exists and that courts must apply “common sense,” as observed in Ratilal. He submitted that the balance between religious autonomy and secular regulation must be determined case-by-case.

On Article 25(2)(b), Gupta contended that social reform provisions necessarily intersect with religion because social practices are often sanctified as religious obligations. “If you want to reform social rules, you will have to touch religious practice,” he argued.