The Supreme Court has held that an order of the competent executive authority refusing concurrence for premature release/remission, particularly where it affects personal liberty, must be a reasoned order disclosing the basis of the decision; a non-speaking and cryptic rejection is arbitrary, violates principles of natural justice, frustrates judicial review, and is therefore unsustainable in law. Further, denial of remission cannot be founded solely on the heinousness or gravity of the offence, because remission is a distinct executive exercise focused on the prisoner’s conduct in custody, reformation, and prospects of reintegration, the gravity of the offence having already been accounted for at the sentencing stage.
The Apex Court clarified that where the State has recommended release, the prisoner’s conduct is good, a long period of incarceration has been undergone, and parity with a similarly placed co-accused is shown without any rational distinguishing basis, the Court may itself grant relief instead of remanding the matter if remand would be an empty formality.
A Two-Judge Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan found that the impugned MHA letter was ex facie non-speaking and cryptic because, although it referred to having considered the relevant documents and judgments, it did not disclose any reason whatsoever for disagreeing with the State Government’s recommendation for premature release. The Bench observed that any order affecting a person’s rights, especially personal liberty, must record reasons and reflect due application of mind, and that recording of reasons is a safeguard against arbitrariness, ensuring transparency, fairness, and accountability in decision-making. The absence of reasons rendered the order bald and made it impossible to ascertain whether relevant factors had been considered.
The Bench further observed that the impugned order contained no discussion of the petitioner’s conduct, the applicable remission policy, or any specific adverse material against him, and therefore failed to meet the minimum requirement of a reasoned order. Such a cryptic rejection, according to the Court, violated the principles of natural justice and also frustrated effective judicial review, because without reasons a constitutional court cannot meaningfully examine the propriety of the decision. The Bench emphasized that executive discretion in remission matters, though broad, is not uncanalised and must be exercised on relevant, rational, and non-discriminatory considerations and not on irrelevant or extraneous grounds.
The Bench reiterated that remission must be tested on factors such as whether the offence was an individual act without affecting society at large, the chance of recurrence, whether the convict has lost the potentiality to commit crime, whether any fruitful purpose would be served by continued confinement, and the socio-economic condition of the convict’s family. The Bench noted that in the present case there was not even a bare attempt to give reasons. Although ordinarily the matter could have been remanded, the Bench held that remand would serve no useful purpose because the Union of India had already clearly articulated before the Court its stand on merits, namely, that remission should be refused having regard to the petitioner’s role in the offence.
The Bench then examined the legal position governing remission and distinguished remission from pardon, reprieve, respite, and commutation. It reiterated that remission merely reduces the period of sentence without altering its character; neither the conviction nor the guilt of the offender is affected, and the sentence as imposed by the court remains intact except to the extent of abridging actual incarceration. The Bench also noted that while remission cannot be claimed as an absolute right, a convict has a legal right to be considered for remission in accordance with the governing policy, and all persons falling within such policy are entitled to equal treatment. The Bench also reiterated that the length of sentence or gravity of the original offence cannot by themselves constitute the sole basis for refusing premature release, and that the assessment must instead turn on antecedents and conduct during custody.
On merits, the Bench observed that the only faint ground invoked by the Union of India was the heinous nature of the crime. The Bench held in clear terms that denial of remission cannot rest solely on heinousness, because remission is a distinct executive function concerned with the prisoner’s present conduct, evidence of reformation, and prospects of reintegration into society. The gravity and heinousness of the offence stand exhausted at the stage of sentencing, and to deny remission only on that basis would collapse the distinction between sentencing and remission and reconvert remission into a retrospective reaffirmation of guilt. The Bench stressed that the decision on remission must emerge from a holistic assessment of the prisoner, balancing societal interests with the prisoner’s right to fair and reasonable consideration for release.
The Bench finally found several factors in favour of the petitioner: first, the State of Uttarakhand had itself recommended his premature release after considering the relevant factors and his custody certificate dated May 16, 2025 specifically recorded that his conduct during incarceration had been good; second, he had already undergone more than twenty-two years of incarceration; third, co-accused Amarmani Tripathi had already been granted premature release after a lesser period of incarceration, and no cogent, rational, and clearly discernible distinguishing circumstances had been shown to justify differential treatment; and fourth, continued incarceration would run contrary to the reformative object underlying remission and premature release policies, particularly when the competent authorities had found his conduct and rehabilitation satisfactory. On this cumulative reasoning, the Bench held the MHA’s letter arbitrary, non-speaking, unsustainable in law and on merits, quashed it, and directed that the petitioner, already on interim bail, be treated as having been prematurely released/remitted.
Briefly, the petitioner has sought quashing of the Ministry of Home Affairs’ letter dated July 09, 2025, by which the Union of India declined to concur with the recommendation of the State of Uttarakhand for his premature release, despite his having undergone approximately twenty-two years of incarceration. The case arose from an FIR registered on May 09, 2003 under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 at Mahanagar Police Station, Lucknow. The investigation was first conducted by the Uttar Pradesh Police and CB-CID and was thereafter transferred to the CBI. The trial, though originally in Uttar Pradesh, was transferred by the Supreme Court to Dehradun, and the petitioner was convicted by the Special Judge, Dehradun under Sections 120B/302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment and fine.
Thereafter, on September 06, 2022, the petitioner made a representation seeking premature release. When no action followed, he approached the Uttarakhand High Court, which directed consideration of his premature release within a week, failing which he would be released on bail. Upon failure of the State to decide within the stipulated time, he was granted bail. Subsequently, he was informed that the appropriate Government had rejected his application for premature release on the ground that his case fell within clause 5 of the Uttarakhand Permanent Policy, 2022, being a CBI-investigated case under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, and he surrendered on June 17, 2023.
The State of Uttarakhand thereafter recommended the petitioner’s premature release and forwarded the proposal to the MHA on June 12, 2025. The MHA, after seeking comments from the CBI, communicated that it did not concur with the proposal for premature release. The petitioner amended the writ petition to challenge this communication. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the impugned letter was a non-speaking order and also relied on parity, pointing out that co-accused Amarmani Tripathi had already been granted premature release by the Government of Uttar Pradesh on August 24, 2023 after undergoing approximately seventeen years of actual sentence and twenty years with earned remission.
Appearances:
Pradeep Misra, AOR, N. Hariharan, Sr. Adv., Aditya Vaibhav Singh, Adv., Vanya Gupta, AOR, Aarushi Singh, Adv., Aman Akhtar, Adv., Rekha, Adv., Riya Parihar, Adv., Arjan Singh Mandla, Adv., Shivendra Singh, Adv., Sanjukta Das, Adv., for the Appellants
Sudarshan Singh Rawat, AOR, Mr. Sunny Sachin Rawat, Adv., Suveni Bhagat, AOR, Rachna Gandhi, Adv., Pradeep Misra, AOR, Vikramjit Banerjee, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, AOR, S.N. Terdal(AOR), Adv., Raman Yadav, Adv., Siddhartha Sinha, Adv., Sonali Jain, Adv., Bharat Sood, Adv., Srishti Mishra, Adv., Arvind Kumar Sharma (AOR), Adv., Shashank Manish, AOR, Nidhi Sahay, Adv., Pragati Singh, Adv., Subhdra S. Chatterjee, Adv., Devjani Sarswat, Adv., Hitesh Kumar Sharma, Adv., Akhileshwar Jha, Adv., Anupam Kumar, Adv., for the Respondents
