In a batch of petitions filed before the Allahabad High Court seeking directions upon respondents 5 and 6 to refix the petitioners’ salary as per the communication dated 20-11-2025 by the Finance Controller, Board of Basic Education, UP, and to command the respondents to disburse the petitioners’ monthly salary regularly, a Single Judge Bench of Justice Manju Rani Chauhan disposed of the petition and directed the competent authority to examine the individual representations of the petitioners as per the statutory provisions, government orders, and the observations made in the present judgment.
The petitioners were Assistant Teachers appointed by the Basic Shiksha Adhikari on 28-06-2016. As 01-07-2016 was a public holiday on account of being the last friday of Ramadan, the petitioners could not join their respective posts on that date, and accordingly submitted their joining on 02-07-2016. After their joining, the State Government issued a Government Order dated 22-12-2016, revising pay scales with retrospective effect from 01-01-2016. In the pay fixation, the first increment was sanctioned from 01-07-2017, whereas the petitioners contended they were entitled to fixation of the first increment on 01-01-2017.
The petitioners submitted a representation contending entitlement to the first increment from 01-01-2017, on which no action was taken. Thereafter, the Finance and Accounts Officer, Basic Shiksha, Pilibhit, sought guidance from the Finance Controller, Board of Basic Education, Uttar Pradesh, who clarified that persons appointed, promoted, or granted financial upgradation between 2nd January and 1st July would be entitled to increment on the following 1st January, while those appointed between 2nd July and 1st January of the succeeding year would be entitled to increment on the succeeding 1st July, relying on paragraph 8(2) of the Government Order dated 22-12-2016.
It was argued that para 8 of the Government Order referred only to the date of appointment, not the date of joining, and since their date of appointment was 28-06-2016 (falling within 02-01-2016 to 01-07-2016), they were entitled to increment from 01-01-2017. They further relied on a Government Order dated 27-02-2009, which provided that where an employee was prevented from joining on the date of appointment due to a Sunday or public holiday and joined on the succeeding working day, such intervening holiday would not operate to the employee’s prejudice.
The Court held that the controversy could not be resolved merely by treating the date of actual joining as the sole and inexorable criterion for determining the date from which the benefit of the first increment would accrue. It was said that the distinction between the date of appointment and the date of joining, particularly in a situation where the appointee was prevented from joining on the immediately succeeding day due to a public holiday or an intervening circumstance attributable to the administration, assumes decisive significance.
It was found that the joining of the Assistant Teachers on 02-07-2016, when 01-07-2016 was a public holiday, could not be understood as an abandonment or postponement of the rights flowing from their appointment, particularly when the inability to join on the earlier date was occasioned by a circumstance beyond their control. The Court said that administrative instructions could not be interpreted so as to visit an appointee with an unintended disadvantage for an event which is neither attributable to him nor within his control. It was stated that if the governing provisions recognise such joining as valid and effective from the date on which the appointment became operative, the consequential service benefits must necessarily follow from that position.
The Court stated that an increment is not a bounty bestowed at the discretion of the employer, but a service benefit regulated by the applicable service rules and the Government Orders issued thereunder. Once the qualifying period prescribed for its accrual is completed, the employee becomes entitled to its benefit in accordance with the governing rules. It was said that the legally recognised date of appointment cannot be artificially postponed merely because the appointee, for reasons beyond his control, entered upon actual physical service only on the next working day.
It was clarified that the entitlement to the benefit must flow from the statutory rules and government orders applicable to the employees concerned and not merely from the nomenclature or wording employed in the appointment or joining orders. The Court said that where the statute leaves the matter to be regulated by executive instructions, the government orders, if otherwise valid and consistent with the statutory framework, would govern the determination of the employees’ entitlement.
The Court held that the real test is the legally recognised commencement of service for particular benefit and not the mechanical comparison of the dates appearing on the appointment letter and the joining report. It was also held that the benefit cannot be withheld by adopting an interpretation which penalises the appointees for a circumstance which was neither occasioned by them nor capable of being avoided by them. Hence, it was held that the Assistant Teachers were entitled to have their service benefits considered while the respondents were directed to undertake the same in light of the statutory provisions as well as the government orders and to not reject the claim merely on the ground that the actual joining report was submitted on 02-07-2026.
The petitions were disposed of with a direction to the competent authority to consider and decide the individual representations by the petitioners, specifically indicating their respective dates of appointment, dates of joining, and the circumstances in which they could not join on the first day of the relevant month. The competent authority was directed to examine each petitioner’s claim in light of the statutory provisions, the applicable government orders and the observations made in the judgment, and to pass a reasoned speaking order within six weeks from the date of receipt of such representation.
