I. Introduction

Sedition is a deliberate act by any person in which extreme expressions (such as writing, speech, etc.) are made against the government or country with the purpose of challenging the very existence of a government through a tendency toward violence or disorder in general. The law of sedition has continually been one of the most important and complex topics of constitutional law, criminal law, and human rights.[1] According to the Law Commission of India, sedition is mainly expressed through words rather than action. The ultimate goal is to break the tie between the nation as represented by the legally created government and individuals whose obedience the government has the authority to compel. However, the measures used, in most cases, are a prelude to more serious actions. Similarly, an act of sabotage, while certainly undertaken with the intention of hampering the nation’s military efforts, is an indirect–and hence difficult to detect–method of attaining that goal. The term ‘subversive activities’ is a useful name for categorizing these actions, as opposed to more serious acts of ‘overthrowing’ the government.[2]

In Reg v. Alexander Martin Sullivan[3], Justice Fitzerald stated that sedition is a crime against society that is essentially identical to treason and frequently precedes treason by a short period of time. Sedition is a broad phrase that encompasses all actions, whether by speech, deed, or writing, that are intended to disturb the peace of the state and inspire uneducated people to attempt to overthrow the government and the laws of the empire. The general goals of sedition are to cause dissatisfaction and unrest, to stir up hostility to the government, and to drag the administration of justice into disrepute; and the very nature of sedition is to provoke the people to revolt and rebellion.

Sedition law in India, embodied in S. 124A[4] of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860, has been a source of legal and political dispute for decades. The law, adopted by the British colonial authority in 1870, was intended to repress dissent against colonial rule by criminalizing any speech, writing, or behavior that incites hatred, contempt, or disaffection with the government. Under this law, seditious activities can result in life imprisonment, fines, or both. Though it was meant to prevent insurgency, the law has been criticized in independent India for violating the basic right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a)[5] of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court’s historic ruling in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar[6] upheld the legality of the sedition legislation while limiting its application to acts of instigation to violence or public disorder. Despite this interpretation, sedition charges continue to be brought against activists, journalists, and political adversaries, prompting widespread calls for reform or abolition. As India evolves as a democratic society, the relevance of sedition law remains a sensitive subject, even if the term ‘sedition’ has recently been removed from S.152[7] of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).

II. History of Sedition law in India

In 1837, Thomas Babington Macaulay[8] proposed S. 113 of the Penal Code as a provision for sedition in India. He relied solely on England’s severe and harsh theoretical definition of sedition. He failed to address the practical consequences of sedition in England, which significantly reduced the harshness of the law. The practice of sedition in England had no effect on him, most likely because he believed that it was easy to rouse Indians. He described Indians as ‘vulnerable and easily excitable subjects’ who were also prone to religious violence.[9] Therefore, in his profound misunderstanding of Indian knowledge, he believed it essential to enact harsh rules punishing even political speeches and writings so that the Indian people of inferior intellect may be safeguarded from the intellectual effect of ‘skillful orator’ and writer.[10]

Ten years after the first draft, the Law Commission provided a second IPC report in 1846, in which some members expressed their dissatisfaction with the provision of sedition, which almost defined mere unpleasant statements and trifling slander as sedition.[11] Aside from the text of S. 113 of Macaulay’s Code, they appear to be concerned with the disproportionate punishment of transportation for life. There was more aversion to verbal communication because it could be inadvertent. However, the majority of the Law Commission dismissed these concerns to the sedition provision. The rationale offered was that, in comparison to documented writing, the influence of a speech delivered by a skilled speaker is easy, quick, and potentially harmful.[12]

In support of the sedition clause, the majority of the Law Commission in 1846 claimed that the rule was not designed to punish ‘mere vague words spoken at random’ but only statements that had a tendency to stir those to whom it was addressed. The condition is that such comments were spoken with the necessary mens rea (guilty mind) of knowing that they had the potential to provoke agitation and disaffection with the government. In 1854, the draft code was referred to another committee[13], where Barnes P. Peacock proposed changes to make the provision for sedition in line with British law. He proposed sedition as an offense only if it incited others to engage in acts of violence or rebellion to the state.

The inclusion of Peacock’s recommendation regarding the ‘incitement’ aspect provided more protection for ‘expression’ against the government. Peacock’s draft was never approved.[14] The Select Committee concluded that Barnes Peacock’s updated draft did not improve upon the original document. For one thing, it was really harsh.[15] Though the Macaulay code was lauded as clever, ‘the draft languished in opposition to such a radical change. Until the 1857 uprising, the forces of inertia prevailed’.[16]

When the Macaulay draft was finalized in the form of the IPC in 1860, the sedition element remained missing. It was shocking because the 1857 uprising was against the government. A provision for ‘sedition’ could have addressed any future attacks on the administration.Sedition entered Anglo-Indian law in 1870, when Sir Barnes Peacock discovered that the comprehensive IPC of 1860 had forgotten its inclusion[17] thus, S. 124A was inserted into the IPC in 1870. It included a main clause and one explanation. The characteristics connected with sedition here were very different. Unlike England, it was broadly defined. Disaffection, with no further potential consequences, was deemed to be a crime. The punishment prescribed was life imprisonment.

The offense was not bailable. Prosecution was initiated in full force. The jury members were mostly British, and convictions were obtained in the majority of instances.[18] In 1898, S. 124A was revised to change the primary clause and substitute one explanation with three. The word sedition was substituted for ‘exciting disaffection’ in the marginal note. ‘Hatred and contempt’ were inserted after ‘disaffection’. It was a non-cognizable offense until 1973. During British time and until 1973, no arrest could be made without a magistrate’s warrant, but after 1973, police were granted the authority to arrest without the warrant.[19]

III. Section 124A of Indian Penal Code and its constitutional validity

S. 124A of the IPC, also known as the sedition statute, has been the topic of intense legal research and popular controversy in India. The Supreme Court’s legal interpretation of S. 124A has developed over time, with the goal of striking a balance between state security protection and constitutionally recognized fundamental rights. Sedition is defined under S. 124A of the IPC as any conduct, speech, or writing that ‘brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards the government established by law’. The phrase ‘disaffection’ refers to feelings of animosity or hostility.

The British introduced this clause to repress opposition and nationalist movements in colonial India, and notable leaders such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Mahatma Gandhi were charged for sedition. During his sedition trial in 1922, Gandhi declared that ‘affection cannot be manufactured or regulated by law’, condemning the colonial government’s attempt to suppress free expression.[20] After independence, the sedition statute was kept in the IPC, however its implementation has been called into question in light of constitutional rights for free speech under Art. 19(1)(a). The law’s expansive phrasing, particularly the ambiguous terms ‘disaffection’ and ‘hatred’, has generated worries about its possible abuse.

Judiciary on Sedition Law

Queen Empress v. Jogendra Chunder Bose[21] was India’s first sedition case, heard by the Calcutta High Court in 1891. The founder, editor, manager, and printer of a Bengali magazine, Bangobasi, were all tried for sedition after publishing an article criticizing the British government’s decision to raise the age of consent for sexual intercourse. While the trial was underway, the charges against the accused were eventually withdrawn after they offered an apology. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, an important player in the independence movement, was convicted of sedition twice. The Bombay High Court sentenced Tilak in 1897 for his statements during a Shivaji festival, which reportedly led to the death of two British officers. The presiding Judge enlarged the definition of ‘disaffection’ against the government under S. 124A of the IPC to include disloyalty. Tilak was convicted of sedition again in 1908 by the same Court for his contributions to Kesari, the Marathi journal he founded in 1881.[22]

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was accused with sedition in 1922 and prosecuted at the Sessions Court in Bhadra, Gujarat, for writing politically sensitive articles for the Young India periodical. Gandhi and the journal’s publisher both entered pleas of guilty.[23] Gandhi read a statement at the trial that detailed his dissatisfaction with the British government over time. He accused S. 124A of the IPC of restricting citizens’ freedoms, claiming that ‘affection towards the government could not be produced’. Gandhi was convicted and sentenced to six years in prison.[24] The Federal Court of India defined sedition as ‘public disorder or the reasonable prospect or likelihood of public trouble’[25] in 1942. The Court underlined that sedition implies some form of rebellion or lawlessness. This verdict was later overturned by the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao.[26]

In 1950, in the case of Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras[27] (hereinafter referred as Romesh Thappar case), the Supreme Court ruled that the State of Madras’ decision to prohibit the circulation of a leftist periodical on the grounds of ‘public safety’ violated the Right to Free Expression[28]. In this judgment, Justice Patanjali Shastri underlined that the Constituent Assembly clearly removed the term ‘sedition’ as an exemption to free expression.

In Kedarnath Singh v. State of Bihar[29] (hereinafter referred as Kedarnath case), a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court maintained the constitutional validity of S. 124A of the IPC. Kedar Nath Singh, a Forward Communist Party member, was charged with sedition after criticizing the administration and using harsh language to voice his displeasure with its policies. He claimed that his conviction infringed his right to free speech under Art. 19(1)(a). The Court conceded that, while criminalizing sedition, imposed a restriction on the Right to Free Speech under Art. 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution of 1950, it was still a ‘reasonable restriction’ under Art. 19(2)[30], which specifies the restrictions that may be imposed on the right to free expression and could not be overturned. The Supreme Court underscored the importance of S. 124A in maintaining public order and state security. It stated that the government has a responsibility to safeguard itself from actions that may undermine its authority and promote violence. The Court went on to say that it is every government’s bounden obligation to protect itself from activities that would undermine its authority and disturb the peace of the state.

The court acknowledged that, while free expression is vital, it cannot be extended to acts that endanger the state’s stability. The Court clarified that reasonable criticism of government programs does not constitute sedition. It determined that only comments or actions inciting violence or upsetting public order qualify as sedition under S. 124A. The Court stated that a person has the freedom to say or write whatever he wants about the government or its policies in the form of criticism or comment, as long as he does not incite others to violence against the legally created government or intends to cause public disorder.[31]

This view permitted citizens to express their opinions and criticize the government, preserving democratic discourse while ensuring national security. In the Kedarnath case, the Supreme Court cited several local and international precedents. One such decision was Gitlow v. New York[32] from the United States, in which the Supreme Court supported restrictions on communication that could incite illegal activities, setting a test for limiting free speech when it poses a ‘clear and present danger’. To prevent misuse, the Court issued rules restricting S. 124A to situations presenting clear dangers to public order or national security. The Court’s ruling was consistent with the standards established in Romesh Thappar, which said that speech limits must be reasonable and directly tied to maintaining public order.

In Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab[33] (hereinafter referred as Balwant Singh case), a two-judge Supreme Court bench confirmed its earlier verdict in the Kedarnath case. The petitioners in Balwant Singh allegedly chanted inflammatory slogans following Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s assassination and were later convicted of sedition by lower courts. The Supreme Court acquitted the petitioners, ruling that just chanting slogans without engaging in any other conduct that incites violence does not constitute sedition.

In the Shreya Singhal v. Union of India[34] (hereinafter referred as Shreya Singhal case), the Supreme Court overturned S. 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act), which was used to restrict online speech. The Court determined that the law was too ambiguous and broad, allowing for possible abuse. This decision reiterated that free speech limits must be clear and circumscribed, emphasizing the importance of clarity in statutes such as S. 124A to prevent abuse. Despite the Supreme Court’s restricted reading, S. 124A continues to draw criticism. Many people believe that the law is obsolete and incompatible with modern democratic norms. Critics argue that the ambiguous language of ‘disaffection’ and ‘hatred’ enables authorities to abuse the law against peaceful opposition. They cite cases in which journalists, activists, and critics were charged with sedition for expressing anti-government views.

In 2018, two journalists were prosecuted with sedition for their social media posts criticizing government officials.[35] In 2021, they filed a writ suit at the Supreme Court contesting the legality of S. 124A of the IPC. They stated that the provision violates an individual’s right to freedom of expression under Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, and that the restriction imposed by S.124A is not a ‘reasonable restriction’ under Art. 19(2). They also contend that the precedent established by the Supreme Court in the Kedarnath case in 1962 is out of date since it does not reflect current laws governing safety, security, and public order. Other petitions contesting the constitutionality of this provision have also been linked to this one. The Supreme Court made a landmark decision by postponing all pending sedition proceedings and pushing the administration to reconsider the statute. This order reflects rising worries about the misuse of S.124A and its implications for free expression.

IV. Comparison between Section 124A of India Penal Code, 1860 and Section 152 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023

Comparing Bare Provisions Relating to Sedition in India

Scope and Language

S.124A of IPC prohibits activities that promote ‘hatred’, ‘contempt’, or ‘disaffection’ toward the Indian government. It is broadly defined as ‘words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise’. S.152 BNS replaces the term ‘sedition’ with terms such as ‘secession’, ‘armed rebellion’, or ‘subversive activities’ that undermine ‘India’s sovereignty, unity, and integrity’. This section also incorporates modern communication methods such as ‘electronic communication’ and ‘financial means’, broadening the scope to accommodate current technologies.

Punishments

Under S.124A of the IPC, penalties might range from life imprisonment to a three-year sentence, both of which could include fines. Under S. 152 BNS, the penalties have been revised to include life imprisonment or up to seven years in jail, as well as fines. This adjustment proposes a scale of legal remedies based on the gravity of the acts.

Application and Enforcement

Because of its ambiguous language, the application of S.124A IPC has long been criticized for its potential abuse against political dissent and free expression. S.152 BNS aims to identify the types of activities that are considered violations, but it still provides significant opportunity for broad interpretation, which may continue to effect legal punishment against dissenters in the name of safeguarding national integrity.

Critical Analysis of S.124A IPC and S.152 BNS

S.152 BNS criminalizes ‘acts undermining the sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India’ and punishes them with life imprisonment or imprisonment for up to seven years, as well as fines. The minimum sentence for the offence has been extended from three to seven years. The clause is similar to S. 124A IPC. The provision may not be labeled ‘sedition’, but its essence has been preserved, and it may now cover a broader range of conduct that are ambiguous and obscure in their current form, raising concerns about its legitimacy. A look at the journey and jurisprudence on sedition is an excellent place to think about the ramifications of this clause. Three significant developments in the history of the crime of sedition have occurred in recent years. First, the Supreme Court has stayed S. 124A of the IPC.[38] Second, the Law Commission of India’s 279th report recommended that the offense of sedition remain on the law books.[39] Third, while proposing new criminal code measures, the Home Minister announced in the Lok Sabha that the charge of sedition had been abolished.[40]

S.152 retains the modalities of conducting sedition, such as ‘by words…visible representation’, but replaces forbidden activities. S.124A of the IPC criminalizes the excitement or effort to excite ‘hatred, contempt, or disaffection towards the Government’ as defined by law. S. 152 BNS criminalizes ‘secession, armed rebellion, or subversive acts, or fostering feelings of separatist activities that undermine the sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India’.

In addition to a change in the entity ‘government of India’ in S.124A IPC as opposed to ‘India’ in S.152 BNS, which is the object of the provision, and the expansion in the range of activities that could be considered as threatening the ‘unity and integrity’ of the country, the provision has also added new means of committing the offence by including ‘electronic communication’ and ‘financial means’, and the mens rea requirement of ‘purposefully or knowingly’ committing such an act.

Scope of vagueness

Unlike the IPC, S.152 BNS contains no explanations for the meaning and scope of these terms. For example, in the lack of a legal definition, ‘subversive actions’ reveals neither the nature of the activity that may be termed ‘subversive’, the degree of harm that must occur, nor the aim of such harm. The threshold is broad enough to encompass valid demonstrations and dissents against the government, which are frequently geared at questioning the legitimacy and authority of the government’s policies and acts.

The absence of accompanying legal definitions in the BNS or other legislations raises the danger of overbroad application, rendering the provision imprecise and arbitrary – grounds on which legal measures have previously been struck down.[41] In the Shreya Singhal case, the Supreme Court ruled that S. 66A of the IT Act was unconstitutional on the grounds that terms such as ‘grossly offensive or of menacing character’, ‘annoyance’, ‘inconvenience’, ‘danger’, ‘enmity’, ‘hatred’, and ‘ill will’, which were used to constitute the offence, were vague and ambiguous, making the provision susceptible to abuse by officials.

Similarly, it is unclear what amount of financial support or what type (direct or indirect) of financial contributions would constitute utilizing ‘financial means’ to conduct the act. The explanation for the phrase also appears to be insufficient, leaving it ambiguous. While it mentions certain acts and their purpose – comments expressing disapproval of the Government’s[42] measures and actions to change them through lawful means – it does not specify whether such acts are offensive or fall outside the scope of this section and are not considered an offense. As a result, it fails to grasp the meaning of Explanation 3 to S. 124A of the IPC, on which it appears to be based.

Against dissent?

The Supreme Court highlighted the important difference between disloyalty to the Government and strong criticism of its measures. The Court categorically held that the freedom of speech and expression under the Constitution (Art. 19(1)(a)) includes criticism or comment against the Government and its measures in the strongest words possible. The freedom exists as long as the act does not incite people to violence against the Government or intend to create public disorder. Freedom of speech was to be the norm and sedition the exception. The decision therefore clarified the scope of sedition with the aim to protect dissent from becoming a criminal offence.

In the Balwant Singh case, the defendants shouted slogans such as ‘Khalistan Zindabad’, which are linked to a movement seeking a separate state for Sikhs in India. The Supreme Court ruled that casual slogans spoken without causing disturbance or instigating individuals to cause trouble are not sufficient to constitute sedition. While the Court has shown a strong desire to safeguard free speech, it is unclear if this spirit and tendency has been put into reality.[43] S.152 BNS has the potential to further weaken this safeguard. For example, it is conceivable that simply chanting slogans like the aforementioned one, without any incitement to violence or disturbance, may be interpreted as a secessionist act or inciting thoughts of separatist activities or subversive activity.

Thus, the enlargement of the spirit of sedition in S.150 generalizes a rule intended to apply only in rare circumstances and broadens its scope beyond that of S.124A, as established by judicial decisions. This may raise issues about the law’s capacity to serve its intended aim of distinguishing between sedition and dissent.

Standard of Harm

The present language in the IPC, which was narrowly interpreted in Kedarnath, has been entirely rewritten. The words ‘hatred’, ‘contempt’, and ‘disaffection’ do not appear in S. 152 of the BNS. Notably, one of the primary reasons presented by the petitioners in the ongoing Supreme Court challenge[44] is the ambiguity and subjectiveness of the test of ‘tendency or intention to provoke public disorder’, which was considered to constitute the essence of the crime in the Kedarnath decision. S. 152 may add even more ambiguous thresholds, such as ‘excites or attempts to stimulate subversive actions’ and ‘encouraging feelings of separatist activities’. The section neither defines the terms nor provides any judicial direction on their meaning. The clause’s constitutionality is called into question due to its vagueness and lower threshold. Meanwhile, until clarity is read into the provision, it will be vulnerable to abuse. In fact, some critics believe that S. 152 of the BNS is more subjective and prone to abuse than S. 124A.[45] The section has the potential to criminalize dissent, which is contrary to the constitution’s democratic principles.

V. Conclusion

The legal and social ramifications of the law of sedition in India illustrate a conflict between national security and freedom of expression. S.124A of the IPC was initially designed to silence criticism of British rule. Despite India’s political transformation since independence, this clause has remained intact. The Supreme Court’s 1962 verdict in the Kedarnath case upheld the statute, but only in situations involving incitement to violence or public disruption. This was a historic ruling that struck a balance between the law’s application and people’ rights under Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, which guarantees free speech. However, this court interpretation has not entirely addressed worries about misuse. The continued use of S. 124A has resulted in contentious cases against activists, journalists, and regular citizens who are facing charges for criticizing government policy. Despite the Supreme Court’s directions to minimize misuse, sedition cases are nonetheless routinely filed, indicating a gap between judicial intentions and on-the-ground implementation. In response to these critiques, the new BNS introduced S.152, which aims to replace S.124A. Although the term ‘sedition’ is not used, this new section criminalizes acts that endanger India’s ‘sovereignty, unity, and integrity’, including ‘secession’, ‘armed rebellion’, and ‘subversive activities’. While S.152 seeks to modernize sedition law to address current security risks, it retains some of S.124A’s uncertainties. Terms like ‘subversive activities’ and ‘separatist activities’ are unclear, raising similar worries about arbitrary enforcement. Furthermore, S. 152 broadens the law’s scope by encompassing electronic communication and financial methods, reflecting the evolution of communication in the digital era while potentially increasing surveillance and prohibitions. The main issue with both clauses is their ambiguity, which could jeopardize the guarantee of free speech. The absence of specific definitions for important terms in S.152 risks including legitimate dissent and criticism of government activities, particularly in instances concerning national integrity. This wide phrasing, as seen in S.124A, has the potential to suppress democratic expressions by criminalizing nonviolent opposition.

In 2021, the Supreme Court suspended all ongoing sedition cases, suggesting a review of the statute, indicating the judiciary’s growing concern over the misuse of sedition provisions. This move demonstrates an understanding that legal systems must grow alongside cultural norms in order to defend democratic principles such as the right to dissent. The ongoing examination of sedition legislation, along with a critical public discourse, provides an opportunity to realign India’s legal structure with constitutional principles. In conclusion, while national security is critical, sedition laws must be carefully crafted to prevent infringing on democratic rights.

*Kavya Arora, Supreme Court Legal Research Associate

[1] Manoj Kumar Sinha and Anurag Deep, Law of Sedition in India and Freedom of Expression (The Indian Law Institute, New Delhi, 2018).

[2] See, Law Commission of India, “43^rd Report on the Offences against National Security” 30, para (1971).

[3] (1868) 1 CCLC 44.

[4] The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860) s. 124A- Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards, the Government established by law in India, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment which may extend to three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine.

Explanation 1.- The expression ‘disaffection’ includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity.

Explanation 2.- Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of the Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section.

Explanation 3.- Comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative or other action of the Government without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section.

[5] The Constitution of India, art. 19(1)(a) – All citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression.

[6] AIR 1962 SC 955.

[7] The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act 45 of 2023) s. 152 – Act endangering sovereignty, unity and integrity of India – Whoever, purposely or knowingly, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or by electronic communication or by use of financial mean, or otherwise, excites or attempts to excite, secession or armed rebellion or subversive activities, or encourages feelings of separatist activities or endangers sovereignty or unity and integrity of India; or indulges in or commits any such act shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.—Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures, or administrative or other action of the Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means without exciting or attempting to excite the activities referred to in this section do not constitute an offence under this section.

[8] S. 113 of Macaulay Penal Code – “Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise, attempts to excite feelings of disaffection to the Government established by law in the territories of the East India Company, among any class of people who live under that government, shall be punished with banishment for life or for any term, from the territories of the East India Company, to which fine may be added, or with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine.

Explanation—Such a disapprobation of the measures of the Government as is compatible with a disposition to render obedience to the lawful authority of the Government, and to support the lawful authority of the Government, against unlawful attempts to subvert or resist that authority, is not disaffection. Therefore the making of comments on the measures of the Government with the intention of exciting only this species of disapprobation, is not an offence within this clause”.;

A Penal Code Prepared by the India Law Commissioners and Published by Command of the Governor General of India in Council (Bengal Military Orphan Press, Calcutta, 1837).

[9] Wing-Cheong Chan, Barry Wright et. al. (eds.), Codification, Macaulay and the Indian Penal Code: The Legacies and Modern Challenges of Criminal Law Reform (Ashgate, United Kingdom, 2011).

[10] Supra note 1.

[11] Abhinav Chandrachud, Republic of Rhetoric: Free Speech and the Constitution of India 283 (Penguin Random House, 2017)

[12] Ibid. at 24.

[13] Committee consisted of J.P Grant, B.P Peacock, James William Colvile, D. Eliott and U.I Moffatt Willis.

[14] Supra note 11 at 25.

[15] W.R. Donogh, A Treatise on the Law of Sedition and Cognate Offences in British India 4 (Thakker, Spink and Co., Calcutta, 1911).

[16] Keally McBride, Mr. Mothercountry: The Man Who Made the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2016).

[17] Rajeev Dhavan, “Goon’s Justice, Mob’s Democracy” The Wire, Feb. 20, 2016 available at: https://thewire.in/22113/goons-justice-mobs-democracy/ (last visited on October 30, 2024).

[18] Supra note 11 at 5.

[19] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974) , s. 2.

[20] Francis Watson, The Trial of Mr. Gandhi (Macmillan, London, 1969).

[21] (1892)ILR 19CAL35.

[22] Emperor v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, (1908) 10 BOMLR 848.

[23] Ashwaq Masoodi, “Republic of dissent: Gandhi’s Sedition Trial” Livemint Jan 25, 2019 available at: https://www.livemint.com/politics/news/republic-of-dissent-gandhi-s-sedition-trial-1548352744498.html

[24] In Re: Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi v. Unknown, (1920) 22 BOMLR 368.

[25] available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5and1Edw8/26/2/part/IX/chapter/I/enacted?view=plain

[26] (1947) L.R. 74 I.A. 89.

[27] AIR 1950 SC 124.

[28] Supra note 5.

[29] Supra note 6.

[30] The Constitution of India, art. 19(2) – Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with Foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.

[31] Supra note 6 at para 15.

[32] 268 U.S. 652 (1925).

[33] AIR 1995 SUPREME COURT 1785.

[34] (2015) 5 SCC 1.

[35] S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India, WP (C) 682/2021.

[36] Supra note 4.

[37] Supra note 7.

[38] Supra note 35.

[39] Law Commission of India, “279th Report on Usage of the Law of Sedition” (June, 2023).

[40] PIB Delhi, ‘Union Home Minister and Minister of Cooperation, Shri Amit Shah introduces the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita Bill 2023, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita Bill, 2023 and the Bharatiya Sakshya Bill, 2023 in the Lok Sabha, today’ Press Information Bureau 11 August 2023, available at : https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=1947941

[41] See, Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248; Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1; State of Bombay & Anr. v. F.N. Balsara 1951 SCC 860; Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1951 SC 118.

[42] The reference to the ‘Government’ in the explanation is also significant considering the fact that s. 152, BNS has otherwise omitted reference to the ‘Government established by law’ as the object of protection, as was done in s. 124A, IPC. Instead s. 150 refers to ‘India’ as the object of protection.

[43] Article 14, ‘A Decade of Darkness: The Story of Sedition in India’ available at: https://sedition.article-14.com/ (last visited on October 28,2024).

[44] Tamine Kishore, Petitioner’s Submissions in Kishore chandra Wangkhemcha v. Union of India, SCobserver, available at : https://www.scobserver.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Kishore_Wangkhemcha_v._Union_of_India1.pdf;

Aparna Bhat, Petitioner’s Submission in People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India,SCobserver,available at: https://www.scobserver.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Sedition_WritPetition_PUCL.pdf

[45] See PTI, ‘Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita Bill allows using draconian police powers for political ends: Kapil Sibal’ The Hindu Aug 12, 2023, available at: https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/bharatiya-nyaya-sanhita-bill-allows-using-draconian-police-powers-for-political-ends-kapil-sibal/article67187039.ece;

Lubhayathi Rangarajan, ‘Home Minister Amit Shah Says Sedition Is Dead. But Its Replacement Is More Fearsome Than The Colonial Law Ever Was’ Article 14 Aug 14, 2023, available at: https://article-14.com/post/home-minister-amit-shah-says-sedition-is-dead-but-its-replacement-is-more-fearsome-than-the-colonial-law-ever-was-64d99ff8dc0d8;

Chitranshul Sinha, ‘Sedition law is not gone, it’s set to be more draconian’ , The Indian Express, Aug 12, 2023, available at: https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/sedition-law-is-not-gone-its-set-to-be-more-draconian-8889139/