The expansive reach of social media speech, across territorial boundaries, ensures the government’s continuing interest in controlling online criticism of its actions, and those of its political masters. Takedown directions to block public access to digital speech are permissible, where online content crosses constitutional and statutory boundaries. There remains, however, a clear and present danger of executive overreach targeting inconvenient but constitutionally permissible speech. Unless courts step in swiftly and decisively to check such governmental excess, the track record of which has been uneven at best, the right to free speech, particularly online, will continue to erode.

This article attempts to shed light on how the constitutional protection of free speech is being sidestepped by the government while issuing blocking orders, in an ever increasing effort to curb troublesome social media speech. In particular, we focus on the governing legal architecture under the Information Technology Act, under which takedown orders are issued. The legality of such orders is also being tested before courts, and we point to some recent judicial responses. By way of disclosure, we have appeared / are appearing in some of the cases mentioned in this article, on behalf of the party questioning the legality of blocking orders.

Section 69A

The exercise of the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution is tempered by reasonable restrictions under law, relatable to grounds identified in Article 19(2), such as “security of the State” and “public order”. The Information Technology Act, 2000 (“the Act”) along with the Rules made under it, are precisely such a law that inter alia seeks to regulate online speech.

Section 69A of the Act empowers the Central Government to direct blocking / takedown of social media posts if “satisfied” that it is “necessary or expedient” to do so, on grounds which are referrable to Article 19(2). The reasons for any such blocking direction have to be recorded in writing. The procedure and safeguards governing the exercise of this power may be prescribed. Non-compliance with a takedown direction can lead to imprisonment of up to seven years and a fine.

2009 Rules

The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 provide for all blocking directions to go through an inter-ministerial Committee of high ranking Central Government officers not below the rank of Joint Secretary, required to base their recommendation on a scrutiny of whether the blocking direction is covered within section 69A.

The recommendation is then placed before the Secretary, Department of Information Technology (now the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (“MEITY”)) for a final decision on blocking. Ordinarily, a blocking order is issued after scrutiny by the said Committee, which includes notice and a hearing granted to the person and/or intermediary (such as Google, Meta, X etc.) uploading / hosting the information sought to be blocked. The Rules however also provide for takedown directions as an interim measure, without reference to the Committee, in cases of an “emergency nature, for which no delay is acceptable”. Within forty-eight hours thereof, the matter is to be placed before the Committee for its recommendation, and the blocking direction to be confirmed or revoked considering the recommendation.

Another safeguard is oversight by a Secretary level Review Committee constituted under rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, required to meet at least once every two months and record its findings whether the takedown directions issued accord with section 69A, and if not, to set them aside.

Shreya Singhal case

The constitutional validity of section 69A and the 2009 Rules was challenged before the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1. The Court repelled the challenge inter alia on the ground that section 69 A “is a narrowly drawn provision with several safeguards”. The requirement of recording reasons in writing, enabling a legal challenge to a blocking direction also weighed with the Court while upholding its validity.

2021 Rules

The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, stated to be in addition to the 2009 Rules, apply a regime for blocking orders similar to the 2009 Rules, in respect of publishers of news and current affairs content, and online curated content. Like the 2009 Rules, the 2021 Rules also provide for a recommendatory inter-ministerial Committee, but unlike the 2009 Rules, don’t prescribe a minimum rank of Joint Secretary for its members, but merely refer to “representatives” of the specified ministries. Another difference is that the final takedown order is passed by the Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, and not MEITY, as in the 2009 Rules.

Takedown Misuse

The person responsible for the offending online content is neither served with the blocking order, nor furnished the reasons required to be recorded in writing, in brazen breach of principles of natural justice and the clear statutory mandate. Legal challenges are thus initially mounted only on the basis of the blocking carried out by intermediaries such as X (formerly Twitter) and Google on the direction of the government, with the litigant unaware of the actual order or its underlying reasons, and unable to furnish them to the court.

The government’s justification for not sharing takedown orders is misplaced reliance on a confidentiality provision in the 2009 Rules, stipulating confidentiality in respect of blocking requests and consequential action. Just as a blocking order is issued to the intermediary for compliance, the rule cannot be read to sanction withholding the takedown direction and reasons from the person responsible for the offending digital content, who is entitled to a hearing before the Committee. Confidentiality, at most, is required qua third parties.

As explained above, the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal upheld the validity of section 69A principally because it was narrowly cast and subject to significant procedural safeguards, including the requirement of reasons to enable a legal challenge. By misusing the emergency provisions, and keeping the concerned person in the dark for as long as possible, the government is bypassing these safeguards in practice.

Two recent examples are instructive.

Sanjay Sharma v Union of India

On 12.3.2026, on the government’s direction, YouTube blocked Sanjay Sharma’s news channel “4PM” with approximately 8.3 million subscribers. The blocking order wasn’t shared with the channel but the intermediary informed Sanjay Sharma that the channel and 27 out of more than 50,000 uploaded videos on the channel, had been blocked on a government order “related to national security or public order”. While a hearing before the Committee was subsequently provided, the takedown order was never shared.

With this handicap, the petitioner approached the Delhi High Court challenging the blocking direction. Even in court, the takedown order was not filed. Eventually, after two months of the channel remaining blocked, the Court relegated the matter back to the Committee, while directing that the channel be unblocked in the meanwhile.

Abhijeet Dipke v Union of India

The satirical X (formerly Twitter) account of the ‘Cockroach Janta Party’ was blocked in May 2026. Again, the government failed to communicate the takedown order with reasons to Abhijeet Dipke, who had created the account. In a legal challenge by Dipke, the Delhi High Court, after more than a month of the account remaining blocked, set aside the takedown order without it ever having been shared with the petitioner or even the Court!

Section 79

The Act, under section 79, exempts intermediaries from liability for third party online content hosted on their platforms, subject to certain conditions. Amongst those conditions is the stipulation in section 79(3)(b) that if upon receiving “actual knowledge” or on being “notified” by the government that content on its platform is being used to commit an “unlawful act”, an intermediary fails to expeditiously block access to such content, it is no longer exempt from liability for hosting such content. The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2011 additionally required an intermediary to disable access to online content upon knowledge of offending content as specified in Rule 3(2).

Dealing with a challenge to section 79(3)(b) and Rule 3(4), the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal (supra), upheld their validity, by reading them down. The Court noted that being an exemption provision, section 79 is closely related to provisions for offences, including section 69A. Section 79(3)(b) was read down to apply only where the intermediary receives actual knowledge of a court order/notification by the government. Further, an “unlawful act” was read as confined to matters specified in Article 19(2). Similarly, knowledge under Rule 3(4) was read down to mean by way of a court order.

Under purported cover of section 79(3)(b), read with the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, particularly Rule 3(1)(d), the government has recently created an online platform called “Sahyog Portal” to streamline the process of issuing takedown directions to intermediaries. Significantly, take down directions are no longer being issued only by the Central Government under the framework of section 69A, accompanied by the prescribed safeguards, as discussed above. Rather, through the Sahyog Portal, blocking orders are now issued by the Central and State governments’ high ranking authorised officers, as well as the police, entirely outside the framework of section 69A, without any prior or, exceptionally, subsequent notice and hearing to the affected party whose online content is sought to be blocked. The government has thus conveniently sidestepped the procedural safeguards for takedown directions that weighed significantly with the Supreme Court while upholding the validity of section 69A in Shreya Singhal (supra), instead empowering officers all across the country to issue blocking orders without following principles of natural justice and without significant oversight. The consequence of non-compliance by intermediaries is to lose their exemption from legal liability, otherwise available to them under section 79.

X Corp. v Union of India

In a writ petition filed before the Karnataka High Court, X corp. sought a declaration that section 79(3)(b), being an exemption provision, does not independently empower issuing of blocking orders outside the framework of section 69A, with a further prayer to either read down Rule 3(1)(d) to that extent, or declare it to be invalid. On similar grounds, the validity of the Sahyog Portal was also challenged. The petition was rejected by a single judge of the Karnataka High Court, holding that section 79 read with the 2021 Rules operate independently of section 69A and the procedural safeguards prescribed under it. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal (supra) was held not to apply in light of the 2021 Rules having superseded the 2011 Rules which were under consideration in that case. The decision has been challenged by X Corp. in an appeal before the Division Bench. The Union has, however, recently moved a transfer petition seeking transfer of the said appeal to the Supreme Court, which is where the matter currently rests, with further proceedings before the Karnataka High Court having been stayed pending consideration of the transfer. Unlike most other intermediaries including Meta and Google, X has so far resisted joining the Sahyog Portal.

Conclusion

According to The Indian Express[1], between March and July 2026, about 195,000 takedown directions were issued against content on Instagram, Facebook and YouTube, an average of around 1,275 blocking orders per day. As illustrated above, not only is the government not following the discipline of section 69A while issuing takedown orders under it, a parallel mechanism for blocking has now been created under section 79, whereby intermediaries risk losing exemption from legal liability if they choose not to implement the takedown directions. Government agencies, both central and state, are now empowered to issue blocking orders without the safeguards and oversight accompanying section 69A.

Recent months have highlighted the power of protest in holding the government to account, with social media playing a vital role in the ‘Cockroach Janta Party’ agitation. With an enhanced ability to block online content, with far fewer controls, state excesses encroaching upon the right to free speech are inevitable.

The benignly named “Sahyog” Portal is an automated governmental tool for censorship of inconvenient speech. One can only hope legal challenges to these excesses meet with greater success.

*Akhil Sibal, Senior Advocate

**Jahnavi Sindhu, Advocate, Delhi High Court

[1] ‘Nearly 2 lakh in 5 months: How many ‘take down’ orders government issued ’, written by Soumyarendra Barik, published on 19.8.2026 in The Indian Express