Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, in his opening address at the ASEAN Arbitration Day, 2026, made this observation in recognising the contribution of arbitral institutions to the development of procedural standards across jurisdictions, citing Singapore International Arbitration Centre’s (“SIAC”) emergency arbitration procedure as an illustration.[1] The source and extent of authority under such institutional rules and procedures recently received judicial consideration in Zhejiang Crystal-Optech Co Ltd v Moveon Technologies Pte Ltd (“COT Judgment”).[2]

The High Court of Singapore (“SGHC” or the “Court”) examined the emergency arbitrator’s authority by reference to Article 23(2) of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Rules (“CIETAC Rules”), which provides for applications for emergency relief “in accordance with the applicable law or the agreement of the parties”. In construing these as alternative bases for the applicability of this provision, the SGHC considered whether the requisite power was conferred by Chinese law being the applicable law, or by the agreement of the parties. It concluded that Chinese arbitration law confers exclusive interim relief powers to the Chinese courts and not to emergency arbitral tribunals. Further, the parties’ agreement to adopt the CIETAC Rules did not constitute the distinct agreement contemplated by Article 23(2) of the CIETAC Rules. The SGHC accordingly set aside the enforcement order under section 31(2)(d) of the International Arbitration Act 1994 (“IAA”).[3]

Background

On 21 July 2025, Zhejiang Crystal-Optech Co Ltd (“Zhejiang”) sought emergency relief against Moveon Technologies Pte Ltd (“Moveon”) before CIETAC’s Shanghai Sub-Commission, filing its substantive arbitration application three days later.[4] Following a hearing, the emergency arbitrator issued an interim award on 12 August 2025 restraining Moveon from receiving distributions on its disputed claim in the liquidation of their joint venture company, pending the final award.[5]Zhejiang obtained an enforcement order from the SGHC on 29 August 2025, which Moveon applied to set aside on 17 September 2025 under section 31 of the IAA.[6] The substantive arbitration remained pending before the constituted CIETAC tribunal when the COT Judgment was delivered.[7]

The Court’s Reasoning

In reference to the interpretation of Article 23(2) of the CIETAC Rules, SGHC read the applicable law as the law of the seat and held that Chinese law grants the relevant power only to courts.[8] The remaining route was the agreement of the parties. SGHC held that an agreement to CIETAC arbitration, which carries deemed consent to the CIETAC Rules, is not the distinct agreement that the provision requires. Otherwise, the words would be redundant in every CIETAC arbitration.[9]

This judgment has prompted debate over the contractual and statutory foundations of emergency arbitral authority, including the legal effect of consent to the CIETAC Rules and the extent to which Chinese law reserves the power to grant interim relief to the courts. One of the criticisms is that the emergency arbitrator’s sole function is to consider urgent interim relief before the tribunal is constituted, so that accepting the rules is the most natural evidence that the parties accepted the power that function requires. On that view, a further grant is artificial. SGHC acknowledged one of the views advanced in the Gary Born commentary referred to in the COT Judgment, “agreement to arbitration rules permitting emergency arbitration should be taken to be an express agreement for the emergency arbitrator to have the power to issue interim measures – otherwise, there would be “no point agreeing to the availability of emergency arbitration”” but held that the answer depends on the wording of the rules.[10]

The SGHC’s answer also turns on the difference between a statutory prohibition and legislative silence. Parties cannot agree to override a prohibition in the law of the seat. The Court did not treat silence as equivalent to prohibition, and it accepted that an express agreement is not necessarily ineffective where the lex arbitri is silent, although it treated the broader argument “with circumspection”.[11] On the facts, the arbitration clauses in the CFA and JVA contained no express agreement that emergency arbitrators could grant interim measures, and the Court found that the parties had not agreed on that power in those clauses or elsewhere.[12] The two questions that remain open and undecided are whether a specific express clause would suffice where the seat’s law is silent, and whether the answer differs for foreign-seated CIETAC arbitrations, which the Court described as a separate matter.[13]

Commentary

The COT Judgment effectively underscores the practical importance of enforceability in securing interim protection. Commentary on the decision suggests that the difficulty lies not merely in a gap in Chinese arbitration law, but in the historical development of arbitration as a process subordinate to the courts and shaped by domestic litigation. In that assessment, the prominence of courts and the comparatively limited autonomy of tribunals raise a broader question concerning the extent to which institutional rules can confer interim powers that legislation does not expressly provide.

Indian law faced a comparable question within a different statutory structure, where section 17 expressly provides for tribunal-ordered interim measures, although the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (“ACA”) contains no express reference to emergency arbitrators. In Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v Future Retail Ltd (“Amazon”)[14] the Supreme Court held that an emergency arbitrator’s order in an India-seated arbitration conducted under the SIAC Rules was an order under section 17(1) and enforceable under section 17(2).[15] The unimplemented Law Commission recommendation for express inclusion of emergency arbitrators appointed under institutional rules in the definition of “arbitral tribunal” in section 2(1)(d) of ACA did not foreclose this interpretation by the Supreme Court.[16] Yet, section 17 does not extend to foreign-seated proceedings; section 9, where available, provides independent judicial protection rather than enforcement of the emergency decision.[17] Although this preserves access to relief, establishing entitlement afresh may duplicate proceedings, increase expense and delay protection, diminishing the procedural advantage of emergency arbitration.

It is also important to note that, generally, in common-law jurisdictions, proof of foreign law is treated as a question of fact rather than a question of law. In Singapore, foreign law is treated as a question of fact, established through expert evidence or admissible sources of foreign law.[18] Against this procedural background, members of the Chinese legal community cautioned against reading the COT Judgment as an unqualified pronouncement on Chinese law. The SGHC observed that the Chinese court decisions relied on in support of one expert’s view were not adduced in admissible form, [19] and commentators have stressed that the conclusions must be read in light of the quality of the evidence presented.

Literature on cultural differences in international arbitration recognises that parties adopting the same institutional rules may nevertheless differ in their understanding of the procedure those rules envisage. The seat and the governing law are among the circumstances relevant to assessing the reasonableness of their procedural expectations. Particular significance, therefore, attaches to SGHC’s distinction between statutory silence and a mandatory prohibition. While the parties could not contract out of a statutory prohibition, SGHC acknowledged that an express agreement might confer interim powers where the law of the seat was silent.[20] The question was accordingly whether incorporation of the CIETAC Rules constituted the agreement contemplated by Article 23(2), or whether a distinct expression of consent was required. Cultural differences may inform an understanding of the competing positions, but their legal resolution depends upon the construction of the rules within the applicable legal framework.[21]

*Vyapak Desai, Counsel, International Disputes & Investigations, Vyapak Desai Law Chambers

** Ananya Mittal, is associated with Vyapak Desai Law Chambers.

[1] Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, ‘Opening Address at the ASEAN Arbitration Day’ (21 July 2026) [13], available at https://www.judiciary.gov.sg/news-and-resources/news/news-details/chief-justice-sundaresh-menon–opening-address-at-the-asean-arbitration-day (accessed on 29 October 2026).

[2] [2026] SGHC 186.

[3] COT Judgment (n 2) [85], [88]-[92], and [139].

[4] COT Judgment (n 2) [11].

[5] COT Judgment (n 2) [13], [17]-[20], and [137].

[6] COT Judgment (n 2) [22]-[23].

[7] COT Judgment (n 2) [111] and [137].

[8] COT Judgment (n 2) [85].

[9] COT Judgment (n 2) [88].

[10] COT Judgment (n 2) [90]-[91].

[11] COT Judgment (n 2) [89].

[12] COT Judgment (n 2) [92].

[13] COT Judgment (n 2) [91].

[14] (2022) 1 SCC 209.

[15] Amazon (n 14) [2.3], [23]-[24], [39]-[40], [70]-[72], [101].

[16] Law Commission of India, Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (Report No 246, August 2014) para 7 and proposed amendment 1(i) to s 2(1)(d), pp 10 and 37; Amazon (n 14) [31]-[32].

[17] Raffles Design International India (P) Ltd v Educomp Professional Education Ltd 2016 SCC OnLine Del 5521 [103]-[108].

[18] Pacific Recreation Pte Ltd v S Y Technology Inc and Another Appeal [2008] SGCA 1 [54].

[19] COT Judgment (n 2) [79]-[80]

[20] COT Judgment (n 2) [89]

[21] COT Judgment (n 2) [87]-[91]