The Supreme Court on Tuesday heard a petition concerning the management of the Delhi Gymkhana Club, in which Senior Advocate Vikas Singh argued that the continued exercise of control over the Club by the Central Government-nominated committee was a “malafide exercise to take over the club completely.”

The case arose from the proceedings initiated under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, pursuant to which the NCLT superseded the elected General Committee and permitted the Central Government to nominate 15 directors to manage the Club. The NCLAT, in its judgment dated October 21, 2024, upheld the NCLT order but directed the government-nominated management to complete remedial measures by March 31, 2025 and thereafter conduct elections and install an elected General Council.

Mr Singh submitted that the NCLAT’s direction to hold elections had not been complied with even after the stipulated deadline of June 30, 2025, and that the government-appointed management continued to remain in control. He argued that the management’s authority had consequently lapsed and that the failure to hand back control to the Club’s elected body was being used to facilitate a complete takeover.

Mr Singh further pointed out that the lessor, lessee and Estate Officer were all connected to the Union of India, questioning how the Club’s interests could effectively be defended in the proceedings. He argued that, as a Club member, he needed clarity that he could represent the Club’s interests if an elected General Committee was restored.

The Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V Mohana, however, noted that several connected proceedings concerning the Club were already pending before the Delhi High Court, including proceedings concerning the lease/resumption issue. It indicated that the petitioner could approach the High Court and seek permission to raise the contentions advanced before the Supreme Court.

The petition challenges the May 22, 2026 Resumption Notification, under which the Centre determined the perpetual lease and ordered re-entry into the entire 27.3-acre premises, citing defence infrastructure, public security, institutional and other public-interest requirements. The petition alleges that the stated public purpose is vague and unsubstantiated and that the action is contrary to the terms of the 1928 perpetual lease and Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. The petitioners have also challenged the subsequent eviction notice dated June 29, 2026, issued under the Public Premises Act.

The Supreme Court ultimately directed the petitioners to raise the issues before the High Court in the pending proceedings and clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the contentions.