The Supreme Court 9-Judge Bench engaged in a prolonged and sharp exchange with Senior Advocate Ravi PrakashGupta, appearing for the Indian Young Lawyers Association in the Sabarimala matter, raising serious concerns over the maintainability, basis, and scope of the original Public Interest Litigation (PIL).

Mr. Gupta defended the petition, arguing that it was rooted in concerns raised by multiple media reports from 2006. He submitted that the plea sought the enforcement of women’s right to enter the Sabarimala temple without challenging religious faith.

“I am not challenging any faith, we are seeking entry to repose faith.”

However, the CJI repeatedly pressed him on contradictions within the petition, particularly between the relief sought and the claim that religious beliefs were not being questioned.

“You are asking the State Government, Board and every authority to ensure the entry. Now in prayer 3 you say you do not challenge the faith. How do you reconcile these two prayers- Prayer A and Prayer 3?”

On locus and authorisation of the petitioner association, with the bench pressed Mr. Gupta on whether the Indian Young Lawyers Association had formally approved the filing of the PIL. The judges repeatedly sought a clear answer:

“We are simply asking whether a resolution was passed. If so, whether the President is a signatory to this association.”

Mr Gupta admitted that “to my knowledge, there is no such resolution.”

The judges also questioned the very foundation of the PIL, noting that it appeared to rely heavily on newspaper reports. The bench further raised concerns about the legitimacy of the petitioner association itself, asking whether it had formally authorised the litigation. Justice B.V. Nagarathna asked whether the original petitioner association was a registered body, to which Senior Advocate Mr. Gupta responded in the affirmative and submitted, “Otherwise, I could not have filed this matter. It is a registered body of the lawyers of this court. Most of them are women lawyers… but there are males also”.

The exchange then shifted to a deeper constitutional question, whether a juristic entity like an association could claim religious belief at all:

“How does a juristic body, which is your association, have belief? A juristic body cannot have a belief… it is an individual who can have belief and conscience.”

Responding, Mr Gupta said the issue was about discrimination against women, arguing that the exclusion amounted to an attack on “womanhood.”

“I am first a woman, then I am a Hindu, then I am any other thing. Why has womanhood been attacked? And you are putting words into the mouth of Lord Ayyappa that he does not like young ladies?”

Justice B.V. Nagarathna then, in sharp rebuke, questioned the priorities of the association:

“The Young Lawyers Association has no other business? They can’t work for the welfare of the Bar or assist the Bench or the legal system of this country? Work for the Bar. Work for younger members. Work for their welfare  those who are struggling in the country from rural areas, who have difficulty coming to cities to argue cases. They have brilliant minds… Work for them, rather than doing this kind of work in the Supreme Court.”

Justice MM Sunderesh also delivered a sharp rebuke, observing:

“You have exposed yourself and embarrassed the court by taking up the costly causes like this. It is a clear case of abuse of process of law, executed by the counsel before the Supreme Court, before the nine judges. We are very sorry to say this. It’s a clear case of abuse of process of law.”

The judges further criticised the broader trend of PIL misuse, warning against petitions driven by publicity or insufficient legal grounding.

“It is easy to get articles written for the sake of filing PILs. We are very much aware that we have entertained PILs when we were in the High Court. We are entertaining PILs here for genuine causes, for getting relief to the public who are in real need of it, not for articles being written in newspapers which become the basis of litigation before this Court.”

 Mr. Gupta, in response, defended the role of PILs and argued that once admitted, such matters become the court’s responsibility:

In response to Justice B.V. Nagarathna’s question on why the PIL was filed, Mr. Gupta stated that the issues raised in the petition had already been considered at multiple judicial stages and had evolved into a larger constitutional matter:

“These issues were raised at the time of admission of the writ petition… it was before a two-judge bench, then referred to a three-judge bench, then to a Constitution Bench, and now it is before a nine-judge bench.”

He emphasised that the case had “travelled a long distance” and was no longer merely about the initial filing, but about resolving broader constitutional questions now before the Court.

Mr. Gupta, in response, defended the role of Public Interest Litigations (PILs), arguing that once the Court takes cognisance, the matter transcends the original petitioner:

“Once the court takes cognizance of the PIL, it is not a matter of the parties… it is purely a matter of the court. The court can even replace the petitioner or the counsel, the court is concerned with the issues.”

However, the bench repeatedly emphasised that the hearing was confined strictly to questions of law, cautioning counsel against straying into factual narratives, religious interpretations, or historical accounts:

“Both sides have agreed that we will not address issues of fact. That will be decided at a later stage. We are addressing purely questions of law. Please go into the questions of law.”

Despite these directions, the judges grew visibly frustrated with the lack of focus, repeatedly urging Mr. Gupta to stay on track At one point, the bench remarked pointedly: “You say you are coming, but you are standing there itself,  that’s the problem. You are not coming to the issue.”

Arguments on Constitutional Law and Reference

Mr. Gupta raised objections to the procedural validity of referring the matter to a nine-judge bench. He argued that a reference to a larger bench is meant to resolve unsettled questions of law, not to revisit issues that have already been settled. According to him, the process adopted in this case departed from established judicial practice.

He contended that the matter was initially referred by a smaller bench without following the proper judicial hierarchy, and the reference ought to have been placed before a seven-judge bench rather than directly before a nine-judge bench. Relying on precedent, he submitted that procedural safeguards in such references are essential to maintain consistency in constitutional adjudication, emphasising that what cannot be done directly should not be achieved indirectly.

The bench, however, indicated that these objections had already been considered at an earlier stage and did not require further examination, observing that the issue no longer survived for consideration.

Arguments on Religion, Essential Practices, and Reform

On the substantive issue, Mr. Gupta sought to distinguish between matters of religious belief and social practices. He argued that exclusionary practices based on custom or usage cannot automatically be treated as essential parts of religion, particularly when they result in discrimination.

He submitted that the restriction on women’s entry was rooted in practice rather than core belief, and therefore open to constitutional scrutiny. Drawing on examples of past social reforms, he suggested that practices once justified in the name of religion have been subject to legal intervention where they conflicted with fundamental rights.

The bench, however, steered the discussion away from broader theological or historical arguments and reiterated that the present hearing was confined to constitutional questions of law, not factual or religious determinations.