INTRODUCTION

In a recent decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N. Sanghavi, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 670, addressed a major issue concerning the grant of post award interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”), to an unsuccessful party in arbitration. The Hon’ble Court held that the expression “a party” in Section 9 of the Act cannot be confined to a successful party alone.

In the past, several High Courts had taken divergent views on this question. Some Courts have held that grant of post award interim relief should be limited to the successful parties seeking preservation of the ‘fruits of the award’, while others have adopted a broader, text-based approach that draws no distinction between successful and unsuccessful parties.

Finally, in Home Care Retail Marts, the Apex Court rejected the view that post-award interim relief exists solely to preserve the fruits of an award and has clarified that an unsuccessful party is not automatically excluded from the purview of Section 9 of the Act.

ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENTS OF VARIOUS COURTS

The central issue concerning the post-award relief under Section 9 was regarding whether “a party” in terms of Section 9 of the Act refers to any party to the arbitration agreement, or only to a party that is entitled to the benefit of the award.

The Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in Dirk India Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N. Sanghavi, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 481, adopted a restrictive interpretation, holding that the post-award interim relief under Section 9 of the Act were confined to protecting the fruits of an award pending enforcement given that a Court under Section 34 of the Act can either set aside or uphold the award. Since an unsuccessful party had no benefit under the award requiring protection, it could not invoke Section 9 of the Act after the award was passed. This approach was subsequently reiterated by Hon’ble High Courts of Delhi in (Nussli Switzerland Ltd. v. Organizing Committee Commonwealth Games, 2010, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 4834), Madras (A. Chidambaram v. S. Rajagopal, 2025 SCC OnLine Mad 21599) and Karnataka (Smt. Padma Mahadev v. Sierra Constructions Pvt. Ltd., COMAP No. 2 of 2021).

However, a divergent approach was adopted by several High Courts, including the Hon’ble High Court of Telangana, Gujarat and Punjab & Haryana. In the case of GAIL (India) Ltd. v. Latin Rasayani Pvt. Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine Guj 14836, the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat had observed that Section 9 of the Act confers power upon the courts to grant interim protection at any one of the three stages: before, during or after arbitration proceedings but before the enforcement of award, without any exception to the unsuccessful party. Similarly, in Saptarishi Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. National Institute of Tourism & Hospitality Management, 2019 SCC OnLine TS 1765, the Hon’ble High Court of Telangana emphasized that even an unsuccessful party in an arbitration may require interim protection and will be entitled to the same under Section 9, depending upon various factors including fear of injury or dissipation of the subject matter of the dispute pending Section 34 proceedings. The Hon’ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana adopted the same reasoning in the case of DLF Home Developers Ltd. v. Orris Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine P&H 23764, wherein it held that if the statute provides a remedy, it is open for a party to choose irrespective of whether a party was successful or unsuccessful in the arbitration proceedings.

This difference created uncertainty among the commercial entities, since whether the interim protection would be granted did not depend on the construction of the statute but on the territorial jurisdiction in which the proceedings were instituted.

THE SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH: FOLLOW THE TEXT, NOT THE PURPOSE

The conundrum with respect to post award interim relief has finally been put to rest by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Home Care Retail Marts, which held that a liberal approach should be applied while interpreting “a party” under Section 9 of the Act.

The Hon’ble Court noted that Section 9 of the Act begins with the phrase “a party may”, and that the term “party” is defined in Section 2(h) of the Act without distinguishing between a party that succeeds and an unsuccessful party in an arbitration. Therefore, the Hon’ble Bench found it difficult to construe the same expression in terms of all parties prior to the making of the award and then limiting the meaning of the same to award holders after the award is made. According to the Hon’ble Court, such a construction would tantamount to judicial legislation as opposed to construction of statute.

The Apex Court rejected the doctrinal foundation of Dirk India, wherein it was held that the Courts under Section 34 can only set aside or uphold an award, and cannot reverse the findings of the arbitral tribunal, therefore, the interim measures under Section 9 of the Act can be availed by the successful party only thereby confining its scope to safeguard the fruits of an award. In this backdrop, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the said reasoning was in contradistinction to the ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench decision in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 986, wherein it was held that a court, under Sections 34 and 37, enjoys the discretion to amend the arbitral award in certain cases by striking off any illegal portion of the award from the valid portion thereof. When an award can be amended and is not simply allowed or set aside, then the assumption that there is “nothing to protect the fruits of the award” cannot hold true. The Hon’ble Court, therefore, rejected the proposition that an unsuccessful party is, by the fact alone, excluded from the ambit of Section 9 of the Act.

RECALIBRATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECTIONS 9, 34 AND 36 OF THE ACT

For years, it was assumed that once a party had invoked Section 34 of the Act and obtained a stay under Section 36 of the Act, the requirement for relief under Section 9 of the Act becomes redundant. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has firmly rejected this assumption and held that while Section 34 of the Act is concerned with the validity of the arbitral award and Section 36 about enforcement of the award; Section 9 of the Act serves an altogether different purpose of protecting subject matter pending completion of judicial proceedings.

The Hon’ble Court has further held that an unsuccessful party would be left remediless if it’s application for interim relief under Section 9 of the Act was denied. This distinction carries considerable significance for the jurisprudence governing the scope of Sections 9, 34, and 36 of the Act.

A POSITIVE SHIFT: EXPANDING THE ROLE OF SECTION 9 OF THE ACT

Beyond resolving the doctrinal debate, Home Care Retail Marts marks a welcome and practical advance for arbitration in India. The fact that even an unsuccessful party can approach the Court under Section 9 of the Act, assures that no party is left without a remedy simply because of having lost the case through arbitration. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, thereby strengthened the protective function and scope of Section 9 in as much as a party will always be able to resort to securing against the dissipation of assets, maintaining interim orders obtained during arbitration, securing the contract relationship or even the status quo, which would otherwise have rendered any challenge to an award under Section 34 of the Act useless.

The judgment enhances the integrity of arbitration as a means of dispute resolution by ensuring that the process is not abruptly brought to an end by an unfavorable award. It provides access to justice and contributes towards achieving uniformity of law among jurisdictions as well as giving meaning to the right to challenge arbitral awards under Section 34 of the Act.

CONCLUSION

The judgment in Home Care Retail Marts is more than an adjudication of an interpretive controversy among the High Courts; it is a conscious reaffirmation of the principles of statutory interpretation, parliamentary supremacy and due process in Indian arbitration jurisprudence. By declaring that the term “a party” used in Section 9 of the Act means exactly what the Legislature intended, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has restored textual clarity to a provision that had acquired judicial limitations unsupported by its own terms.

More significantly, the judgment recognizes that the arbitral process cannot be divorced from the judicial process that follows it. The efficacy of arbitration lies as much in the finality of the arbitral award as in ensuring that parties are not left remediless in the interim period between the passing of an arbitral award and its enforcement.

*Mr. Sidharth Sharma, Senior Associate and **Ms. Nandini Gupta Associate