The Allahabad High Court has stayed an FIR registered against Raja Bhaiya, a former Uttar Pradesh Minister, in connection with allegedly offensive and abusive social media posts.
A Division Bench of Justice Abdul Moin and Justice Pramod Kumar Srivastava passed the order while considering Raja Bhaiya’s plea seeking quashing of the FIR registered at Kotwali City Police Station, Pratapgarh, under Sections 356(2) and 352 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Section 67-A of the Information Technology Act.
The petitioner contended that the FIR had been lodged by a representative of the former Minister in relation to social media posts allegedly found to be offensive and abusive.
On the allegation of criminal defamation under Section 356(2) BNS, the petitioner relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Subramaniam Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221, arguing that proceedings must be initiated through a complaint by the aggrieved person.
The petitioner also challenged the invocation of Section 67-A of the IT Act, which deals with publishing or transmitting sexually explicit material in electronic form. Relying on Apoorva Arora & Anr. v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr., 2024 INSC 223, it was argued that mere vulgarity, profanity or objectionable language, without sexually explicit material, would not attract Section 67-A.
On allegation of intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace under Section 352, the Bench noted that the provision requires the insult to be accompanied by provocation intended or known to be likely to cause the person to break public peace or commit another offence. The Court prima facie found substance in the petitioner’s contention that the person allegedly insulted should be the aggrieved person for purposes of lodging the FIR.
The Court further noted that in the present case the FIR had been lodged by a representative of the person against whom the alleged insults were directed.
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“The Court is prima facie of the view that the FIR could not have been lodged by the representative of the said person, inasmuch as it is the person who has been insulted who ought to have lodged the FIR indicating that he had been provoked by such utterances.”
Holding that a prima facie case for interference was made out, the Bench directed that the impugned FIR shall remain stayed until further orders.
