The Allahabad High Court has dismissed a criminal revision petition seeking to impose maintenance liability on a woman’s stepson after her biological son had already been directed to pay her monthly maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). The Court held that once a maintenance order has been passed against the biological son and the mother is receiving maintenance, she cannot seek an additional maintenance order against another person merely because he is also related to her.
Justice Lakshmi Kant Shukla was hearing a revision petition challenging an order of the Family Court, Muzaffarnagar. The Family Court had directed her biological son to pay ₹8,000 per month towards her maintenance but had not fastened any liability on her stepson. Dissatisfied with the order, the petitioner approached the High Court seeking modification of the Family Court’s decision to also hold her stepson liable for maintenance.
Before the High Court, the petitioner’s counsel argued that the Family Court had erred in exempting the stepson from liability solely because he was not the petitioner’s biological son. It was contended that both sons should have been directed to contribute towards her maintenance.
Opposing the plea, the State and the stepson’s counsel submitted that where the biological son possesses sufficient means and has already been directed to maintain his mother, there is no justification for imposing a similar obligation upon the stepson. They argued that the revision petition was devoid of merit and had been filed only to harass the stepson.
Examining the scope of Section 125 CrPC, the High Court observed that while deciding a claim for maintenance by parents, the court must examine the relationship between the parties, the claimant’s inability to maintain herself, and whether the person from whom maintenance is sought has sufficient means to provide such support.
The Court held that although the petitioner may have been unable to maintain herself when she initially filed the maintenance proceedings, the Family Court’s order directing her biological son to pay maintenance had addressed that inability. Since the biological son had accepted the order and had not challenged it, the petitioner was no longer incapable of maintaining herself on account of the maintenance awarded by the court.
Justice Shukla further observed that once a competent court has directed a person liable to maintain the claimant to pay maintenance, the claimant cannot thereafter seek another maintenance order against a different person for the same purpose. Where more than one person may potentially have an obligation to maintain a claimant, it is for the court to determine who should bear that responsibility and to what extent.
Holding that the revision petition lacked any substantive legal basis and appeared to have been filed only to harass the stepson, the High Court dismissed the revision petition and declined to interfere with the Family Court’s order.
