The Bombay High Court has held that a suit alleging forcible dispossession and filed within six months under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act remains maintainable before the civil court, even if the parties are in a licensor-licensee relationship and the premises are situated in Mumbai. The Court also held that Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC could not be invoked because rejection of plaint is possible only when the bar is apparent from a meaningful reading of the plaint itself. Since the plaint here disclosed a maintainable Section 6 suit, neither return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10 nor rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d) was justified on the basis argued by the respondents.
Essentially, the Court clarified that where a plaint is framed as a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and clearly pleads prior possession, dispossession otherwise than in due course of law, and filing within six months, the suit does not cease to be maintainable before the civil court merely because the parties also happen to stand in a licensor-licensee relationship. In such a case, the dominant nature of the action is a statutory summary possessory remedy, not an ordinary licensor-licensee possession dispute under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Farhan P. Dubash said the real controversy was narrow: whether the suit, as framed, was one falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, or whether it was a summary possessory suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. The Court reproduced both provisions and noted the conceptual difference between them. Section 6 gives a summary remedy against dispossession otherwise than in due course of law, while Section 41 applies to suits and proceedings between licensors and licensees relating to recovery of possession in Greater Mumbai.
The Court emphasised that a Section 6 suit is concerned only with two limited questions: whether the plaintiff was in possession, and whether that possession was disturbed otherwise than in due course of law within six months before filing. Questions of title and better rights are outside the scope of such a suit. On the pleadings, the appellant had asserted possession under the leave and license agreements, alleged forcible dispossession on 23 October 2018, and filed suit on 7 January 2019, i.e. within six months. The Court therefore held that the plaint prima facie satisfied the essential ingredients of Section 6.
The Court referred to the Supreme Court’s discussion in Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain v. Eknath Vithal Ogale [AIR 1995 SC 1102] to reiterate that a Section 6 suit is a summary possessory remedy where the status of the parties is irrelevant and the plaintiff need only show prior possession and illegal dispossession within six months. The Court said these observations were important because they showed that the existence of a licensor-licensee relationship does not automatically decide jurisdiction if the suit is truly based on dispossession under Section 6. Here, the leave and license agreements were used only to explain how the appellant came into possession, not to enforce contractual rights under those agreements.
The Court found that the trial court had committed an error by focusing mainly on the admitted licensor-licensee relationship without properly examining the true nature of the cause of action and the dominant relief. According to the High Court, once the plaint disclosed prior possession, alleged dispossession on a specific date, and institution of the suit within six months, the matter had to be examined within the limited framework of Section 6. At the stage of deciding return or rejection of plaint, the court must proceed mainly on the plaint averments and reliefs, and not on the defendant’s defence.
The High Court also observed that earlier orders in the proceedings had already noted, at least prima facie, that the suit was under Section 6 and that even a licensee cannot be dispossessed except by due process of law. Though those observations were not conclusive on jurisdiction, they supported the character in which the suit had been filed.
The respondents had argued that the suit included additional reliefs like injunction, damages and appointment of receiver, and therefore could not be treated as a pure Section 6 proceeding. The High Court was not persuaded at the jurisdiction stage. It held that for present purposes the dominant nature of the suit was what mattered, and the principal relief remained restoration of possession based on alleged unlawful dispossession. The mere presence of ancillary reliefs did not justify return or rejection of the plaint when the basic ingredients of Section 6 were clearly pleaded.
Briefly, Ambrosia Restaurants Pvt Ltd. filed an appeal against a City Civil Court order dated 31 August 2024 which had returned its plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC for presentation before the Bombay Small Causes Court. The trial court had held that, because the dispute arose between a licensor and licensee and concerned possession of premises in Mumbai, Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882 gave exclusive jurisdiction to the Small Causes Court. The respondents also filed cross-objections arguing that the plaint should have been rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC instead of being returned.
The property involved was the East Wing and West Wing on the third floor of Udyog Bhavan, Worli, Mumbai. Under two leave and license agreements dated 7 October 2017, the appellant was put in possession of about 6,700 sq. ft. The appellant said the respondents later issued an NOC on 29 March 2018 to allow operation of a restaurant from the premises. After obtaining finance from Union Bank of India and carrying out renovation and interiors, the appellant alleged that it was forcibly dispossessed on 23 October 2018 otherwise than in due course of law.
Based on that allegation, the appellant filed the suit on 7 January 2019 under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, seeking restoration of possession. Interim protection was granted restraining creation of third-party rights, and that protection continued from time to time. Later, after enhancement of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court, the suit was transferred there, where the respondents again raised the jurisdiction objection under Section 41 of the 1882 Act and succeeded before the trial court.
