“The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers”[1]

The doctrine of Attorney-Client privilege is a cornerstone of an Advocate’s professional role and is vital to the effective discharge of professional duty.

The underlying rationale for this principle is that an advocate can advise and represent a client effectively only when the client feels free to disclose all relevant facts, without fear that such communications may later be revealed.

Against this backdrop, the recent decision of the Delhi High Court in Puneet Batra v. Union of India[2] raises significant questions regarding the scope of attorney-client privilege, the independence of the legal profession, and the limits of investigating authorities exercising powers under tax statutes.

While on a cursory reading of the judgement, we are conscious that what weighed before the Hon’ble High Court’s to arrive at the decision is the peculiar facts of the case and the material placed before it in sealed cover, however, the principles and directions laid down by the Hon’ble High Court have far-reaching implications on independence of the legal profession, and therefore merit deeper study of the judgment.

Genesis of Attorney-Client Privilege

Attorney-Client privilege traces its origins to the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, when it was viewed as a lawyer’s duty of confidence. By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it had evolved into a substantive right of the client, recognised as a safeguard of due process and the Rule of Law.

Attorney-Client Privilege in the Indian Landscape

In India, Attorney-Client privilege has its roots in English common law and gained statutory recognition under Sections 126 to 129 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Though the Evidence Act has since been replaced by the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (“BSA”), the substance of these protections has been retained.

Sections 132(1) and 132(2) of the BSA preserve confidentiality between an Advocate and a client by prohibiting disclosure of information exchanged during professional engagement, except with the client’s express consent. Section 134 reinforces this by ensuring a client cannot ordinarily be compelled to disclose such communications.

In Re: Summoning Advocates who give Legal Opinion or Represent Parties during Investigation of cases and related issues (Re 2025)

The scope and protection of Attorney-Client privilege came under significant judicial scrutiny in In Re 2025, where the Supreme Court held privilege to be a substantive protection that investigating authorities must respect from the outset. Emphasising Section 132 of the BSA, the Court held that coercive powers cannot be used to force disclosure, and that a digital device’s production must be before the jurisdictional court ensuring that authorities gain no access to privileged material until their entitlement to it is established.

Delhi High Court’s Judgment in Puneet Batra v. Union of India

The facts of this case also arise from 2025, when GST officers conducted a search and seizure operation under Section 67 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (“CGST Act”) at the office premises of an Advocate, seizing various documents and electronic devices.

The search and seizure was challenged before the Delhi High Court, the key issue being whether the exercise of powers under Section 67 of the CGST Act at an Advocate’s office could be sustained in law when it risked breaching Attorney-Client privilege.

Dismissing the writ petition, the High Court held that the GST authorities had recorded adequate reasons to believe and sufficient prima facie material indicating that the Advocate’s own role was under investigation. We do not comment on the correctness of that dismissal; the greater concern is the broader observations and directions in the judgment, and the apprehension that they could be misused by other agencies to justify searches of legal practitioners.

Unaddressed aspects of the judgment

Although the judgment in Puneet Batra acknowledges Attorney-Client privilege, it does not examine the rationale of the privilege under Section 132 BSA in any detail, nor does it engage with constitutional values or the jurisprudence on search of an Advocate’s office premises.

The High Court analyses the issue through the lens of statutory powers of search and investigation, and places excessive reliance upon the reasons to believe available with the authorities, without articulating the standard of proof to be met before such authorities may access privileged material.

Nor does it prescribe a mechanism for prior judicial scrutiny of the material relied upon, or an independent privilege-review process before search and seizure powers are exercised. It instead leaves it to the investigating authority to decide whether the record establishes reasons to believe, without any judicial intervention.

While the judgment records that its conclusions are confined to the peculiar facts of the case, its broader observations on searches of Advocates’ premises and examination of electronic devices confer substantial operational latitude, and may be misused by other enforcement agencies conducting searches and seizures of legal practitioners.

“Reasons to Believe” threshold and its impact on Attorney-Client Privilege

It is this relatively low threshold for initiating investigation, coupled with the considerable deference shown to investigative authorities, that gives rise to significant concerns regarding the implications of Puneet Batra.

The principal apprehension is that the judgment permits investigating authorities to search an Advocate’s office and seize documents and digital devices so long as they can demonstrate adequate reasons to believe and sufficient prima facie material.

The breadth of this power becomes apparent when the reasons to believe requirement is examined. In Radhika Agarwal[3], the Supreme Court held that an authority must possess material on the basis of which it forms a belief that a person has committed an offence, a threshold higher than mere suspicion, but one resting on the subjective satisfaction of the officer based on material available at the relevant time.

Viewed together, Puneet Batra and Radhika Agarwal reveal the wide ambit of the reasons to believe standard, which requires only prima facie material capable of giving rise to a belief in the officer’s mind. Since courts ordinarily examine the existence of material rather than its evidentiary strength, the factual foundation for such action may, from the affected Advocate’s perspective, appear insufficient.

As legal practitioners, we are acutely aware that such reasons are frequently couched in broad, generic terms, with limited disclosure of the underlying factual nexus. Yet once accepted as meeting the statutory requirement, they may justify intrusive measures that significantly impact Attorney-Client confidentiality.

Tests stipulated in In Re 2025[4], applied to Puneet Batra

However, the judgment in Puneet Batra narrows the practical effect of Attorney-Client privilege and conflicts with In Re 2025. It begins with a presumption that investigation may continue notwithstanding privilege, so long as the authority possesses prima facie material. Thus, while In Re 2025 treats privilege as the primary protection that must be preserved unless lawfully displaced, Puneet Batra treats investigation as the starting point and privilege merely as a limitation upon its scope.

The divergence is particularly evident for electronic devices belonging to Advocates. The Supreme Court’s binding ratio  that examination of an advocate’s digital device must occur through a court-controlled privilege-determination process, after considering objections under Section 132 BSA ought to have been applied in Puneet Batra. Instead, the Court validated a prior executive seizure of, and access to, the device without first identifying a recognised Section 132 BSA exception overlooking the principles laid down in In Re 2025, a conflict that would arguably render Puneet Batra per incuriam.

Practical implications of the judgment in Puneet Batra

The most significant adverse consequence of the Puneet Batra judgment lies in its impact on the reality of confidentiality within the Attorney-Client relationship: it may create a perception among clients that even privileged communications stored on an Advocate’s digital device can be exposed to investigative scrutiny. Such a perception shall in turn discourage clients from making full and frank disclosures to their Advocates.

Although the Court repeatedly stated that Attorney-Client privilege remains protected, it nevertheless upheld the seizure, cloning and forensic examination of an Advocate’s entire digital device on the basis of prima facie material suggesting the Advocate’s own involvement in the client’s business. It is a matter of grave concern that the High Court allowed reliance on material supplied in a sealed cover, while refusing disclosure to the affected Advocate reducing procedural transparency and impairing the Advocate’s ability to rebut the allegations.

This is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s own emphasis that legal professional privilege is fundamental to the administration of justice, and must ordinarily protect against State intrusion into confidential lawyer-client communications.

More importantly, Puneet Batra lowers the practical threshold for scrutiny of Advocates, since untested allegations of participation in a client’s affairs may suffice to justify substantial intrusions pending investigation.

If adopted as a broader precedent, this could expose Advocates to increased investigative pressure whenever they represent controversial or heavily regulated clients — undermining the principle that Advocates should not be identified with their clients or subjected to coercive measures merely for providing legal advice or representation.

Conclusion

The judgment in Puneet Batra raises issues that transcend the facts of the individual case and have far-reaching implications for the legal profession as a whole.

In these circumstances, the judgment in Puneet Batra warrants immediate consideration before the Supreme Court. Given the constitutional and professional issues at stake, this cannot be viewed as a dispute affecting only the advocate concerned, it concerns the scope of legal professional privilege and the independence of the Bar across the country. Bar Councils and Bar Associations ought accordingly to collectively seek intervention to ensure that the broader institutional interests of the profession are represented. The issue is of vital importance to every Advocate in India, with lasting consequences for the administration of justice and the preservation of client confidence in the legal system.

The views expressed are purely personal.

*Abhishek Garg, Advocate on Record, Supreme Court & Managing Partner, AGS Legal

**Yash Gaiha, Principal Associate, AGS Legal

[1] Henry VI, Part II Act IV Scene 2

[2] Puneet Batra v. Union of India [WP(C) 11021/2025] – High Court of Delhi

[3] Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India [2025 6 SCC 645] – Supreme Court of India

[4] In Re: Summoning Advocates who give Legal Opinion or Represent Parties during Investigation of cases and related issues