In a petition filed before the Delhi High Court seeking setting aside of an order dated 20-05-2026 by the ASJ (SC-POCSO), South West District, Dwarka Courts, Delhi, whereby the respondent was granted bail in a First Information Report (FIR) filed under Sections 64(2)/3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Sections 6/17/21 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences, 2012 (POCSO), a Single Judge Bench of Justice Saurabh Banerjee set aside the impugned order and directed the respondent to surrender within 3 days.
On 28-04-2026, the 3-year old victim was enrolled in Nursery at a Junior School. On 30-04-2026, the victim woke up from sleep after coming back from school and stated crying, pointing to her private parts, complaining of severe pain. She informed the complainant that a boy had taken her downstairs in school and had touched her private part causing pain and bleeding. Thereafter, the present FIR was registered.
In her statement, the victim also mentioned a madam who had taken her to the basement, took her clothes off, cleaned the blood stains, and given her sweets. During investigation on 05-05-2026, the victim identified the respondent as the said madam. Thereafter, the blood-stained tissue paper and a piece of bed sheet were also recovered from the scene of offence. The victim’s medical records revealed that she was undergoing treatment for urinary tract infection as well as a bladder infection following the incident. The respondent was arrested on 14-05-2026, and was granted bail by the impugned order.
Referring to X v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. 2026 SCC OnLine SC 43, the Court stated that if it is found that a court of law had overlooked material considerations in a case involving grave offence as it might have failed to consider the nature and gravity of the offence, the statutory rigors of the POCSO Act, as well as the vulnerability of the child victim, therein, interference is justified.
The Court stated that the trial court was well aware that any three-year-old child could not be expected to reveal all details at the time of making the initial complaint. Referring to the Supreme Court’s decisions, the Court stated that the first complaint and/or the FIR itself is not the gospel truth or an encyclopedia, which can always be supported later at different stages, provided there is nothing contrary therein. It was found that despite this, the trial court had granted regular bail to the respondent merely because the victim failed to disclose the name of the respondent in the complaint, but which surfaced in her statement.
Hence, the Court held that the trial court had erred and referring to State of Bihar v. Rajballav Prasad (2017) 2 SCC 178, stated that material considerations had been ignored by the trial court, especially while it was dealing with a case under the POCSO Act. The Court found it strange that the trial court had granted bail to the respondent barely within six days of her arrest, when the impugned order did not reflect anything which could have prompted it to do so.
The Court stated that the trial court had also overlooked the fact that the respondent had been a teacher in the said school for the lat thirteen years, and held a post of significance, meaning that there may be some likelihood of her tampering with the evidence and/or influencing the witness. Hence, the Court set aside the impugned order and directed the respondent to surrender before the ASJ (POCSO Court) within three days. Thus, the petition was disposed of.
