In a writ petition filed before the Delhi High Court by P B Agro LLP seeking quashing of a show cause notice dated 11-08-2026 and a direction upon respondents to restrain them from taking any coercive action against the petitioner or its brand ambassadors for alleged non-compliance with the impugned notice, a Single Judge Bench of Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma dismissed the petition for want of territorial jurisdiction.
P B Agro LLP is the Master Licensee for manufacture and sale of Elaichi and Pan Masala not containing tobacco under the brand ‘VIMAL’ and hence, it engaged reputed actors as brand ambassadors under formal brand endorsement agreements requiring compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements. The petitioner learnt through media reports that FSSAI, through the Food and Drug Administration, Greater Mumbai Division, Mumbai, Maharashtra (FDA, Mumbai) had issued the impugned show cause notice to its brand ambassadors, all residents of Mumbai, in relation to the advertising campaign for VIMAL Elaichi. However, no notice was issued to the petitioner itself, and it was not afforded any opportunity of hearing. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present petition.
The petitioner argued that the petition was maintainable under both Article 226(1) and Article 226(2) of the Constitution, since the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and FSSAI, the apex authority under the FSS Act, were situated in New Delhi, and FDA, Mumbai, functioned under FSSAI’s overall supervision. It was also contended that the direction requiring the brand ambassadors to immediately take down the ads from platforms within their control were effectively against the petitioner and that the direction requiring sponsors to produce information to establish that VIMAL Elaichi was an independent product, could only be complied with by the petitioner. P B Agro also submitted that CCPA at Krishi Bhawan, New Delhi, had already issued a show cause notice to the petitioner on the same issue of surrogate advertising.
The respondents argued that the impugned notice had been issued by FDA, Mumbai, under the Government of Maharashtra, that the State of Maharashtra was not before the Court, that Section 30 of the FSS Act vested certain functions in the Commissioner of Food Safety of the concerned State, and that the three brand ambassadors who had received the notices, being residents of Mumbai, had not themselves challenged the notice. FSSAI also argued that the mere location of the petitioner’s office or of FSSAI in Delhi could not confer territorial jurisdiction.
The Court noted that the impugned notice was issued by FDA, Mumbai in the claimed exercise of the powers available to the State food safety authorities under the FSS Act and that at this stage there was no material to show that FSSAI had directed FDA, Mumbai to issue the impugned notice. Hence, the Court found that the impugned notice was an independent action of FDA, Mumbai. It was held that the mere fact that FSSAI was the apex body under the enactment, or that it is situated in Delhi, could not alter the source or character of the impugned show cause notice.
It was stated that the aspects of the present matter revealed that the subject matter of the impugned action was located in Maharashtra, inasmuch as the alleged prohibited activity, the regulatory action, the authority issuing the notice and the persons to whom the notice was addressed are all connected with the State of Maharashtra. Hence, it was found that there was no material on record or no pleading to the effect that the impugned notice was issued pursuant to any decision taken by any authority situated in Delhi. The Court opined that the mere impleadment of the Ministry or FSSAI without any specific relief being sought against them and without any impugned action attributable to them could not confer territorial jurisdiction upon the Court.
The Court stated that a fact which is merely incidental, collateral or remote, and which had no real bearing upon the lis could not be treated as a part of the cause of action for conferring territorial jurisdiction. It was held that a petitioner cannot be permitted to create territorial jurisdiction by referring to facts which do not have any nexus with the impugned action. It was said that reference to the petitioner’s alleged injury also did not assist its case at this stage as no order pursuant to the show cause notice by respondent 3. The Court held that the alleged injury was founded substantially on the petitioner’s apprehension regarding the possible consequences of the impugned notice issued to the brand ambassadors.
It was noted that the petitioner’s own pleadings also demonstrated that the real dispute was situated in Maharashtra. The Court said that the petitioner sought to establish that the impugned notice is factually incorrect because VIMAL pan masala is not manufactured or sold in Maharashtra, that the FDA, Mumbai has misunderstood the nature of the product advertised, and that the alleged prohibited activity has not taken place in that State.
The Court stated that if the mere existence of FSSAI in Delhi was sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon this Court, then every show cause notice or order issued by a Food Safety Commissioner or an officer of the Food and Drug Administration of any State in the country could be challenged before this Court. It was said that such an interpretation would render the territorial limitations contained in Article 226 practically meaningless.
It was held that the Court cannot permit jurisdiction to be created by selectively referring to facts and that it must also guard against a situation where pleadings are moulded in a manner so as to project incidental facts as constituting the cause of action, while the material facts relating to the actual dispute lie elsewhere. Hence, the petition was held to be non-maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction, and the courts in Maharashtra were found to be the more appropriate forum under the doctrine of forum conveniens. Thus, the petition was dismissed.
