The Delhi High Court has held that in a pending passing off suit, a plaintiff can be permitted to amend the plaint under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to plead subsequent registration of its trademark and add a relief for infringement, where the later infringement claim is based on the same set of facts, same rival marks, and same products. Such an amendment does not fundamentally alter the nature of the suit, and courts should adopt a liberal, justice-oriented approach to avoid multiplicity of litigation, unless the amendment causes prejudice that cannot be compensated in costs or otherwise defeats settled procedural safeguards.
Allowing the petition, the Delhi High Court quashed and set aside the Trial Court order and allowed L’Oréal’s application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. It also directed the Trial Court to take the amended plaint on record, and to proceed with the suit accordingly.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Jyoti Singh emphasised that where a cause of action arises during the pendency of a suit, courts can and should take note of such subsequent events, especially when doing so avoids multiplicity of proceedings. It observed that if a party could otherwise file a fresh suit based on the later event, there is no reason why the same relief cannot be incorporated in the pending suit, so long as the basic structure of the litigation is not fundamentally altered.
The Court referred to Pravesh Narula Trading as M/s. Capital Enterprises v. Raj Kumar Jain Trading as M/s. Bholaram Puranmall [2024 SCC OnLine Del 7537] and Usha International and Another v. Usha Television Limited [2002 SCC OnLine Del 306], to underline that passing off and infringement actions are rooted in substantially the same factual matrix when the rival marks and products are the same. The Court noted that the later registration of a mark is a supervening event that can be brought on record through amendment, and such amendment is generally treated as expanding the plaintiff’s statutory rights rather than changing the essence of the dispute.
On the issue of delay and stage of the proceedings, the Court held that merely because the trial had commenced, or even because the amendment was sought later, that by itself could not justify rejection if the amendment was bona fide and necessary for effective adjudication. The Court also noted that respondents 2 to 5 were already ex parte, and refusing the amendment would only compel L’Oréal to file a separate infringement suit involving the same trademarks and products, thereby prolonging the dispute unnecessarily.
The Court specifically found the Trial Court’s reasoning flawed in saying that absence of any reference to a registration application in the original plaint was fatal. Since the registration application itself had been filed after institution of the suit, the Court said that this could not be used against the plaintiff. In the High Court’s view, the proposed infringement claim arose from the same rival marks, same products, and same factual foundation, and therefore the nature and character of the suit did not fundamentally change.
Briefly, the underlying suit had originally been filed as a passing off action against the respondents, who were allegedly manufacturing and selling cosmetic and skincare products under the marks “GARUDA BRIGHT COMPLETE 30x” and “6 DROPS BRIGHT COMPLETE 3x and VITAMIN C”, which L’Oréal claimed were deceptively similar to its mark and trade dress “GARNIER BRIGHT COMPLETE”. An ex parte ad interim injunction had already been granted in L’Oréal’s favour on May 16, 2024.
At the time when the suit was instituted, L’Oréal’s mark was not yet registered. During the pendency of the suit, it applied for registration on April 26, 2024 in Class 03 claiming use from Sep 04, 2020, and the registration was granted on April 20, 2025. After obtaining registration, L’Oréal moved an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to amend the plaint so as to include the fact of registration and add a relief of trademark infringement in addition to passing off.
The Trial Court rejected the amendment application on Feb 10, 2026, and held that the original plaint contained no pleading about any pending registration application, that the suit had originally been framed only as a passing off action, and that post-registration infringement would amount to a fresh and distinct cause of action requiring different legal considerations. The Trial Court also noted that the plaintiff’s evidence had concluded and allowing the amendment at that stage would effectively turn the clock back in the suit.
