The Gujarat High Court has ruled that selling duplicate hardware accessories does not constitute copyright infringement under Section 63, and that converting a trademark dispute into a copyright FIR to evade the mandatory Registrar’s opinion and DSP-rank investigation under Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act amounts to an abuse of process. The Court clarified that AirPods, USB cables, power adapters, smartwatches and similar electronic accessories are commercial industrial products and do not fall within the scope of ‘literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work’ under Sections 2(c) and 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957, and hence, selling duplicate versions of such items cannot attract Section 63 of the Copyright Act.
The Court held that an FIR invoking Section 63 of the Copyright Act must explicitly set out how the seized material satisfies the definition of a protected ‘work’ under Section 2 read with Section 13. A generic allegation that goods ‘infringe copyright’ without identifying any specific literary work (such as instruction manuals) or artistic work (such as original packaging artwork) is insufficient to sustain a copyright offence. The High Court also clarified that standard MRP price tags, barcodes, technical model stickers and seal stickers contain purely functional and factual data which cannot originate as an ‘original literary work’ of authorship. Photographs produced by the complainant through an affidavit in reply cannot substitute the recovery memo, and no new factual foundation can be invented during oral arguments.
Moving ahead, the Court emphasised that the mandatory prior opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks and the requirement that search and seizure be conducted only by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police are statutory conditions precedent, not technical formalities. The Court also said that where a complainant deliberately dresses up a trademark dispute as a copyright infringement to bypass statutory safeguards under the Trade Marks Act, the Court will not permit a subsequent ‘conversion’ or fallback to trademark charges. Allowing such indirect achievement of what is directly prohibited would amount to sanctioning a deliberate evasion of statutory mandate.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice P. M. Raval observed that under Section 13 read with Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act, 1957, copyright protection is strictly confined to original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works, sound recordings and cinematograph films, and that hardware components, cables, power adapters and electronic devices are commercial industrial products. The Court noted that misusing a brand name or producing duplicate hardware bearing a trademark constitutes falsification of trademarks punishable under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, rather than an offence under the Copyright Act, and that selling duplicate commercial items bearing a registered trademark cannot attract Section 63 of the Copyright Act unless the FIR explicitly establishes the existence of a copyrightable artistic work.
The Court found that the FIR merely describes the seized items as ‘goods’ infringing upon the copyright of Apple Inc. Corporation and bearing the Apple trademark but does not state that Apple holds copyright in any specific literary work (such as instruction sheets or user manuals) or artistic work (such as a specific graphical layout, original artwork or visual packaging design). The Court further observed that the recovery panchnama is silent on the recovery of any user manual or instruction manual, and that photographs placed on record by way of affidavit in reply cannot be relied upon as they are not part of the investigation papers.
The Court held that an MRP price tag, a standard barcode or a technical model sticker contains purely functional and factual data which cannot originate as an ‘original literary work’ of authorship, and that basic safety or operational instructions printed inside a hardware package are purely ancillary and functional text to a hardware device. The Court further noted that the actual raid, search and seizure were executed under the command of a Police Inspector along with Head Constables and Police Constables, who are officers below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) or Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP), and that no prior written opinion was ever sought or obtained from the Registrar of Trade Marks before executing the raid.
Briefly, the petitioner, Jitendrabhai Mohanbhai Kriplani, approached the High Court seeking to quash FIR registered at Kalupur Police Station, Ahmedabad City, for offences punishable under Sections 51, 63 and 64 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The FIR was lodged by Vishalsinh Hirasinh Jadeja, a Manager at Griffin Intellectual Property Service Pvt Ltd., who claimed to be authorised by Apple Inc. Corporation to take legal action against persons manufacturing or selling counterfeit iPhones, iPads, MacBooks, mobiles and mobile accessories bearing Apple’s trademark.
Acting on private information that shops in Murtimant Complex and Mangalmurti Complex on Relief Road, Kalupur, were selling counterfeit Apple products, the complainant approached the D.C.P. Zone-03, who forwarded the application to Kalupur Police Station. A raid was then conducted by a Police Inspector along with head constables and constables, accompanied by company representatives and two independent panchas, at the shop ‘Raj Cover House’ on the second floor of Murtimant Complex.
The petitioner was found present inside the shop and identified himself as Jitendrabhai Mohanbhai Kiplani, aged 39, businessman from Navrangpura, Ahmedabad. During the search, goods bearing the Apple trademark were recovered, including 52 iPhone AirPods-3, 178 iPhone AirPods, 179 iPhone AirPods Pro, 80 iPhone C-USB Cables, 116 iPhone C+C 35W Power Adapters, 110 iPhone C Power Adapters, 12 iPhone Dual C Port Power Adapters, 8 iPhone Smart Watches, and various stickers and labels (Mono Stickers, Side Stickers, MRP Stickers, Barcode Stickers, Seal Stickers), with a total value of Rs. 15.11 lakhs.
The petitioner argued that the seized products do not fall within the meaning of ‘work’ under Section 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957, and that Sections 63 and 64 were wrongly invoked since the products are not literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works. He further contended that if the matter was treated as a trademark dispute, the mandatory safeguards under Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, were violated, as no prior opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks was obtained and the investigation was carried out by a Police Sub-Inspector, an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP). He also relied on Section 15 of the Copyright Act, arguing that copyright in any artwork ceases once it is applied to an article more than 50 times by an industrial process.
The complainant countered that the definition of ‘literary work’ under Section 2(o) is inclusive and covers photographs, packaging, promotional material, product literature, instruction manuals, stickers and MRP labels with barcodes, all of which constitute original literary work of Apple Inc. in which copyright subsists under Section 13. The complainant argued that unauthorised reproduction of these materials amounts to infringement under Section 51 of the Copyright Act.
