In a first appeal filed before the Jharkhand High Court by a husband (appellant) under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, against a judgment dated 30-11-2023 and the decree dated 07-12-2023 by the Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court, Bokaro, whereby a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce was dismissed, a Division Bench of Chief Justice M.S. Sonak and Justice Manoj Prasad dismissed the appeal and upheld the Trial Court’s decision, finding that neither cruelty nor desertion had been established.
The parties were married on 30-04-2005 as per Hindu rituals and had two children, a son and a daughter. The husband alleged that the wife (respondent) kept her distance from him, disregarded her in-laws, quarrelled frequently, talked continuously with another male person on his mobile phone, and was a lady of suspicious character. He further alleged that on 15-04-2015, she left the matrimonial home without informing her in-laws and had resided with her parents since then, despite several attempts at settlement and restitution of conjugal rights.
The wife denied these allegations and stated that she was tortured, that dowry demands were made, that her dignity was compromised, and that the appellant himself had an extra-marital relationship. She added that she returned to her parents’ house because of the said torture, that she had filed a complaint under the Dowry Act and Section 498-A IPC, which was compromised to restore conjugal life, and that she remained willing to resume cohabitation with due respect and honour.
The appellant filed an original suit before the Additional Family Court seeking divorce under Section 13(1) (i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Trial Court held that the marriage was undisputed, that the suit was maintainable, and that cruelty had not been proved. It gave little weight to the daughter’s testimony because she admitted in cross-examination that her evidence was prepared at her father’s dictation. It also relied on the undisputed documents including the compromise and the dowry complaint. By a judgment dated 30-11-2023 and decree dated 07-12-2023, it dismissed the suit. Hence, the present appeal.
The appellant argued that there had been no restitution of conjugal life since 2015, that all efforts at settlement had failed, and that his witnesses supported his case. He said the daughter’s evidence of her mother’s frequent quarrels had been ignored, that the marriage had become a mere formality, that the respondent’s criminal cases against him, which ended without a finding of guilt, themselves amounted to cruelty, and that the Trial Court had not passed a speaking order on desertion even though it was pleaded and an issue was framed.
The Court observed that even though cruelty has not been defined under the provisions of the 1955 Act, for the purpose of divorce, it should be such that matrimonial life becomes incompatible and conjugal life cannot be restored on account of such behaviour by either spouse. On physical cruelty, the Court found that two of the appellant’s witnesses were his colleagues and friends, so their evidence could not be accepted without suspicion. It noted that no family member, particularly the mother who was said to be a victim of the quarrels, was examined.
Further, the Court held that the daughter, then about 11 years old and living with only one parent, could have been influenced, and that her admission that her evidence was dictated by her father made it unreliable. It was also found that the appellant’s own statement was uncorroborated, that he had made no complaint to any authority and no effort at reconciliation.
On mental cruelty, the Court characterised the husband’s allegation that the wife talked to a male on his phone as a typical gender-based stereotype where if a woman talks to a man, even if he is a friend, charges of adultery or of an extramarital relationship are levelled. Hence, the Court held that such allegations in fact amounted to cruelty towards the wife, so no case of mental cruelty was made out against her.
On desertion, the Court held that omitting to cite the specific provision was not fatal because the pleadings and the framed issue covered it. It was then found that the wife expressed her desire to restore conjugal life, which was refused by the appellant. The Court stated that such a statement established the absence of animus deserendi, further establishing the element of desertion for divorce. The Court also took note of documents showing a 2015 compromise under which the parties lived together, and stated that the appellant’s challenge to the modest Section 24 interim maintenance of Rs. 3000 spoke volumes about his conduct.
The Court decided the points for determination against the husband and in favour of the wife, holding that the husband failed to make out a case of cruelty or desertion under Section 13(1) (i-a) or (i-b) of the 1955 Act for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce. The Court declined to pass a separate order on interim maintenance because the Section 24 order had already been affirmed, but it left the respondent at liberty to apply for modification on changed circumstances.
Thus, the first appeal was dismissed.
