In a writ appeal filed before the Madhya Pradesh High Court to challenge an order dated 15-07-2025 by the Single Judge in a writ petition, whereby the State was directed to pay Rs. 5 lakhs to the writ petitioner (respondent 1) on account of inaction on their part in registering a First Information Report (FIR), a Division Bench of Justice Anand Pathak and Justice Ashish Shroti allowed the appeal while setting aside the impugned direction.
Respondent 1 used to work as a female yoga instructor in Laxmi Bai Institute of Physical Education, Gwalior (Institute). She made a complaint of being sexually harassed by the Vice-Chancellor of the Institute (respondent 7). The Internal Complaints Committee dealt with the complaint and a report was submitted to the Secretary, Dept. of Youth Affairs & Sports, New Delhi. The Vice Chancellor appealed against the said part of the order and this Court set aside the Single Judge’s order in view of the pendency of the said appeal against the recommendations of ICC.
Respondent 1 also approached the SHO of the police station concerned, complaining about the sexual harassment by the Vice Chancellor. She also made complaints to the SP, Gwalior on two occasions. When the FIR was not registered, respondent 1 filed an application under Section 156(3) of CrPC before the Judicial Magistrate First Class. By a final order dated 21-11-2021, the Magistrate found that the allegations made out a cognizable offence and directed respondent 1’s complaint to be treated as complaint under Section 200 and 202 of CrPC.
Aggrieved, the respondent approached this court, but the JMFC’s order was upheld. Still aggrieved, she approached the Supreme Court by way of a SLP wherein leave was granted and the case was registered as a criminal appeal. The Supreme Court directed the police to register an FIR on the respondent’s complaint and to take further action, while the order by this Court was set aside. While these litigations were pending, the respondent filed the writ petition in question.
The Court perused the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition and found that she had not prayed for any specific relief against the appellants. Considering that the writ petition was filed when the matter was still pending, the Court noted that she had no occasion to ask for any relief against the police authorities, meaning that there was no relief prayed for against the police. After perusing the impugned order, the Court noted that there was no discussion regarding the action/inaction of the police authorities and that only in a particular paragraph were the police held responsible for not taking timely action for three years.
The Court held that since there was no relief claimed against the police authorities, the impugned direction by the Single Judge directing the State to pay compensation to respondent 1 was unjustified. It was stated that even though the police’s actions had not been approved by the Supreme Court, they were not guilty of inaction for three years, since the matter remained pending before various courts. The Court stated that because of this, the writ court’s observation that police had failed to take action for three years was not just and proper.
It was noted that the other directions in the impugned order were set aside by a separate order in an appeal by the Vice Chancellor. The Court stated that the matter had been relegated to the appellate authority under the Sexual Harassment of Woman at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition, and Redressal) Act, 2013. Thus, the impugned direction was set aside and the appeal was allowed.
