The October jabs that dented India’s Digital Trust
There is no doubt that India is moving towards a digital era, with the Government focusing on building a digital ecosystem that attracts foreign business and building trust across various sectors regarding India’s cybersecurity.
However, within the first three weeks of October this year, that trust has been rattled by two back-to-back cybersecurity disclosures. One of the Country’s largest commercial lenders, the State Bank of India (“SBI”) and the Bengaluru- based digital trust provider eMudhra Ltd. (“eMudhra”) both found themselves at the centre of two serious and unique security incidents.
On October 21, 2026, the SBI formally notified all the Stock Exchanges in India by way of the mandatory disclosure norms under the Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”), that during a preliminary analysis of approximately, 3,75,000 records available on the dark web, around 3,897 customer records containing Personal Identifiable Information (“PII”) were identified.[i]
On similar lines, it was reported by security researchers that eight private keys used by eMudhra to issue web security and software signing certificate had been exposed as a result of weak cryptographic generation, which prompted major web browsers to block eMudhra.[ii]
These incidents showcase the vulnerability of the Indian digital ecosystem. While the SBI PII exposure exposes the fragility of the customer data at the hands of the banking industry; the eMudhra incident shows flaws of how a single cryptographic oversight can endanger data in transit across Government and Public Sector websites. Therefore, the former concerns the exposure of stored personal data, while the latter concerns the integrity of the infrastructure dealing with digital trust.
An Analysis of the Breach: Customer PII vs Cryptographic Keys
The Customer PII breach:
The breach of customer PII was not discovered by the SBI through any internal monitoring system. According to reports, SBI received external alerts on the 16th of October from Threat Intelligence Service Provider and Defence Cyber Agency, and the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (“CERT-In”), after a threat actor using the alias Siriusim advertised the data on Breach Forums.
Roughly 5 days after receiving the alerts, SBI informed the exchanges about the breach on 21st of October, 2026. It engaged a CERT-In empanelled forensic auditor, and confirmed only on the 23rd of October, 2026 that all the affected customers have been notified individually.
Out of the 3,75,000 dark web rows examined, SBI has confirmed and verified that 3,897 customer records containing Customer PII, including full names, date of birth, gender, registered mobile number, email ids, address, branch identification number, CIF number, loan details, etc. While SBI assured Core Banking System (CBS) details such as bank balance, account password, PIN are secured, the leaked data, especially CIF and loan details, indicate a major fault in the digital data storing system employed by the banks.
Inside the eMudhra key blunder:
While the SBI incident exposes the customer data storage structure, the eMudhra crisis struck at the very core of cryptographic chain of trust which secures web browsers and software.
On October 17, 2026, it was reported by an independent researcher that the private keys associated with 8 intermediate Certificate Authority (“CA”) certificates which were generated during April 30, 2025, the eMudhra key ceremony lacked cryptographic randomness. It stated that instead of the 384-bit elliptic curve numbers, all the 8 keys of eMudhra were tiny integers below 256, which included one private key with the numerical value 4. Cryptographic keys are central to how digital certificates work, the keys are meant to remain secret and are used to authenticate or identify an entity, website or the software publisher. As such, cryptographic randomness is essential for preventing outsiders from predicting or reconstructing the private keys.
Since eMudhra is used across government portals, including UIDAI, income tax portal, etc, and also across public sector banks, the flaw prompted CERT-In Advisory[iii] and immediate blocks from major browsers like Chrome, Firefox, Apple and Microsoft.
Following the Motive: How such customer data and keys are weaponised:
The question that now arises is why do cybercriminals target such banking data, especially when the same does not include bank account details and passwords? In the Indian cybercrime market, such customer information like, name, phone number, address, bank CIF number, loan account details, commands a steep premium. It is with the help of such data that scammers conduct phishing and spear targeted phishing calls posing as bank official and demand OTP etc.
The combination of Date of Birth, Phone Number and CIF number also enables scammers and syndicates in executing SIM swap fraud, forge the KYC documents and most dominant in today’s age execute digital arrest.[iv]
In the eMudhra incident, though threat stemmed not due to some external factor but due to weak internal key generation. The motive for any cybercriminal exploiting a weak key is domain impersonation and traffic interception. Since, in this incident, the reported vulnerability was so severe that the keys that lack sufficient randomness could be recovered from its public certificate within seconds, an attacker could easily forge TLS certificates and launch Man-in-the-Middle (“MitM”) attacks, and steal data in the transit. Similarly, compromised signing codes enables an attacker to sign malware as trusted software.[v]
A grim situation: Tracing India’s recent Data Breach Wave:
The two incidents above are just an addition to the number of breaches that has been happening in the Indian banking and government sector over the past few years. These incidents are not all of one kind, and are best understood in three categories: (i) customer-data breaches; (ii) infrastructure and ransomware attacks; and (iii) cryptographic and certificate-authority compromises.
(i) Customer-data breaches:
Just three months before the October breaches, the Bank of Baroda, on July 27, 2026, confirmed that a compromised email id of an employee led to exposure of an estimated 1TB of data, roughly 1,00,000 to 3,00,000 accounts data, Aadhaar and Pan copies, photos, etc.[vi] It was reported that the said data was listed on the dark web on June 24, 2026 even as the Core Banking System remained intact.[vii]
In February 2025, Angel One, one of the biggest retail stock brokers in the Country, suffered a major compromise of its AWS cloud resources, putting at risk the records of nearly 8 million users[viii] and triggering an 11% stock drop.[ix]
Another relevant example is the breach in Star Health, which resulted in a data leak of around 7.24 tb of data across 3.12 crore customers.[x] This was followed by November 2024 leak in HDFC Life.[xi] In the public sector in May 2024, CERT-In reported intrusion at BSNL exposing customer SIM card and IMSI data.[xii]
(ii) Infrastructure and ransomware attacks:
In 2024 alone, India’s insurance and public banking system saw multiple onslaughts on its data security. In July 2024, a ransomware attack on C-Edge Technologies forced NPCI to temporarily disconnect nearly 300 cooperative and regional rural banks from the UPI network.[xiii]
(iii) Cryptographic and certificate-authority compromises:
The eMudhra incident falls in a category of its own. It involved no conventional theft of customer data; rather, it compromised the certificate trust infrastructure on which the security of other systems, including government portals and banking websites depends on. This demonstrates that India’s cybersecurity vulnerabilities are not confined to data storage but extend to the underlying infrastructure of digital trust.
Viewed together, these incidents are not merely a sequence of isolated security failures. Their recurrence points to deeper inadequacies in institutional cybersecurity governance, in the ability of institutions to detect incidents themselves, and in the mechanisms that hold them accountable. It is against this backdrop that the regulatory framework must be assessed.
The Regulatory Maze; Strong Rules on Paper and Gaps in Practice:
The DPDP Act, 2023 and the 2027 enforcement Gap
The Government of India enacted the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act) in August 2023 and notified DPDP Rules, 2025 in 13th November, 2025. Under Section 8 (5) and Section 8 (6) of the DPDP Act read with the Schedule of the DPDP Act, it is obligatory for the data fiduciaries to maintain reasonable security safeguards of personal data, or face penalties upto INR 250 crores. It is also obligatory that in case of any breach the Data Fiduciaries must notify the Data Protection Board without any delay and within 72 hours giver detailed report to the Board[xiv], and failure to do so would lead to imposition of penalty upto INR 200 crores.
However, the DPDP Act read along with the DPDP Rules envisage a phased commencement as provided under Rule 1 of the DPDP Rules 2025. While the commencement notification issued by the Government of India brought the foundational institutional provisions into force immediately. The substantive obligation and duties governing the Data Fiduciaries under Section 3 to 17, including Section 8, are scheduled to commence after the expiry of eighteen months from the date of notification, i.e. from 13th of May, 2027. Similarly, the DPDP Rules 2025 also follows a staggered timeline, with procedural rules governing personal data breach notifications under Rule 7, along with Rules 3, 5 to 16, 22, and 23, scheduled to take effect in May 2027.[xv]
As a result, without these provisions having come into force at the time of the October SBI incident, the affected customers had no statutory right under the DPDP Act, or the protections envisaged under the same.
Active remedies that are available on date:
Until the aforementioned DPDP Rules comes into force, the legal remedy rests with the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act). Under Section 43A [Compensation for Failure to protect data] provides that body corporate who are negligent in protecting sensitive personal data must pay civil compensation. Further, Section 72A [Punishment for disclosure of information in breach Of lawful contract] imposes a penalty upto INR 25 lakhsfor disclosing personal information in breach of Contract, and Section 43 [Penalty and compensation for damage to computer, computer system, etc.], 66 [ Computer related offenses done dishonestly or fraudulently] and 66C [punishment for identity theft] penalise the unauthorised access, data theft and identity fraud with the latter two carrying criminal liability
Sectoral watchdogs:
Additionally, there are three sectoral watchdogs which currently governs the cyber security incidents. The CERT-In, under Section 70B of the IT Act, is empowered to serve as the national agency for analysis of cyber incidents, forecast alerts, take emergency measures, etc. Similarly, Regulation 30 of the SEBI LODR Regulations, 2015 a listed entities must disclose material events or information to the stock exchanges as soon as reasonably possible, and no later than 24 hours from the occurrence of the event (or 12 hours where the decision originates from within the board or executive management). Further, the SEBI Cybersecurity and Cyber Resilience Framework (“CSCRF”) formulated under SEBI Circulars and updated CSCRF guidelines, Annexure O requires SEBI-regulated market entities to report specified cybersecurity incidents to SEBI and CERT-In within 6 hours of detection or notice, followed by incident logging on SEBI’s reporting portal within 24 hours, while other non-critical incidents follow a separate 24-hour timeline. Crucially, the CSCRF governs SEBI-registered market intermediaries (such as stockbrokers, clearing corporations, and depositories); commercial banks operating primarily under the RBI’s regulatory umbrella are subject to CSCRF requirements only to the extent of their specific SEBI-registered intermediary operations (e.g., merchant banking or custodial divisions), rather than across their entire enterprise banking operations.
Institutional Accountability: Beyond Regulatory Compliance
One limitation of the regulatory framework is that it operates largely after the incident as it prescribes when an incident must be reported and what penalty follows a failure. The SBI and eMudhra incidents suggest that the more fundamental question is one of institutional responsibility, namely the obligation of organisations that hold personal data, or that operate the infrastructure of digital trust, to prevent such incidents and to detect them when they occur.
For banks, this means maintaining a data-security architecture proportionate to the sensitivity of the data they hold, including access controls, data minimisation, encryption of customer records and continuous monitoring capable of detecting exfiltration.
For Certifying Authorities, every website, portal and software publisher relying on its certificates is vulnerable to its weaknesses. Therefore, secure key generation, carried out through properly controlled and witnessed key ceremonies using verified sources of randomness, is not just a technical formality but the foundation on which digital trust rests.
One aspect that is common to both is the importance of independent security audits and robust key-management protocols. Reporting obligations, however short their timelines, operate only once harm has occurred. Therefore, regulatory compliance should accordingly be treated as the bare minimum as opposed to the highest standard of Indian cybersecurity which can be accomplished by pre-empting the threat.
Conclusion:
Ultimately, these incidents deliver an urgent warning that India’s digital ecosystem cannot afford to ignore. The SBI breach is a reminder that institutions holding personal data are accountable both for securing it and for detecting its loss, while the eMudhra compromise shows that the chain of digital trust is only as strong as the cryptographic integrity of its weakest link. For all the progress in digital public infrastructure, the banking and public sectors remain encumbered by legacy vulnerabilities and a patchwork regulatory regime that has repeatedly fallen short of safeguarding citizens. While the DPDP Act represents a vital leap forward with its stringent penalty structure, its deferred enforcement until May 2027 leaves an eighteen-month void that institutions must bridge on their own initiative. Every exposed loan lead or leaked KYC document is not merely an abstract compliance failure, it directly arms organized syndicates with the raw material for predatory scam calls, identity theft, and coercive ‘digital arrest’ extortion. As India accelerates toward a multi-trillion-dollar digital economy, fortifying institutional cyber defences is no longer a future compliance milestone; it is an immediate prerequisite for sustaining public trust.
*Ms Arpita Mukherjee, Senior Partner-Corporate & Commercial Practice – Hammurabi & Solomon Partners
**Mr Sanjivan Chakraborty , Senior Associate at Hammurabi & Solomon Partners
[i]Data Breach: SBI says it individually informed all affected Customers, THE HINDU (October 23, 2026, 12:53 pm IST) https://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/data-breach-sbi-says-it-individually-informed-all-affected-customers/article71615008.ece
[ii] Soumyarendra Barik, Why Google, Mozilla, other browsers blocked eMudhra certificates over security lapse, THE INDIAN EXPRESS (October 21, 2026, 07:57 PM IST) https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-sci-tech/emudhra-security-flaw-certificates-blocked-chrome-firefox-10931124/
[iii]Compromise of eMudhra Intermediate CA Certificate, CERT-In (October 21, 2026) https://www.cert-in.org.in/s2cMainServlet?pageid=PUBVLNOTES02&VLCODE=CIAD-2026-0050
[iv]SBI data breach: What information was exposed and what customers should do, THE HINDU (October 23, 2026, 07:37 AM IST) https://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/sbi-data-breach-what-information-was-exposed-and-what-customers-should-do/article71610873.ece
[v]CERT-In Flags Website Impersonation Risks Following eMudhra Incident: The Architecture of Digital Trust and Supply-Chain Liability, TRAARO (October 16, 2026) https://tsaaro.com/blogs/cert-in-flags-website-impersonation-risks-following-emudhra-incident-the-architecture-of-digital-trust-and-supply-chain-liability.
[vi] Daryna Antoniuk, India’s Bank of Baroda confirms cyber incident after hackers claim data theft, THE RECORD (July 28, 2026) https://therecord.media/india-bank-of-baroda-reports-cybersecurity-incident
[vii] Kumar Shantanu, Data Breach Decoded: One Password, One Tera-byte Data Lost, CY5.io (July 28, 2026) https://cy5.io/blog/bank-of-baroda-data-breach-2026-explained/
[viii]Angel One Data Breach: 8 Million Users’ Personal Records at Risk, NPAV (March 03, 2025) https://blogs.npav.net/blogs/post/angel-one-data-breach-8-million-users-personal-records-at-risk
[ix] Ionut Arghire, Indian Stock Broker Angel One Discloses Data Breach, SECURITY WEEK (March 03, 2025 6:30 AM ET) https://www.securityweek.com/indian-stock-broker-angel-one-discloses-data-breach/
[x]Star Health acknowledges data breach affecting 31 million customers, report says data was sold deliberately, INDIA TODAY (October 10, 2024, 11:26 IST) https://www.indiatoday.in/technology/news/story/star-health-acknowledges-data-breach-affecting-31-million-customers-report-says-data-was-sold-deliberately-2614501-2024-10-10
[xi]HDFC Life probing customer data breach, THE HINDU (November 25, 2024, 11:33 PM IST) https://www.thehindu.com/business/hdfc-life-probing-customer-data-breach/article68910883.ece#google_vignette
[xii]Government admits BSNL data breached in May; forms telecom security panel, THE HINDU (July 25, 2024, 10:53 AM IST) https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/government-admits-bsnl-data-breached-in-may-forms-telecom-security-panel/article68441779.ece
[xiii]Ransomware Attack on C-Edge Technologies: Implications for Indian Banking, CYBER PEACE (August 08, 2024) https://cyberpeace.org/resources/blogs/ransomware-attack-on-c-edge-technologies-implications-for-indian-banking
[xiv] Rule 7, DPDP Rules, 2025.
[xv] Rule 1 (4), DPDP Rules, 2025.

