The Supreme Court has asserted that Section 498A IPC is applicable to live-in relationships that qualify as “relationships in the nature of marriage”, with the intent to marry being established as an intrinsic part thereof. The word “husband” in Section 498A is to be given a purposive interpretation, keeping in view the reformative, corrective and socially beneficial intent of the section.
The Court explained that the distinction between a married woman and a woman in a relationship in the nature of marriage, insofar as protection against cruelty is concerned, has no rational nexus with the object of preventing domestic violence and is offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution.
The DV Act, being fundamentally a civil legislation, does not provide adequate protection to women in such relationships, as it lacks the force of criminal deterrence. The extended interpretation is limited to Section 498A IPC only and shall not affect any other provision. The application is restricted to relationships in the nature of marriage between two consenting adult individuals where the intent to marry is established, and the initial burden of proving such intent lies on the female live-in partner, added the Court.
The Division Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh noted that Section 498A was introduced through the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983, in response to the increasing number of dowry deaths and cruelty to married women by their in-laws. The statement of objects and reasons explicitly referred to cruelty by “the husband and relatives of the husband.” The Court also acknowledged the well-documented misuse of Section 498A, noted the growing tendency to implicate all relatives of the husband, the low conviction rate of 15% against a charge-sheeting rate of 93.6%, and the use of Section 498A as a tool for arm-twisting and extortion.
The Court rejected the contention that Section 498A being a penal provision must be confined only to a husband in a traditional marriage. The purpose of the provision was to introduce deterrence against reprehensible behaviour toward a woman in a domestic setup, and the interpretation must keep this reformative objective in view.
Moving ahead, the Court examined the concept of “live-in relationship” and “relationship in the nature of marriage” as understood under Section 2(f) of the DV Act, and clarified that “live-in relationship” is a wider category and “relationship in the nature of marriage” is a subset thereunder. For the purposes of the judgment, the Court used the term “live-in relationship” in the context of a “relationship in the nature of marriage.”
The Court also rejected the Union of India’s submission that the DV Act adequately protects women in relationships in the nature of marriage, making expansion of Section 498A unnecessary. The Court examined the scope of the DV Act in detail, noting that it is fundamentally a piece of civil legislation providing for protection orders, monetary relief, custody orders, and compensation orders. The only penal consequence under the DV Act is under Section 31, which provides for imprisonment up to one year and fine up to Rs. 20,000 for breach of a protection order. The Court observed that the import of civil and criminal law is different — one has almost singularly civil and monetary consequences, whereas the other is backed by the force of criminal deterrence. To say that the DV Act provides adequate protection would be a misstatement of law.
The Court framed the issue as not merely one of statutory interpretation but also a constitutional question under Articles 14, 15 and 21. The Court used an illustration of woman ‘A’ and man ‘B’ to demonstrate that the only difference between a married woman and a woman in a relationship in the nature of marriage, for the purpose of protection against cruelty, is whether the couple followed some ritual or ceremony. The Court held that this distinction has no rational nexus with the object of preventing domestic violence and is offensive to Article 14.
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The Court observed that choosing to live in a relationship in the nature of marriage attracts at least two kinds of privacy, spatial privacy and associational privacy. Also, the Court held that the distinction between “married” and “live-in relationship in the nature of marriage,” insofar as protection against cruelty under Section 498A is concerned, has no rational nexus with the object of preventing domestic violence and is offensive to Article 14.
Applying the four factors of Heydon’s mischief rule, the Court observed: (i) prior to Section 498A, the law did not envisage protections for women in a domestic setup under criminal law, with only the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 having limited application; (ii) there was no comprehensive avenue in law to seek redress for cruelty in a domestic setup; (iii) the remedy was Section 498A, explaining what constitutes cruelty and applying it to a married woman, her husband and his relatives; and (iv) the true reason for the remedy was to give shelter of the law to unwelcome situations not falling within the scope of the dowry law. The intent is to stop the cruelty and advance the remedy.
The Court further observed that the law is a living organism, and its life comes from experience. Marriage was once perceived as the only method by which two individuals could live together, but living together prior to marriage is no longer unheard of or unacceptable. As far as safeguards are concerned, the Court expressed concern about the growing and worrisome trend of misuse of Section 498A. The Court held that only those relationships in the nature of marriage that also have the requisite intent to marry are entitled to the protection of Section 498A. This specific requirement differentiates a “relationship in the nature of marriage” for the purposes of the DV Act (civil in nature) from the criminal provision under Section 498A. A higher standard of proof applies, and the initial burden of proof lies on the female live-in partner seeking protection of the law.
Briefly, Dr. Lokesh B.H. and respondent no. 2 (Smt. Theertha) allegedly married as per Hindu customs and rituals on 17th October 2010 and were residing in Bengaluru. The marriage hit rocky waters around 2016, leading to the filing of two criminal complaints by respondent no. 2. The first culminated in a charge-sheet under Section 498A IPC before the III Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) and JMFC, Shivamogga District. The second resulted in a charge-sheet under Sections 498A, 504, 506, 307, 494 and 149 IPC, along with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, before the XXIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru.
The fundamental dispute between the parties rested on whether they were married at all. The accused-appellant contended that no valid marriage existed and, therefore, Section 498A IPC had no application. Respondent no. 2, on the other hand, submitted that there was a valid subsisting marriage and all charged sections were maintainable. The High Court of Karnataka rejected the appellant’s contention that a valid marriage is a sine qua non for Section 498A IPC, observing that the term “husband” must be given a purposive and expansive construction. The High Court held that the expression “husband” in Section 498A IPC is not confined to a man in a legally valid marriage but extends to one who enters into a marital relationship which is void or voidable, as also to a live-in relationship which bears the attributes of marriage.
