Emphasising that Section 114A of the Evidence Act, 1872 is not automatic and presumption cannot be invoked mechanically, the Supreme Court has held that where the same factual matrix underlies kidnapping and rape charges, disbelieving the prosecutrix for one charge forecloses conviction on the other. The Court clarified that conviction for rape can rest on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, but only if that testimony inspires the confidence of the court. Contradictions, omissions, and absence of any attempt to seek help during prolonged travel cannot be overlooked.
The Apex Court said that presumption under Section 114A of the Evidence Act, is not automatic and cannot be invoked mechanically without appreciating the totality of the evidence on record. Further, mere presence of spermatozoa in the vaginal swab does not, by itself, establish rape. The surrounding circumstances including the conduct of the prosecutrix, the nature of travel, and the absence of injuries are all relevant factors. Accordingly, the Apex Court held that if the prosecutrix’s version is disbelieved for kidnapping, the very same version cannot be relied upon to convict for rape.
A Two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar noted that the prosecutrix’s testimony was riddled with contradictions. She admitted in cross-examination that she travelled with the appellant in a car through busy bazaars and brightly lit intersections to LIG Flats, Ludhiana, and then on a scooter from Ludhiana to Malerkotla, passing through crowded streets and multiple intersections, without raising any hue and cry or attempting to alight from the scooter. The journey from Ludhiana to Malerkotla took about one and a half hours. Her statements regarding the return journey were also contradictory, as she first stated they returned by car, then stated they travelled back by train ticketless.
The medical evidence by Dr. Ananjit Kaur showed no external or internal injuries on the prosecutrix’s body. The ossification test conducted by Dr. Hatinder Kaur opined the prosecutrix’s age as between 17 to 19 years, which the trial court accepted as 19 years. The trial court itself observed that if the prosecutrix had not consented to accompany the appellant, she could easily have raised an alarm or disembarked from the scooter, added the Court.
The Supreme Court further noted that the trial court took internally contradictory positions, disbelieving the prosecutrix’s version for the Section 366 IPC charge but accepting the very same version for the Section 376 IPC charge. The High Court mechanically affirmed the conviction by invoking Section 114A of the Evidence Act, 1872, without appreciating these contradictions. The Supreme Court remarked that the trial court’s example of ‘some daring women choosing to travel to far-off places in the company of men’ was contextually misplaced, particularly because the prosecutrix had absented herself from home for 5/6 days voluntarily.
Briefly, the appellant, Paramjit Singh Bedi, was convicted by the Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1861 (IPC) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment (RI) for 10 years along with a fine of Rs. 5,000. The conviction was affirmed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh.
The case arose out of FIR registered at Ludhiana Division No. 5 police station. According to the prosecution, the prosecutrix (PW-1), a student of class VIII and daughter of PW-2 (Ranjit Singh), was allegedly taken by the appellant on June 19, 2009, from her house on the pretext of meeting his daughter Nancy. She was first kept at LIG Flats, Ludhiana for two days, then taken to an abandoned factory at Malerkotla on a scooter where she was confined in a room till June 25, 2009.
The prosecution alleged that the appellant had sexual intercourse with her against her will during this period. On June 25, 2009, when the appellant and PW-1 were intercepted at Railway Colony No. 5, Ludhiana, the appellant was apprehended. The trial court acquitted the appellant of the charge under Section 366 IPC but convicted him under Section 376 IPC. The High Court affirmed the conviction. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court, which granted leave on Jan 30, 2015, releasing him on bail after noting that he had already undergone nearly 6 years of incarceration.
