The Supreme Court on Wednesday set aside the Kerala High Court Division Bench’s order refusing to entertain an appeal against a Single Judge’s direction to register an FIR and commence investigation in the CMRL-Exalogic corruption case involving former Kerala Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan, his daughter Veena T and son-in-law Muhammed Riyaz.

The Court permitted the petitioners to pursue their appeal before the Division Bench and directed that the investigation under the FIR remain stayed for seven days, allowing them to seek appropriate interim relief.

The Bench of Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V Mohana clarified that its observations were confined to the petitioners’ right to challenge the Single Judge’s order and did not express any opinion on the merits of the allegations. It also made clear that the Division Bench would independently consider any request for interim relief in accordance with law.

The dispute concerns an FIR registered following information shared by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) with the Kerala Government under Section 66(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA). The information reportedly concerned alleged offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act involving Pinarayi Vijayan, his daughter Veena Vijayan, son-in-law Mohammed Riyas, a former minister, and others. The Kerala High Court Single Judge had directed the State’s Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau to register the FIR after setting aside the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry through a Special Investigation Team (SIT). The Division Bench subsequently declined to grant leave to appeal to persons aggrieved by that direction.

Senior Advocates Sidharth Luthra and N. Hariharan, appearing for former Kerala Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan, his daughter Veena T and son-in-law P.A. Mohammed Riyas, argued that the petitioners should be permitted to challenge the Single Judge’s order directing registration of the FIR and commencement of investigation, particularly since they had not been heard in the original proceedings. They raised questions concerning the applicability of Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act and whether the ED’s communication under Section 66(2) of the PMLA could, by itself, mandate registration of an FIR and investigation in a corruption case.

Senior Advocate Zoheb Hossain, appearing for the ED, submitted that the material shared with the State disclosed cognisable offences. He submitted that the ED had acted within its statutory powers by forwarding the information to the State for action in accordance with law. The Bench, however, indicated that the question of whether the ED’s communication required the State to register an FIR in a corruption case would need consideration, while emphasising that the ED could not use its statutory powers to encroach upon the domain of other investigating agencies.

The Supreme Court examined whether the petitioners could challenge the Single Judge’s findings directing registration of the FIR and commencement of investigation, particularly when they had not been parties to the original proceedings. It also considered the implications of Section 175(4) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), which provides for the involvement of a public servant or superior authority in the process of ordering an investigation against a public servant.

The Court observed that the Single Judge had gone beyond directing registration of an FIR by also directing commencement of investigation and taking it to its logical conclusion. It noted that investigation under the Prevention of Corruption Act could involve compliance with additional statutory requirements. The Bench observed:

Accordingly, the Court set aside the impugned order and permitted the petitioners to pursue the appeal before the Division Bench. It clarified: “We make it clear that our observations are limited to the issue at hand, that is the locus of the petitioner to prefer the appeal and not an expression of opinion on merits.”

The Court granted the petitioners liberty to pursue the appeal and seek interim relief in accordance with law. To enable them to do so, it directed that the investigation under the FIR remain stayed for seven days. The Bench clarified that the arrangement should not be treated as an opinion on the interim relief to be considered by the Division Bench, which would remain free to decide the matter independently and in accordance with law.

The Court also noted that a subsequent Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) had reportedly been registered in connection with the matter. It expressly declined to comment on that ECIR, keeping the issues concerning it open.