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Supreme Court Refuses to Lay Down Uniform Policy on Demolition of Unauthorised Colonies Across States; States May Consider Policy Reforms

Supreme Court Refuses to Lay Down Uniform Policy on Demolition of Unauthorised Colonies Across States; States May Consider Policy Reforms

Centre for Law and Good Governance v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 984/2026 [Order dated August 12, 2026]

Unauthorised Colony Demolition Policy

The Supreme Court on Wednesday refused to lay down a uniform policy framework governing demolition of unauthorised colonies and rehabilitation of affected residents, holding that such issues primarily fall within the policy domain of the respective State governments. The matter was heard by Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V Mohana.

The PIL raised concerns over the demolition of longstanding unauthorised colonies and structures, particularly where State authorities had allegedly allowed such constructions to remain for decades, collected municipal and property taxes and provided civic amenities including electricity and water connections, before subsequently treating the structures as illegal and ordering their demolition. The petitioner argued that demolition must be considered in the context of the right to shelter, livelihood and dignity under Article 21.

The petitioner submitted that State governments were following inconsistent approaches, pointing out that policies in Delhi, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana contemplated regularisation of unauthorised structures, while in other cases longstanding colonies were subjected to demolition without adequate rehabilitation measures.

The petitioner also relied upon the Court’s jurisprudence recognising the right to shelter as part of human dignity and contended that longstanding possession should be considered while undertaking demolition. At the same time, the petitioner clarified that it was not seeking protection for unauthorised construction as such, but wanted a framework ensuring that demolitions were carried out in a humane and systematic manner.

Seeking judicial intervention, the petitioner proposed the constitution of a court-empowered committee to examine the issue and formulate guidelines for demolitions across the country. The Court, however, expressed reservations about such a mechanism, observing that the Court could not substitute itself for the authorities constitutionally entrusted with enforcing planning laws, as it would be completely contrary to the Constitution.

The petitioner nevertheless argued that merely prescribing procedural safeguards was insufficient if the affected family had nowhere to go after demolition. Referring to the concept of positive liberty, the petitioner submitted that meaningful protection required consideration of alternative accommodation in appropriate cases. The petitioner submitted:

“There is a negative guarantee of liberty, means not interfering. There is another positive liberty… that unless there is a meaningful guarantee, merely having the guarantee on a piece of paper will not be enough. For example, even after 15-day notice, if a person has nowhere to go, can’t we provide some alternative?”

The Court acknowledged that the circumstances could vary considerably. It noted that there could be cases involving illegal constructions undertaken for profit, as well as cases involving economically marginalised persons occupying land who may require alternative accommodation. Such distinctions, according to the Court, reinforced the need for policy decisions rather than a single judicially prescribed framework. The Bench observed:

“There are cases and cases. There are rampant illegal constructions which have been undertaken for profit motivation. There are situations… [where] a large number of unfortunately economically marginalized people occupying tracts of land… require alternate accommodation. This is how policy decision calls…We cannot threaten the State from taking a particular policy recourse. Once it takes such recourse, we can step in through judicial review if that policy is arbitrary, unreasonable, or not accommodating due process.”

The Court also suggested that the petitioner should first approach the concerned States and the Union Government for formulation of appropriate policies. The Bench indicated that it could assist to the extent of directing the authorities to consider the concerns raised in the PIL.

On rehabilitation specifically, the Court noted that demolition cannot be viewed in isolation from the question of where affected families would go. It observed that if a State intends to undertake demolition, it should have a corresponding rehabilitation policy.

Ultimately, however, the Court declined to formulate a uniform nationwide policy, holding that rehabilitation and demolition-related issues are substantially dependent upon local circumstances and therefore fall within the policy domain of the States. The Court said:

“While we appreciate the concern of the petitioner organisation regarding rehabilitation of those who are affected by it, those whose right to shelter is adversely impacted as a result of the demolition, et cetera, but we are also of the view that such life issues essentially fall within the policy domain. So, that situation may vary from State to State and it may therefore warrant variation in their policy discipline as well. It would be difficult and may not be convenient for this Court to lay down any uniform policy framework to be applied in all these States.”

The Court accordingly disposed of the PIL with a direction to forward a copy of the petition to the Union Government, States and Union Territories, enabling the competent authorities to consider the issues raised while formulating or revisiting their existing policies.