In a couple of writ petitions filed before the Allahabad High Court seeking quashing of a FIR dated 30-06-2025 registered under Sections 115(2), 352, and 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, a Division Bench of Justice Chandra Dhari Singh and Justice Tarun Saxena quashed the FIR along with the consequential proceedings and allowed the petitions.
Petitioner 1(husband) and respondent 4 (wife) got married on 12-11-2024 as per Hindu rites and ceremonies. As per the FIR, approximately Rs. 4 crores were spent for the marriage and substantial articles along with jeweller and stridhan were given to the matrimonial family. The informant (respondent 3) (wife’s father) alleged that the matrimonial family expressed dissatisfaction with the dowry and articles given. It was alleged that a demand of Rs.10 crores and a further demand of Rs.50 lakhs on 07-12-2024.
The informant further alleged harassment, abuse, physical assault, an attempt to strangulate the wife, which led her to leave the matrimonial home on 03-02-2025. Thereafter, the husband instituted a divorce petition under Section 13(1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on 03-05-2025 and subsequently, the FIR was registered. It was also mentioned in the FIR that after the wife had been living separately for several months, the husband called his mother-in-law and threatened her stating that he would destroy them and cause their death. The informant mentioned that the situation became more serious after the alleged telephone threat as the wife’s mental condition allegedly deteriorated and she attempted suicide.
The Court considered three issues. The first was whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at their highest and read as a whole, disclosed the essential ingredients of the offences invoked. The second was whether continuation of the criminal proceedings would serve the legitimate purpose of criminal law or amount to an abuse of process. The third was whether the case fell within the exceptional categories recognised in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 and subsequent judgments warranting exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 for quashing FIR.
The Court stated that the principles remained those mentioned in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866, Bhajan Lal (supra) and Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401. Reference was also made to Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor (2013) 3 SCC 330. Perusing Section 85 of BNS read with Section 86, the Court stated that the provision does not criminalise the mere failure of a marriage, incompatibility between spouses or ordinary domestic disagreements. It was stated that criminality arises only when the conduct pleaded answers the statutory description.
Considering Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the Court stated that these provisions cannot be attracted merely because substantial expenditure was incurred at a marriage, articles were exchanged, or financial disagreements later arose between the spouses. Regarding Sections 115(2) and 352, the Court said that the provision was not a penalisation of every quarrel or exchange of harsh words between persons in a matrimonial dispute.
Further, the Court stated that to constitute a legally sustainable allegation of dowry demand, the FIR must disclose the occasion on which the demand was made, the person who made it, the person from whom it was demanded, the circumstances in which it was made and the manner in which the alleged harassment was connected with the demand. It was said that expressions such as ‘harassed’, ‘tortured’ and ‘ill-treated’ could summarise a narrative but could not replace one. The Court found that the demands were attributed generally to the matrimonial family without distinguishing petitioner 1 from petitioners 2 and 3.
It was stated that the allegations of physical assault and strangulation must not be minimized by the absence of an MLC as a victim of domestic violence may be unable to obtain immediate medical assistance. However, in the present case, the Court found that the record did not disclose any contemporaneous domestic-violence complaint, any earlier complaint specifically alleging dowry demand, any PCR call or contemporaneous police intervention concerning the alleged assault, intimidation or strangulation, or any contemporaneous medico-legal record corresponding to the alleged physical injuries.
The Court did not treat the absence of a particular injury as conclusive proof that an assault did not occur, but stated that these documents cannot be completely ignored when the Court is examining whether the criminal proceedings should be permitted to continue. Furthermore, the Court stated that chronology may acquire substantial significance when accompanied by other objective circumstances, particularly absence of particulars, material improvements, lack of specific attribution and absence of any earlier indication of the serious acts later alleged, as was the case in the present matter.
Noting that the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against implication of every member of the husband’s family in matrimonial litigation, the Court stated that relationship cannot substitute for an overt act. It was said that collective attribution is inadequate where the prosecution seeks to subject each accused to the consequences of a criminal trial.
The Court stated that the existence of misuse cannot justify weakening a genuine complaint, imposing an evidentiary burden at the FIR stage or discouraging a woman from seeking protection. However, it was also stated that matrimonial discord cannot automatically be converted into criminality, and that the criminal process is not a substitute for matrimonial adjudication, nor can it be used to determine every emotional, financial or relational consequence of a failed marriage.
It was said that the Court must avoid two opposite errors. The first was treating every criminal matrimonial complaint as mala fide merely because it follows separation or divorce proceedings. The second was treating every allegation in such a matrimonial FIR as immune from scrutiny merely because it is made by a woman or invoked protective penal provisions. The Court said that the statutory purpose is served only when both propositions are considered and applied in light of the peculiar circumstances. It was stated that a court of law is duty-bound to separate genuine, actionable criminal victimization from vague, sweeping allegations that merely cloak civil incompatibility in criminal garb.
The Court stated that the continuation of prosecution would subject the petitioners to the coercive machinery of criminal law without the foundational facts necessary to constitute the offences, and would amount to an abuse of the process of law. Hence, the FIR and all consequential proceedings were quashed while the writ petitions were allowed.
