In a special leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court against the final judgment and order dated 01-07-2025 by the Bombay High Court whereby a prayer for quashing a FIR under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) was rejected, a Bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Augustine George Masih quashed the subject FIR.
Respondent 2 (complainant) alleged that the appellant induced him to invest, in several chunks, a cumulative amount of Rs. 28,00,000/- promising good returns, in crypto currency. However, later, the appellant refused to return the said amount. After the subject FIR was registered, the appellant’s anticipatory bail was rejected on 09-02-2024 and he was arrested on 15-02-2024. Thereafter, a consent deed was executed between the appellant’s wife and respondent 2 wherein respondent 2 agreed for quashing of the FIR if the appellant paid Rs. 18,00,000/- to him.
Accordingly, the appellant paid Rs. 15 lakhs and thereafter, the appellant’s bail petition was considered by the Additional Sessions Judge and after respondent 2 endorsed the terms of consent and filed an affidavit, the appellant was released on bail. Thereafter, the balance sum of Rs. 3 lakhs were also paid to respondent 2. The appellant then preferred a quashing petition in the High Court, which was rejected by way of the impugned order.
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The appellant submitted that once respondent 2 had agreed for quashing of the FIR, the High Court should have exercised powers under Section 482 od CrPC to do the same. Whereas, respondent 2 submitted that the consent deed was not signed by the appellant and that any agreement between the appellant’s wife and respondent 2 could not be considered as a valid compromise as per Section 320 of CrPC. It was also submitted that since the charge sheet had been filed, the subject FIR had no independent existence.
The Court opined that the High Court ought to have exercised its inherent powers under Section 482 of CrPC to quash the FIR as respondent 2 not only consented for the appellant’s release on bail, but also stated before the Court that he wanted to withdraw the allegations levelled against the appellant. Further, the Court said that the High Court’s observation that there was no valid execution of terms of consent between the parties would not deter the Court for exercising powers under Section 482 of CrPC. It was stated that if respondent 2 had signed the consent terms and the appellant was still abiding by the same, it was not a case where there was no valid consent between the parties.
It was stated that once the terms had fully been complied with by the appellant, the High Court ought to have appreciated the entire facts and chain of events. Thus, the Court quashed the subject FIR while allowing the appeal.
