In an appeal filed before the Delhi High Court against a judgment of conviction dated 19-04-2022 as well as a sentence order dated 24-04-2022 by the Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi in a case arising out of a First Information Report (FIR) under Sections 302/304-B/498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), a Division Bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Ravinder Dudeja maintained the conviction under Sections 302 and 498-A, but set aside the conviction under Section 304-B.
On 26-09-1998, an unknown person telephonically informed the police station that a woman was set ablaze at Jagat Puri. The police officials arrived at the spot and learned that the injured victim had been shifted to Safdarjung Hospital with severe burn injuries. At the hospital, the doctor declared the victim fit for statement, and recorded the case history of the victim who was burnt by her husband following a domestic quarrel. The victim also stated that she married the appellant three to four years prior and had two daughters.
She stated that her husband continuously harassed her for dowry, beat her, and demanded money from her parents. On the night of the incident, upon her refusal to bring money, the appellant poured kerosene oil from a household stove, lighted her with a matchstick, and absconded. The victim ran outside shouting for help, where neighbours doused the fire and took her to the hospital. Investigative teams subsequently inspected the spot, prepared a site plan, and seized a stove, broken bangles, and burnt clothes.
The Sub-Divisional Magistrate recorded a formal statement from the victim on 27-09-1998. The victim ultimately died from her injuries on 29-09-1998, prompting the police to add the charge of murder. The appellant subsequently surrendered before the court on 03-10-1998. Charges were framed under Sections 498-A, 304-B, and 302 of the IPC. The appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed trial, stating in his defense that he was innocent, was not present at the house during the incident, and that his wife sustained burns due to an accidental stove burst. To prove its case, the prosecution examined twenty-three witnesses, including the victim’s parents and brother, who testified to a continuous pattern of matrimonial cruelty and demands for a scooter, fridge, television, and cash.
By the impugned order, the Trial Court convicted the appellant on all counts, sentencing him to life imprisonment under Section 302 with fine of Rs. 10,000/-, life imprisonment under Section 304-B with fine of Rs. 5000/-, and three years of rigorous imprisonment under Section 498-A along with fine of Rs. 2000/-, with a direction that the sentences run concurrently. Subsequently, this Court suspended the sentence on 12-09-2005, pending appeal.
The appellant assailed the conviction primarily by challenging the consistency and genuineness of the three dying declarations. It was argued that the medical endorsements of fitness were contradictory, the first statement was not in the actual words of the deceased, and the prosecution failed to examine independent public witnesses or the children. Conversely, the State argued that the dying declarations were materially consistent regarding the core components of the crime, namely the identity of the husband as the assailant, the pouring of kerosene, and the setting of fire.
The Court noted that the appellant’s conviction was founded mainly upon the dying declarations made by the deceased, which was corroborated by the medical, forensic, and surrounding circumstantial evidence. It was said that multiple dying declarations can form the sole basis of conviction if they are voluntary, reliable, and consistent on material particulars. The Court found that in the present case, the dying declarations made before the doctor, the IO, and the SDM were materially consistent.
It was stated that minor discrepancies regarding exact timings or procedural descriptions cannot outweigh the substantive consistency regarding the assailant’s identity and the manner of occurrence. The Court said that a dying declaration cannot be discarded merely because it was not recorded in a stereotyped format as long as the statement is voluntary, truthful, and coherent. Hence, the Court held that all three dying declarations were consistent and corroborative of each other.
Further, the Court stated that even though the defence suggested that the deceased sustained burns due to stove burst, no evidence was led to establish the same. Hence, it was held that this defence was not applicable. The Court also noted that the appellant’s conduct of remaining absconding and failing to visit his critically injured wife at the hospital constituted a significant incriminating circumstance as the conduct was inconsistent with the behaviour expected of a husband whose wife had suffered accidental burn injuries. It was also held that the non-examination of children, particularly in circumstances involving traumatic domestic violence, cannot by itself be fatal to the prosecution and that the absence of eyewitnesses in offences committed within confines of a matrimonial home was neither unusual nor fatal.
Stating that the absence of prior complaints cannot be fatal to the case when oral testimonies inspire confidence, the Court said that families often endure such harassment silently in the hope that matrimonial relations may improve with time. The contention that allegations regarding demand for costly articles was improbable since the witnesses belonged to a poor family was also found to be devoid of substance by the Court.
The Court continued to state that “greed and unlawful desire for dowry are not confined to any particular economic class and unfortunately continue to plague all sections of society. The social evil of dowry is deeply entrenched and often manifests in demands that are wholly disproportionate to the financial condition of the bride’s family.”
The Court held that the prosecution successfully established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant poured kerosene oil on the deceased and set her ablaze. The Court maintained the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant under Sections 498-A and 302 of the IPC. However, it was ruled that once a conviction under Section 302 was sustained, a separate conviction under Section 304-B was not warranted, and consequently set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 304-B. Lastly, the appellant was directed to surrender before the Jail Superintendent within two weeks to serve his remaining sentence.
