The Delhi High Court has dismissed cross-petitions filed by Supreme Advertising Pvt. Ltd. and Genus Power Infrastructure Ltd. challenging different portions of a 2014 arbitral award, reiterating that the Court’s jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is supervisory and not appellate. Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar held that none of the objections disclosed patent illegality, perversity, or violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law warranting interference with the arbitral award.
The dispute arose out of a series of Memoranda of Understanding and Joint Venture Agreements executed between the parties for electrification and infrastructure projects awarded by the Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited (UPPCL) and Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (JVVNL). Both parties challenged different findings of the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act.
At the outset, the Court undertook an extensive survey of Supreme Court jurisprudence on judicial interference with arbitral awards, relying heavily on OPG Power Generation Pvt. Ltd. v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions (India) Pvt. Ltd. (2025) 2 SCC 417. The Court reiterated that a court cannot act as an appellate forum over an arbitral award and may interfere only on the limited statutory grounds under Section 34, such as patent illegality, conflict with the fundamental policy of Indian law, or perversity. Mere errors of law or re-appreciation of evidence are impermissible.
Importantly, while discussing the concept of perversity, the Court reproduced the test laid down in Associate Builders v. DDA, observing that an arbitral award can be termed perverse only where (i) the finding is based on no evidence, (ii) the tribunal has relied upon irrelevant material, or (iii) it has ignored vital evidence. Even then, courts must not reassess the quality or sufficiency of evidence merely because another view is possible.
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The Court also rejected Supreme Advertising’s attempt to argue, for the first time during oral submissions, that Genus Power’s counterclaims were barred by limitation. Holding that limitation, in the facts of the case, was a mixed question of law and fact, the Court observed that the issue had neither been raised before the arbitral tribunal nor pleaded in the Section 34 petition. Permitting such a plea at the final hearing would require factual enquiry, which falls outside the limited scope of judicial review under Section 34.
In doing so, the Court relied on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. RV Anderson Associates Pvt. Ltd,2026 SCC OnLine SC 354., cautioning against parties keeping a jurisdictional ace up their sleeve and seeking to deploy it only after participating in arbitral proceedings without objection. The Court held that a party cannot invite adjudication on merits and thereafter introduce an entirely new challenge at the stage of final arguments.
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The Court further rejected the challenge to the Modified Award dated 17 May 2014, holding that the arbitral tribunal had merely exercised its statutory power under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act to correct computational, clerical and typographical errors. Such corrections, the Court held, did not amount to an impermissible review or reconsideration of the award on merits.
Finding that the arbitral tribunal’s conclusions represented plausible views based on the evidence and contractual documents, the High Court dismissed both petitions filed by Genus Power, holding that no ground existed to interfere with the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
