In an appeal filed before the Supreme Court to assail a judgment dated 29-05-2026 by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court whereby decisions rendered by the statutory authorities under the Insecticides Act, 1968 (Act) granting registration certificate to Crystal Crop Protection Ltd (appellant) under Section 9(3) of the Act as confirmed by the Single Judge, were set aside, a Bench comprising Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Prasanna B. Varale allowed the appeal, and set aside the impugned judgment.
By the impugned order, the decision by the Registration Committee in the 430th meeting dated 23-07-2021 was also set aside. The appellant filed an application for grant of registration for indigenous manufacture of Halosulfuron methyl, as well as its import before the Registration Committee under the Act. A registration certificate was granted to the appellant in the 430th meeting for import of Halosulfuron methyl technical 98% min. and for indigenous manufacture of formulation of Halosulfuron methyl 75% WG.
Dhanuka Agritech Ltd. (respondent 1), a commercial competitor of the appellant, filed an appeal-cum-revision petition under Sections 10 and 11 of the Act, and the appellate/revisionist Authority dismissed it on 10-09-2021. Dhanuka then filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court, and the Single Judge dismissed it on 24-01-2023, confirming the orders of the statutory authorities. On appeal, the Division Bench set aside the Single Judge’s findings and quashed the registration certificate by the impugned judgment. The Division Bench had sought the views of the Union of India, and it exercised judicial review on the finding that the order facilitating compliance was not given effect to by the Union, even though the compliance had been carried out. Hence, the present appeal.
The Court referred to the Compliance Affidavit filed by respondents 2 to 4, which concluded that source verification, a mandatory requirement, was done by the Committee and found satisfactory, and that Dhanuka’s objections rested on surmises and conjectures. It was stated that judicial review over an executive decision, especially one challenging a license granted to a commercial competitor or business rival, is limited, and that the Division Bench took the role of an Appellate Authority by reversing the views of the statutory authorities, which the Single Judge had confirmed. The Court also expressed its reservations on the entitlement of the private respondent seeking recourse to file an appeal under Section 10 of the Act.
On the point of law, the Court noted that Section 10 facilitates an appeal only against non-registration or cancellation, and that the expression “any person aggrieved” applies only in that context. It therefore held that Dhanuka could not be termed “a person aggrieved” entitled to invoke the Section 10 remedy. The Court found that both on merits and on the principle of law, the impugned judgment could not be sustained. Thus, the appeal was allowed and the Division Bench’s judgment was set aside.
