The Supreme Court has asserted that a court may direct a DNA test where the result of the test is directly in issue, no other evidence on record can effectively substitute for the scientific determination, and the balance of interests and justice favours such testing. The Court held that the controlling test is whether paternity is central to the lis and whether the truth can otherwise be reached without the test; if not, and if the balancing exercise favours the person seeking determination, a direction for DNA testing is justified. On the facts of this case, those conditions were satisfied, and the plea of res judicata was rejected because the earlier proceedings did not amount to a conclusive adjudication of the present civil claim on paternity after a full trial. Accordingly, the Apex Court dismissed upheld the impugned judgment directing DNA testing.
A Two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh reviewed the governing line of authorities on court-ordered blood/DNA tests, including Goutam Kundu vs State of West Bengal [(1993) 3 SCC 418], Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy [(2015) 1 SCC 365], to reiterate that DNA testing cannot be directed as a matter of course, and that courts must consider whether paternity is directly in issue, whether other evidence can satisfactorily answer the controversy, and whether the balance of interests justifies such an order. The Bench emphasised that the inquiry involves balancing privacy and dignity concerns against the child’s legitimate interest in knowing his biological father, while also considering whether the dispute can be resolved without scientific evidence.
Applying those principles, the Bench found that in the present case the question of paternity was directly in issue in Amar’s civil suit. It noted that the appellant had consistently denied paternity, that the alleged relationship between the appellant and Amar’s mother corresponded with Amar’s birth in September 1999, and that there was no other evidence capable of providing a categorical answer on paternity. The Bench also observed that prior findings against Amar and his mother were not rendered after a full-fledged civil trial on the present issue and therefore did not conclude the matter. On privacy, the Bench held that the appellant’s privacy interest had to be balanced against Amar’s long-standing quest for closure and the possibility that, absent a definitive answer, he may be denied rights to which he may otherwise be entitled if he is indeed the appellant’s son.
Briefly, the appeal arose from concurrent orders of the trial court and the High Court directing the appellant, Chaturbhuj Pradhan, to undergo a DNA test to determine whether respondent no. 1, Amar Pradhan, is his son. Amar claimed that he was born on 10 September 1999 from consensual relations between his mother and the appellant in January 1999. The appellant denied paternity and relied, among other things, on his earlier acquittal in a rape case initiated by Amar’s mother.
The record also showed earlier maintenance litigation between the parties, including observations in prior proceedings that Amar and his mother had failed to establish any relationship with the appellant. During the pendency of earlier proceedings, Amar, upon attaining majority, instituted a civil suit seeking a declaration that he is the appellant’s son and, on that basis, entitled to a one-third share in the appellant’s property. In that suit, the civil court directed a DNA test, and the High Court affirmed that order.
