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Hundreds of Permissible Activities, Businesses & 150 Million Users: Telegram Assails Government’s Emergency Ban

Hundreds of Permissible Activities, Businesses & 150 Million Users: Telegram Assails Government’s Emergency Ban

Telegram FZ LLC & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) 8259/2026

Telegram Emergency Ban Challenge

Telegram on Thursday urged the Delhi High Court to strike down the Centre’s emergency blocking order issued in connection with the alleged misuse of the platform during the NEET examination cycle, arguing that isolated instances of examination-related misconduct could not justify blocking an entire platform used by nearly 150 million people in India. The submissions were made before Justice Tejas Karia, where the Court reserved judgment after hearing extensive arguments from both sides.

Appearing for Telegram, Counsel challenged both the legality of the emergency blocking order and the subsequent confirmation order passed under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. Section 69A of the IT Act states:

69A. Power to issue directions for blocking for public access of any information through any computer resource. –

(1) Where the Central Government or any of its officer specially authorised by it in this behalf is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do, in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above, it may subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order, direct any agency of the Government or intermediary to block for access by the public or cause to be blocked for access by the public any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource.

(2) The procedure and safeguards subject to which such blocking for access by the public may be carried out, shall be such as may be prescribed.

(3) The intermediary who fails to comply with the direction issued under sub-section (1) shall be punished with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

At the outset, Justice Karia identified the central questions arising in the case.

“Firstly you are questioning the nature of the power here by saying that it is not an emergency situation. Number two is you are saying that information can be blocked, not the app can be blocked. Number three is application of mind by the Secretary about the necessity and the circumstances under which the power has to be exercised. And fourth is proportionality.”

Counsel argued that the Government’s orders suffered from a fundamental legal infirmity because the statutory authority had merely reproduced the language of Section 69A without demonstrating any genuine application of mind. Referring to the blocking order, he submitted:

“You cannot recite the words of the statute like a mantra. The law requires the competent authority to examine the material and arrive at an independent satisfaction that an emergency exists. Merely reproducing the language of Section 69A does not amount to application of mind. The order repeatedly invokes phrases like ‘public order’, ‘sovereignty and integrity of India’ and ‘prevention of cognizable offences’, but there is no analysis showing how the facts of this case satisfy those statutory thresholds.”

The senior counsel argued that the complaints before the Government arose out of alleged circulation of examination-related content connected with NEET and that the authorities had failed to explain how such allegations could suddenly become a matter affecting the sovereignty and integrity of India. Questioning the reasoning adopted in the blocking order, he contended:

“An examination conducted by NEET may be extremely important, but one still has to ask whether alleged misconduct relating to that examination can suddenly be elevated into a threat to sovereignty, integrity, security of the State or public order merely by reproducing the statutory language. The authority must demonstrate how it reached that conclusion. It cannot simply copy and paste the words of the section and treat that as compliance with the law.”

What Measures Telegram Took?

The Court then examined Telegram’s response to the concerns raised by authorities. Justice Tejas Karia questioned whether the platform’s actions were sufficient to prevent the alleged misuse that prompted the blocking order. He questioned: “Whatever action you have taken, does it justify exercise of power is question number one. You may have taken many actions but the question here is what you have not done that has triggered that.”

In response, Telegram pointed to meetings with government officials, compliance with takedown requests, and the removal of identified channels, groups, bots and URLs. It was argued that the platform had acted promptly whenever specific content was flagged and that these compliance efforts were not adequately considered before the Government decided to block the entire platform. Counsel argued that Telegram had not remained passive and had acted whenever specific content was identified.

“Telegram has not sat back and done nothing. There were repeated engagements with the authorities. There were meetings. There were communications. There were takedown requests. Hundreds of channels, groups, bots and URLs identified by authorities were removed. Telegram also undertook independent enforcement action. All of this material was before the Government, yet the final order proceeds as though the platform had failed to cooperate altogether.”

Was the Blocking order Proportional?

The Court, however, noted that compliance with takedown obligations under the intermediary framework and the Government’s power to invoke Section 69A were distinct issues. Justice Karia observed that the Court was primarily concerned with whether the statutory conditions for exercising emergency blocking powers had been met and whether the response adopted by the Government was proportionate.

A substantial part of the hearing focused on the proportionality of a platform-wide ban. Counsel argued that even assuming unlawful content existed, the Government had several less restrictive alternatives available, including blocking specific channels, groups, URLs or users. According to Telegram, shutting down an entire platform used by approximately 150 million Indians, for business educational and other permissible activities, was constitutionally disproportionate.

“The doctrine of proportionality exists precisely for situations like this. Before resorting to the most restrictive measure available, the State must demonstrate why less restrictive alternatives would not work. If the concern relates to specific channels, specific users, specific groups or specific information, those can be targeted. What cannot happen is that an entire platform used by approximately 150 million Indians is blocked because of the conduct of a limited number of actors. The effect of this order is not confined to those alleged to have circulated examination-related content. It affects students, teachers, educational institutions, businesses, professionals and ordinary citizens who use Telegram for entirely legitimate purposes. The question is whether all of those users can be deprived of access because of allegations against a small subset of users. That, we respectfully submit, is the very definition of a disproportionate measure.”

Justice Karia remarked that the situation is that there were so many students who got affected and that can’t be ignored. The question is: to curb that one particular instance, can you block the entire app? The Court also recognised the wider consequences of a platform-wide blocking order.

To What Extent Government Can Exercise Power u/s 69A

On the scope of the Government’s blocking powers under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, Telegram did not dispute the existence of the power itself; it argued that the Court must examine the limits of its exercise, particularly where the Government seeks to block an entire platform rather than specific information. Justice Tejas Karia repeatedly focused on whether the statutory conditions for invoking Section 69A had been satisfied and whether a platform-wide blocking order was a proportionate response in the facts of the case. Telegram again submitted that it was not disputing the existence of the Government’s power under Section 69A but only the manner in which that power had been exercised in the present case.

“The existence of power is one thing; the lawful exercise of power is another. The authority must satisfy the statutory conditions, apply its mind to the material before it, and choose a measure that is proportionate to the objective sought to be achieved.”

After hearing the parties at length on the scope of Section 69A, the meaning of “information” and “computer resource”, the existence of an emergency, and the proportionality of a platform-wide ban, Justice Tejas Karia reserved judgment.