The Delhi High Court has treated ‘VOLVO’ as a coined, inherently distinctive mark not found in any English dictionary, with the prefix ‘MAX’ being a commonplace laudatory expression that does not detract from the dominant element. The Court explained that substitution of ‘W’ for ‘V’ in ‘MAX VOLWO’ was held visually near-identical and practically indistinguishable when spoken, since ‘V’ and ‘W’ are commonly pronounced alike.
The case was placed within Section 29(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, as the impugned marks are not identical with the registered mark in the strict sense, with the Court declining to invoke the Section 29(3) presumption at this stage. The Court also found that advance notice would defeat the object of the injunction, given the defendant’s cash dealings, substantial stock, shift from the GST-registered address, and readiness to despatch goods across State lines including to Delhi. The defendant was directed to take down all listings, including the IndiaMART listing, within one week.
Holding that adopting a family of marks subsuming a registered trademark for identical pharmaceutical goods is deliberate free-riding, not coincidence, the Delhi High Court has declared Mankind Pharma, a well-known trademark holder, established prior use of MANKIND since 1986 and a family of over 100 ‘KIND’ formative marks including FLOKIND, COXKIND, NUROKIND, AMLOKIND, MOXIKIND, RABEKIND and PANTAKIND, with FY 2025-26 turnover crossing Rs. 10,421 crores.
The Court also found Coskind Pharma’s use of FLORAKIND, COSKIND, ETORIKIND, PANDOKIND, RABELKIND and M-PREDKIND prima facie to subsume the Plaintiff’s registered ‘KIND’ marks and to closely track specific prior registrations such as FLOKIND, COXKIND, PANTAKIND and RABEKIND for identical pharmaceutical goods. The Trade Marks Registry’s own objection under Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, citing Mankind’s COXKIND against the Defendant’s Director’s application for COSKIND, was treated as significant corroboration of deceptive similarity.
Relying on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cadila Health Care Ltd. vs. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. [(2001) 5 SCC 73], the High Court reiterated that the threshold for proving confusing similarity is materially lower in the case of medicinal products, given the heightened public interest in drug safety and consumer trust. Accordingly, the Court granted ex parte ad interim injunction, appointed a Local Commissioner to raid the Defendant’s Kanpur premises, seize offending goods and stock registers, and fixed the Commissioner’s fee at Rs. 2 lakhs plus expenses, with the order itself kept off the website until execution of the commission.
Relying on the decree in DRS Logistics v. Rajesh Agarwal [CS(OS) 1131/2008], the Delhi High Court has accepted that ‘AGARWAL PACKERS & MOVERS’ is a well-known trademark in India. The Court injuncted Defendant nos. 1 to 70 from using the plaintiff’s mark ‘AGARWAL PACKERS & MOVERS’ or any identical or deceptively similar variant as a trademark, trade name, corporate name, keyword, meta tag, or in any other manner, including through Google Search and Google Business Profile listings.
The said defendants were further directed to remove, to the extent within their control, all existing business listings, profiles, pages, accounts and online content using the plaintiffs’ mark or suggesting any association with the plaintiffs.
The High Court held that where a trademark has been judicially recognised as well-known and the plaintiffs have established prior recognition of their rights, the continued unauthorised use of the mark by third parties in online business listings, particularly on Google Search and Google Business Profile, causes irreparable injury to goodwill and reputation that cannot be compensated in monetary terms.
Finding prima facie infringement of near-identical trade dress and three-leaf device copycat of Herbalife’s registered marks, the Delhi High Court has directed Amazon, Flipkart and IndiaMART to take down 18 listings within 36 hours and disclose seller KYC details. The Court found that Herbalife established a prima facie case of trademark infringement under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and passing off against the sellers of ‘Herbawish’ and ‘Herbawish Nutrition’ nutritional products, on the ground that the rival marks were visually and phonetically deceptively similar to its registered ‘Herbalife’ trademarks with the common prefix ‘Herba’ enhancing deception.
The Court treated the copying of the Plaintiff’s trade dress, including the three-leaf device, colour combination, white container background, green band and label placements, as evidence of dishonest intent, holding that the rival products were difficult to distinguish by a person of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. Further, use of the Plaintiff’s registered three-leaf device by the Defendants was prima facie held to be trademark infringement, with the Court noting that since the products were nutritional, inferior quality could pose health risks to the public and dilute the ‘Herbalife’ mark.
The Delhi High Court has granted an ex parte ad interim injunction to Impresario Entertainment and Hospitality Pvt Ltd., which operates 52 ‘SOCIAL’ restaurants/bars pan India, secured against M/s Social Circle from using the impugned mark ‘SOCIAL CIRCLE’ or any identical/deceptively similar variation. The Court placed significant weight on its earlier order dated Jan 09, 2026, declaring ‘SOCIAL’ a well-known trademark under Section 2(1)(zg) of the Trade Marks Act, 1899, treating it as a binding precedent on the plaintiff’s mark strength.
The injunction extends broadly to the defendant, its directors, principals, proprietors, partners, officers, employees, agents, distributors, suppliers, affiliates, subsidiaries, franchisees, licensees, representatives, group companies, and assignees, covering use, sale, marketing, supply, advertising, and any direct or indirect dealing under the impugned mark.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Vikas Mahajan observed that the comparison between the defendant’s impugned mark ‘SOCIAL CIRCLE’ and the plaintiff’s registered mark ‘SOCIAL’ demonstrates that the mark adopted by the defendant is identical/deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s trademark. The Court noted that the plaintiff’s ‘SOCIAL’ restaurants/bars have become very popular among the general public and have received various awards for excellence in the hospitality industry.
The Delhi High Court has held the unauthorised ‘PURPLLE 2026 Franchise Opportunity’ as actionable trademark infringement, copyright infringement and passing off, emphasising that the goodwill of a Unicorn brand cannot be left to monetary compensation. The Court therefore granted an ex parte ad-interim injunction against the unknown operator of a Facebook page and WhatsApp Business Account offering a fake ‘PURPLLE 2026 Franchise Opportunity’ for Rs. 15 lakhs, using the Plaintiff’s registered mark, logo, genuine store photographs and official email.
The Court recorded prima facie infringement under Sections 29(1) and 29(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, copyright infringement under Section 51 read with Section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957, and passing off, on the basis that the identical mark was used as the central identifier of a commercial franchise programme. Reliance was placed on the Plaintiff’s 62 trademark registrations across 14 classes, Unicorn valuation of approximately USD 1.1 billion.
Meta was ordered to take down the impugned URL within 36 hours and disclose BSI and IP logs, WhatsApp LLC was directed to suspend the linked account within 36 hours and disclose registration, IP, login and payment details, Reliance Jio was directed to block the mobile number within 36 hours and furnish KYC particulars, and Truecaller was directed to remove the false ‘Purplle Store’ listing within 36 hours.
The Delhi High Court has restrained a hidden real estate squatter from operating deceptively similar websites misusing Signature Global’s registered marks, logos and exclusive Tonino Lamborghini collaboration content, while ordering global registrars to disclose the John Doe’s KYC details in sealed covers. The Court held that where the registered proprietor of well-known real estate trademarks alleges infringement, copyright violation and passing off through multiple deceptively similar websites operated by an unidentified squatter whose WHOIS details are masked, the Court can grant an ex parte ad interim injunction and direct global domain registrars to lock and suspend the infringing domains.
Accordingly, ex parte ad interim injunction granted against John Doe / Ashok Kumar restraining registration, operation, hosting, publishing and advertising of nine websites using the SIGNATUREGLOBAL marks, logos and copyrighted project content. Also, six global domain registrars, namely, GoDaddy, Hostinger, Openprovider, WIX, NAMECHEAP and Realtime Register are directed to lock and suspend the infringing domains within 72 hours of receipt of the order.
While upholding the temporary injunction granted in favour of ITC Limited, the Calcutta High Court has affirmed that Sections 28(3) and 30(2)(e) of the Trade Marks Act do not bar infringement or passing off actions where validity of the defendant’s registration is disputed. The Court clarified that Sections 28(3) and 30(2)(e) of the Trade Marks Act bar only infringement claims between registered proprietors of identical or similar marks, and do not apply to passing off actions.
The Court found that the defendant/appellant could not produce a registered user agreement under Section 48, the mandatory affidavit under Section 49, or genuine royalty payment documents. Further, the purported license was retrospective, and the royalty vouchers were unsigned, unstamped, and described as ‘legal expense’. The Court also pointed out that the disclaimer appeared only in one of ITC’s registrations, while at least three other similar marks carried no such disclaimer.
As multiple High Courts have recognised that ITC has acquired secondary meaning in the word ‘Gold’ through open, continuous, and extensive use since 1905, the High Court emphasised that with only 15% of cigarette packaging available for the actual trademark, even slight similarity between marks is likely to deceive the common purchaser. Accordingly, the overall impression, including the statutory image, must be considered in assessing deceptive similarity.
In an appeal by Baskin Robbins licensee Graviss Foods, the Bombay High Court has held that carving out a generic phrase from a wider branded mark cannot attract registration under Section 9 of the Trade Marks Act. The Court said that a trademark consisting of a simple combination of generic, descriptive or laudatory words such as ‘ICE CREAM ROCKS’ is devoid of distinctive character and falls foul of both Section 9(1)(a) and Section 9(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, even where the applicant actually uses the mark in the market with a brand differentiator.
The Court clarified that an applicant cannot, by carving out the generic and descriptive integers from a wider branded mark actually used in commerce as ‘Baskin Robbins Ice Cream Rocks’, secure a statutory monopoly over those integers alone, since the proviso to Section 9 cannot be invoked on the strength of use of the wider mark. The Court also clarified that acquired distinctiveness under the proviso to Section 9 requires long, continuous and extensive use; a period of seven months between the attested commencement of use and the date of application is insufficient to clothe generic words with secondary meaning, particularly where the mark is not shown to be a household name.
The High Court went on to explain that the registration of other marks containing the same generic expression neither creates a precedent nor confers a right upon a later applicant to demand similar treatment, especially where those registrations carry a distinguishing brand element that the subject mark lacks. Further, where a mark is hit by the absolute bar under Section 9, the relative grounds under Section 11, including the Registrar’s invocation of likelihood of confusion with prior cited marks, become academic and need not be further analysed, even if the Section 11 reasoning itself is inadequately articulated.
While granting injunction to FanCode against rogue sports streaming websites, the Delhi High Court has restrained four rogue domains from pirating Formula 1, Saudi Pro League, ATP Tour, Afghanistan T20s, Copa del Rey, Masters and USGA broadcasts. The Court also directed registrars to suspend and lock the infringing domains within 24 hours and disclose complete registrant, KYC, IP and access log data within 6 weeks in password-protected form, while ISPs were ordered to block access to the listed domains and any mirror or variant within 24 hours.
The Court found that FanCode’s exclusive broadcast reproduction rights under Section 37 of the Copyright Act, 1957 across seven sporting properties were prima facie recognised, with the Court placing reliance on its own line of John Doe orders protecting live sports streaming. The Court also reaffirmed that any injunction against hydra-headed pirate websites must extend to mirror, redirect and alphanumeric variants to remain effective. While underscoring that piracy of live sporting content must be curbed with a heavy hand, the High Court emphasised that the commercial value of each event is exhausted within its duration and any delay in blocking causes irreparable breach of exclusive rights and revenue loss.
While refusing interim injunction against Xiaomi in anti-theft patent suit, the Delhi High Court has upheld the Single Judge’s finding that Conqueror Innovations failed to establish prima facie case of infringement of Patent No. 244963, with less than two months remaining before patent expiry. The Court, therefore, precluded the appellants from advancing a fresh construction of Element E2 in appeal by contending that mere presence of Security Activation Element (SAE) data in Read-Only Memory (ROM) satisfied the claim, when their plaint and claim chart had originally relied upon installation of third-party anti-theft applications to render the relevant data non-erasable in flash memory.
The High Court held that the essential feature of Element E2 is the non-erasable storage of relevant data, including the message centre number, in flash memory with auto-reinstall feature and/or in ROM. Since the message centre number is SIM-dependent and cannot be permanently stored in ROM, the appellants’ ROM-only interpretation was held to be inconsistent with the working of the claimed invention.
The Court also construed ‘auto-answer mode’ in light of the patentee’s own description in the complete specification, holding that it means silent automatic answering of incoming calls without visual or voice cues, enabling the owner to listen to surroundings of the stolen device. The appellants’ attempt to equate it with mere remote activation was rejected as contrary to their own pleadings and as lacking novelty over prior art.
The Calcutta High Court has restrained the respondent hotel from engaging in or authorizing public performance/communication to the public of the appellant’s repertoire of literary and musical works without a licence, and from publicly performing or communicating to the public works created by the author members of the appellant without paying the statutory royalty. The Court held that the respondent hotel, by providing cable connections in each guest room for viewing by paying guests without obtaining a licence from the copyright owner, was guilty of infringement of copyright under Section 51 of the Copyright Act, 1957.
The Court went on to explain that the Explanation to Section 2(ff) expressly deems communication through cable to residential rooms of any hotel as communication to the public. The cable operator’s licence did not extend to the hotel’s commercial use, as the definition of “subscriber” under the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995 prohibits further transmission to any other person, and hotel guests cannot be treated as subscribers.
Emphasising that nominal, token, or post-solution physical steps such as displaying, presenting, or printing do not take a claim outside Section 3(m) of the Patents Act, 1970 where the substance of the monopoly, read as a whole, remains a mental act, the Delhi High Court has laid down seven-step structured test for assessing whether a claim is excluded as a “mere scheme or rule or method of performing mental act,” distinguishing mental acts from technical implementations. The guidelines were directed to be placed before the Controller General of Patents and Designs for implementation within six weeks.
The Bombay High Court has restrained the Defendant from manufacturing, selling, or using the impugned mark “BISLIE” or any mark deceptively similar to “BISLERI” pending final disposal of the suit. The Court found that the Defendant had merely deleted the sixth alphabet “r” from “Bisleri” and interchanged the fifth and seventh alphabets “e” and “i” to create the impugned mark “Bislie,” establishing deceptive similarity on the face of the record.
The Court held that where a defendant adopts a mark that is a minor phonetic and visual manipulation of a well-known registered trademark, achieved by deleting one alphabet and interchanging two others, and couples it with an identical colour scheme, get-up, layout, and trade dress, a strong prima facie case of trademark infringement, copyright infringement, and passing off is made out. Thus, the defendant’s failure to appear or contest despite service, combined with corroborative findings in the Receiver’s Report, warrants confirmation of the ex-parte ad-interim injunction and appointment of the Court Receiver for search and seizure of infringing goods.
The Bombay High Court finds Mumbai Khadi & Village Industries Association in violation of injunction restraining use of “Khadi” mark and Charkha logo for organising Khadi Mahotsav 2.0 on its own premises. Rejecting contempt allegations for execution of land sale agreement and residual digital listings, the High Court laid down structured four-step test and directs payment of Rs. 2.50 lakhs as costs.
The Board of Trustees of MKVIA is directed not to host any event relating to “Khadi” and the promotion of “Khadi” by any person whatsoever, regardless of whether such person is certified or approved by KVIC, whether on MKVIA’s premises or elsewhere. Since MKVIA has fallen in line and compliance with the Injunction Order has been achieved, the Court declined to direct any attachment of property or confinement to civil imprisonment, holding that these measures are not ends in themselves but means to securing compliance.
Further, each of the trustees of MKVIA was warned to be careful in future and directed to refrain from indulging in any sharp practice by holding events in conflict with the obligation not to directly or indirectly sell and market any products purporting them to be “Khadi” products or using the “Khadi” name and Charkha mark.
Bombay HC Restrains Dabur from Using ‘NEEM’ As Trade Mark on Toothpaste Packaging
In a detailed interim order, the Bombay High Court has ruled that Jyothy Labs, which has used “NEEM” in relation to toothpaste since 1920 through its predecessor Calcutta Chemical Company, has made out a prima facie case of trade mark infringement and passing off against Dabur India. The Court held that the leading and essential feature of a composite or label mark can be protected even without standalone registration, and that a defendant who seeks registration of a mark without disclaiming a constituent element is estopped from later arguing that the same element is generic or descriptive.
The Court allowed the interim application, granting an injunction that restrains Dabur India from infringing Jyothy Labs’ registered trademarks and from passing off its goods by using the impugned label or any deceptively similar mark in relation to toothpaste. However, the Court explicitly clarified that this injunction does not place any fetter on Dabur from using the word ‘NEEM’ per se in a purely descriptive manner on its packaging.
The Court held that the proprietor of a composite or label mark may protect its leading and essential feature against unauthorised appropriation even where that feature is not independently registered. Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act does not preclude such protection, as it merely prevents the proprietor from asserting an independent monopoly over a part that is common to the trade or non-distinctive; it does not bar the proprietor from relying on the appropriation of the essential and distinctive feature to establish deceptive similarity.
Cracking down on anonymous operators masking their identities to pass off packing and relocation services under the well-known “GATI” brand, the Delhi High Court has held that a registered proprietor of a well-known trademark is entitled to immediate ex-parte injunctive relief against anonymous entities operating rogue websites with masked identities. The Court also recognized ‘GATI’ as a well-known trademark with extensive, continuous use since 1989, entitling it to a high degree of statutory protection in the logistics sector.
The Court emphasised that when infringers deliberately replicate a brand’s look and feel to pass off identical services, causing a strong likelihood of public confusion and irreparable harm to the brand’s goodwill, the balance of convenience necessitates urgent judicial intervention to suspend the infringing domains and halt the unlawful commercial activities.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Jyoti Singh observed that the plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the ‘GATI’ marks, which have been openly and extensively used for decades and are officially recognized as well-known trademarks entitled to a high degree of protection. It was noted that the defendants had adopted deceptively similar marks and website layouts with a prima facie dishonest intention to misrepresent a commercial nexus with the plaintiff and free-ride on its established reputation.
The Court further observed that the defendants were operating behind a veil of anonymity by masking their registrant details on these rogue websites, highlighting that such deceptive practices by counterfeiters constitute an ever-increasing menace that urgently needs to be curbed to prevent public confusion and dilution of the plaintiff’s brand.
The Madras High Court has issued a permanent injunction restraining Matrimony.com (respondent) from infringing FreeElective Network (appellant’s) registered trademark ‘Jodi365’ by using the deceptively similar mark ‘Jodii’ or any other deceptively similar mark. The Court also directed the respondent to surrender to the appellant for destruction all materials, brochures, screen prints, packing materials, advertising materials and other materials including on the Internet bearing the trademark ‘Jodii’ or any mark deceptively similar to ‘Jodi365’. However, the relief of damages of Rs. 1 crore was declined, as the appellant had not led any oral evidence to prove the extent of damages suffered.
Where the appellant was the registered proprietor and prior user since 2009 of the composite device mark ‘Jodi365’ for matchmaking and matrimonial services, and the respondent, owner of the well-known ‘BHARATMATRIMONY’ house mark, launched the mobile application ‘Jodii’ in 2021 for identical services after having itself filed applications for registration of ‘Jodii’ as both a label and a word, the Court held that the respondent’s adoption was dishonest and deceptively similar to the appellant’s mark, and that the issue of validity of the appellant’s registration could not be canvassed in a civil suit absent a rectification proceeding.
The Calcutta High Court has allowed Sun Pharma’s appeal and set aside the ad interim injunction that had restrained it from airing the impugned video and making any statements regarding Emami’s “Zandu Balm”, “Mentho Plus Balm” and “Zandu Ultra Power Balm” products. The Court held that a suit for disparagement simpliciter is not a “commercial dispute” under the Commercial Courts Act and that mere market leadership cannot convert a generic term like “Balm” into a brand-specific reference.
The Court clarified that a suit for disparagement simpliciter does not constitute a “commercial dispute” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, even if stray references are made in the plaint to trademarks, copyrights, or design registrations. The items enumerated under Section 2(1)(c) of the CC Act are exhaustive, and a narrow interpretation is to be lent to the provisions of the Act in light of its object of providing speedy remedy. Disparagement and infringement or passing off stand on diametrically opposite poles, since the former denigrates a product while the latter acknowledges its worth through emulation.
For Section 29(8) of the Trade Marks Act to apply, the registered trademark itself must feature in the offending advertisement, which was absent in the present case. A generic term like “Balm” cannot be presumed to be exclusively linked to a particular manufacturer merely on the basis of market leadership, and in the absence of any direct correlation between the container depicted in the advertisement and the plaintiff’s product, no recall value can be deduced. The plaintiff must plead and prove generic disparagement as a distinct cause of action to succeed on that ground, and mere market share does not substitute for such pleading, added the Court.
In an ex parte ad interim injunction order, the Delhi High Court has held that the Defendants’ adoption of the dominant feature “THUNDER” with a mere substitution of the numeral “15000” was insufficient to distinguish the rival marks, and that the Plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of infringement and passing off under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
The Court applied the settled principle that a registered proprietor of a trademark has a statutory right to use the mark exclusively and to restrain third parties from infringing it. Where a party adopts a mark that is deceptively similar to a registered mark for identical goods, with full knowledge of the prior statutory and common law rights of the registered proprietor, such adoption constitutes a deliberate attempt to come as close as possible to the registered mark and amounts to infringement under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, as well as passing off.
The Court further applied the position that the use of the dominant and essential feature of a registered mark, with only a minor substitution that is insufficient to distinguish the rival marks, particularly where the trade channels and consumer base are common, results in an inevitable likelihood of confusion amongst the public.
The Delhi High Court has reaffirmed that ‘NOVARTIS’, being a well-known mark registered and used in India since 1996 with substantial sales figures, is entitled to strong protection against any deceptively similar adoption, even where the competing mark differs in suffix or device elements. The Court rejected the appellants’ argument that the prefix ‘NOV’ was generic or common to the trade, holding that it constituted the dominant and essential feature of the respondents’ mark and could not be allowed to be diluted by a subsequent user without adequate explanation for adoption.
The Court held that where a well-known pharmaceutical mark with established goodwill and continuous use since 1996 is sought to be diluted by a subsequent user adopting a coined expression sharing the dominant prefix and overall visual and phonetic similarity, and where both parties operate in the pharmaceutical sector with overlapping trade channels, the case satisfies the ‘triple identity’ test warranting grant of interim injunction.
Allowing the petition filed by Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, the Delhi High Court has cancelled the registration of the trademark “DAPLOGIN” (Registration No.5208898 in Class 05) held by M/s Razenta Pharmaceuticals, holding it to be deceptively similar to Dr. Reddy’s prior registered and coined trademark “DAPLO”. The Court held that rival trademarks must be compared as a whole under the anti-dissection rule, focusing on overall structural and phonetic similarity from the perspective of a man of average intelligence and imperfect recollection.
The Court further held that the dominant feature of a composite mark can be identified for comparison without violating the anti-dissection rule. In pharmaceutical trademark disputes, an exacting and stringent judicial scrutiny is warranted, and a lesser quantum of proof is required to establish confusing similarity. The Court also explained that a coined mark, even if it incorporates letters or syllables from the generic name of an API, is entitled to protection and cannot be claimed to be publici juris unless the entire mark is shown to be generic.
To invoke the “common to trade” defence, the party asserting it must establish substantial, frequent, customary and habitual use of the mark by third parties in the actual trade, and mere registration of similar marks is insufficient, added the Court while directing the Registrar of Trade Marks to rectify the Register within six weeks to maintain its purity.
While holding that converting a passing off action into an infringement claim post-registration does not change the basic structure of the suit, the Delhi High Court has allowed KRBL Limited to amend its 2016 suit against J.R. Rice India Pvt Ltd., allowing it to add a claim of trademark infringement over the use of “ROYAL GATE” with a device of “INDIA GATE”. However, the Court imposed a cost of Rs. 50,000 on KRBL payable to the Delhi High Court Advocates Welfare Trust within two weeks, on account of the unexplained five-year delay in moving the amendment application.
The Court explained that where a Plaintiff files a suit for passing off and the trademark which is the subject matter of the suit gets registered in the Plaintiff’s favour during the pendency of the proceedings, the Plaintiff is entitled to seek amendment of the plaint under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to incorporate a claim of infringement, since the cause of action for both passing off and infringement is founded on the same set of facts and the basic structure of the suit remains unchanged. While mere delay is not by itself sufficient to refuse a bona fide and necessary amendment, the same can be a relevant factor while imposing terms and costs on the party seeking the amendment.
In a landmark ruling on trademark rights of partnership firms, the Calcutta High Court held that goodwill belongs exclusively to the firm and not to individual partners or their heirs, while rejecting the defendants’ “family mark” defence and finding no triable issues warranting a full trial. Accordingly, the Court restrained the defendants, their servants, agents, and other partners from claiming any legacy in the year of establishment of Fox and Mandal (plaintiff no. 1), i.e., 1896, or passing off their firm or legal services as that of the plaintiffs. The Court also restrained the defendants from using the marks “Fox & Mandal”, “Fox and Mandal” and “F&M”.
The High Court held that the “classic trinity” of reputation, misrepresentation, and damage to goodwill are the basic ingredients to succeed in an action for passing off, and misrepresentation lies at the heart of such an action. A prior user has a superior right and is entitled to protection against any subsequent user of an identical or deceptively similar mark.
The Court also emphasised that goodwill of a partnership is a partnership asset, and only partners have a right to the property of the firm subject to contract; no third party can claim a right in the assets and properties of the firm. Registration is inconsequential in an action for passing off, and the plaintiff can succeed even upon showing likelihood of injury or damage, without proving actual damages.
In a landmark ruling on AI authorship, the Registrar of CopyrightDr. Unnat P Pandit has rejected the application for the artwork “A Recent Entrance to Paradise,” holding that authorship under the Copyright Act, 1957 must vest in a legally recognised person and that conferring authorship on an autonomous AI system is a policy decision reserved for Parliament.
The Copyright Office emphasised that Section 2(d)(vi) of the Copyright Act, 1957 attributes authorship of a computer-generated work to “the person who causes the work to be created,” and this expression must be read as a composite phrase identifying the legally recognised originator or mastermind of the work, and not the immediate computational mechanism through which the final output is generated. Consequently, an AI system lacking legal personality cannot be entered as author, and the person who conceived, configured and initiated the generative process is the statutory author entitled to first ownership under Section 17.
The Registrar of Copyrights held that the artistic work “A Recent Entrance to Paradise” satisfies the limited threshold of originality under Section 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957, as the final composition was not predetermined and was not shown to reproduce any identified pre-existing work, even though it was generated through the autonomous computational processes of the DABUS AI system.
Holding continued use of identical mark after express acknowledgment of proprietor’s rights as evidence of dishonest intention, the Delhi High Court has granted an ex parte ad interim injunction and restrained Patson Foods (Defendants) and all others acting on their behalf, until the next date of hearing, from directly or indirectly selling, marketing or offering for sale the impugned products under the mark “RASANAND SCHEZWAN CHUTNEY” and/or any product bearing the mark “SCHEZWAN CHUTNEY”, or from using any other mark identical or deceptively similar to Capital Foods (Plaintiff’s) registered mark SCHEZWAN CHUTNEY, amounting to infringement and/or passing off.
The Court held that a registered proprietor of a trademark that has acquired secondary significance through sustained, extensive and uninterrupted use over more than a decade is entitled to protection against identical use of the mark on identical goods, even where the alleged infringer appends its own house mark in a smaller font, where such use is likely to cause confusion among members of the public.
The High Court cautioned that continued use of a mark after an express acknowledgment of the proprietor’s rights and an undertaking to cease such use is a strong indicator of dishonest intention and constitutes both infringement under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and passing off. Also, mere addition of a house mark in a smaller font does not dispel the likelihood of confusion where the plaintiff’s mark is used prominently and the goods, trade channels and consumer base are identical.
The Delhi High Court has granted an ex parte ad interim injunction to IDFC First Bank against operators of social media handles such as ‘Settlement Guru’, ‘AHK Tips’, ‘Expert Loan Settlement Advice’, ‘Kunal Kumar Tutorial’, ‘Loan Wala Bishu’, who were holding themselves out as agents capable of procuring loan settlements at steep discounts. The Court treated the Defendants’ use of the registered ‘IDFC FIRST’ mark and its formative variants in video titles, descriptions, tags, graphic overlays and fabricated one-time settlement letters as prima facie infringement under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and a classic case of passing off, since such use was likely to deceive the public into believing that the Defendants’ services were authorised or connected with the Bank.
Staged and selectively edited call recordings portraying the Bank’s recovery agents as engaging in coercive, abusive or criminal conduct were held to be calculated to erode public trust in a regulated entity, and the Court recorded that the continued availability of such content was causing injury to the Bank’s goodwill and reputation that was incapable of being computed in monetary terms. Accordingly, the High Court directed the Defendants 1 to 6, including the John Doe, to take down the impugned URLs and weblinks within 36 hours of receipt of the order, failing which Google LLC (Defendant 8) was directed to lock and suspend the said URLs within 36 hours of intimation.
The Gujarat High Court has ruled that selling duplicate hardware accessories does not constitute copyright infringement under Section 63, and that converting a trademark dispute into a copyright FIR to evade the mandatory Registrar’s opinion and DSP-rank investigation under Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act amounts to an abuse of process. The Court clarified that AirPods, USB cables, power adapters, smartwatches and similar electronic accessories are commercial industrial products and do not fall within the scope of ‘literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work’ under Sections 2(c) and 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957, and hence, selling duplicate versions of such items cannot attract Section 63 of the Copyright Act.
The Court held that an FIR invoking Section 63 of the Copyright Act must explicitly set out how the seized material satisfies the definition of a protected ‘work’ under Section 2 read with Section 13. A generic allegation that goods ‘infringe copyright’ without identifying any specific literary work (such as instruction manuals) or artistic work (such as original packaging artwork) is insufficient to sustain a copyright offence. The High Court also clarified that standard MRP price tags, barcodes, technical model stickers and seal stickers contain purely functional and factual data which cannot originate as an ‘original literary work’ of authorship. Photographs produced by the complainant through an affidavit in reply cannot substitute the recovery memo, and no new factual foundation can be invented during oral arguments.
Moving ahead, the Court emphasised that the mandatory prior opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks and the requirement that search and seizure be conducted only by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police are statutory conditions precedent, not technical formalities. The Court also said that where a complainant deliberately dresses up a trademark dispute as a copyright infringement to bypass statutory safeguards under the Trade Marks Act, the Court will not permit a subsequent ‘conversion’ or fallback to trademark charges. Allowing such indirect achievement of what is directly prohibited would amount to sanctioning a deliberate evasion of statutory mandate.